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ABSTRACT

THE TALE OF TWO NARRATIVES: NATO AS A COLLECTIVE DEFENSE
AND A COLLECTIVE SECURITY INSTITUTION
Anna M. Rulska

Old Dominion University, 2010
Director: Dr. Regina Karp

The goal of this project is to determine NATO's present and future roles as a
collective security organization and as a security alliance. In the past, NATO has dealt
with both objectives under different and changing conditions. This paper argues that
throughout the entirety of its history, NATO worked as both collective security and
collective defense organization. The theoretical assumptions made within the paper are

supported by the analysis of the past behavior of the Alliance in respect to the
relationship between the narrative of collective security and that of collective defense,
and changes within that relationship. Four specific periods will be taken into account:

the creation ofNATO, the Cold War, post-Cold War to September 1 1th, 2001, and post9/1 1 in an effort to draw applicable lessons for the future of the North Atlantic Alliance.
NATO traditionally and historically has been described as and considered to be an

alliance. This project shows, however, that contrary to the common perception, the story
ofNATO is that of two narratives: of an alliance and a collective security arrangement.

While conceptually and theoretically separate, in the case of the North Atlantic Alliance
those two narratives are linked together. Through most of NATO's history, those two
narratives reinforced each other to such an extent that neither would have been possible
and durable without the other.

The combination ofthose two narratives has been dependent on the structure of
the international environment. In the past twenty years, with the change of the

international structure following the end of the Cold War, the relationship between the
two narratives changed as well. For the past two decades, the narrative of collective
security has been dominating the collective defense nature ofNATO.
Ultimately, the future ofNATO is based on both features, intertwined: collective
security and collective defense. As the organization has managed to carry out both
characteristics in the past, it now must find political will and commitment among its
members to continue effectively and successfully its role as a collective security
arrangement and a collective defense organization.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NATO

Security is one of the basic human needs. From the beginning, people sought to
create groups to maximize three factors necessary for survival: sustenance, shelter, and
security. Security, therefore, serves as one ofthe three basic variables pushing all levels
of actors—individuals, groups, states, institutions—to cooperate in some fashion or
another. In response to this trend, the body of literature focusing on security
organizations, be it alliances, coalitions, treaties, or loose institutions, is plentiful.
Scholars have looked at the reasons why states create security organizations; how
they are managed; what sort ofbehavior they display during war and peace times; why
those institutions fall apart; or under what circumstances and how they operate; what sort
of norms they set or how the concept of security culture is established. However, in the
vast body of literature on security organizations, the relationship between the alliances
nature of such institutions and their role as collective security arrangements have not

been directly addressed and analyzed. This project looks at the relationship between the
internal and external security within a group of states, and between the functional and
normative role of security organizations.

The argument of the paper centers on NATO and its continuing, and highly
controversial, transformation in an effort to adapt to the post-Cold War security

environment. The goal of this project is to determine NATO's present and future role as
a collective security organization and effectiveness as an alliance. In the past, NATO has
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dealt with both objectives under different and changing conditions. The theoretical
assumptions made within the paper will be supported by the analysis of the past behavior
of the alliance in respect to the relationship between the narrative of collective security
and that of collective defense, and changes within that relationship. Four specific periods
will be taken into account: the creation ofNATO, the Cold War, post-Cold War to

September 1 1th, 2001, and post-9/1 1 in an effort to draw applicable lessons for the future
of the North Atlantic Alliance.

NATO: DUAL NARRATIVE OF ALLIANCE AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

NATO traditionally and historically has been described as and considered to be an
alliance. This project posits, however, that the story ofNATO is that of two narratives:
of an alliance and a collective security arrangement. While conceptually separate, in the
case of the North Atlantic Alliance those two narratives are linked together. Through

most ofNATO's history, those two narratives reinforced each other to such an extent that
neither would have been possible and durable without the other. The combination of
those two narratives has been dependent on the structure of the international
environment. In the past twenty years, with the change ofthe international structure

following the end of the Cold War, the relationship between the two narratives changed
as well. For the past two decades, the narrative of collective security has been dominating
the collective defense nature of NATO.

The conclusion of this project posits that given the current international
environment, with its challenges and opportunities, NATO cannot function as a pure
alliance or solely as a collective security arrangement. Ultimately, the future ofNATO is

based on both features, intertwined: collective security and collective defense. As the

organization has managed to carry out both characteristics in the past, it now must find
political will and commitment among its members to continue effectively and
successfully in its role as a collective security arrangement and an alliance.
The concept of an alliance makes the basic structure and the goal ofNATO clear
to define. Alliances are created to protect their members against an outside threat. In this
case, the threat was the Soviet Union. In contrast, collective security theoretically defines
an all-inclusive arrangement designed to promote certain values and patterns ofbehavior
within its community. Those values and standards, in turn, serve to provide peace and
stability on the international scale, preventing and discouraging potential defectors from
violating the rules. The goal of collective security arrangement is similar to any other
institution, defined by Stephen Krasner as "rules and norms around which actors'

expectations converge."1 In other words, collective security institutions provide security
benefits to its members, while in the same time punishing those that violate the rules and
norms of behavior through built-in mechanisms.
From its birth, NATO's nature was based on the linkage between the collective

security values and alliance goals. The look into the post-WWII discussions of the
organization's founding fathers clearly shows the undertones ofboth narratives. On one
hand, in the face ofthe tangible threat from the Soviet Union, the United States and
Western European democracies created an alliance to provide an effective defense
against a potential attack. On the other hand, NATO was born as a collective security

1 Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 3.
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extension of the United Nations, based on Roosevelt's belief that powerful states carry
the responsibility to preserve world's peace and stability.
IfNATO is considered only as an alliance, it gives a rather unique example of an

alliance. Many of the organization's decisions and developments over time do not fit the
behavior of an alliance. For example, the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance to the
east in the 1990s, where the functioning of the alliance was jeopardized with increasing
number of members, cannot be explained by pure alliance theory. In a similar fashion,

the Alliance's engagement in Afghanistan does not conform to the goals of an alliance, as
Afghanistan does not present a direct, tangible threat to the European members.
The same can be said if NATO were to be framed only as a collective security

arrangement. Collective security is designed to promote a standard of behavior within a
group of state that ensures peace and stability. How would one explain British and
French acquisition of nuclear weapons with collective security theory? Likewise, the

invocation ofArticle V after the attacks on the United States on September 1 1th, 2001
does not correspond with collective security arrangements characteristics.
Therefore, this exceptional and distinctive nature of the North Atlantic Alliance

provides a fertile ground for joined application of traditionally divergent approaches.
More specifically, in the case ofNATO, there is an interaction of realist understanding of
threat (alliance) combined with neoliberal, institutionalist, and constructivist
understanding of norms (collective security). Some decisions from NATO's past,

consequently, show exactly this equal interaction of alliance and collective security
characteristics. For example, the case ofWest Germany's accession into the Alliance can
be explained by both narratives, and shows how the NATO's nature as an alliance and
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collective security reinforced each other to such an extent that Germany would not be
able to join NATO if the elements ofboth collective security and collective defense were
not satisfied.

Given the change in the current international environment after the fall of the
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the interaction of these two narratives has also

changed. In the past twenty years, NATO's role as a collective security arrangement has
been taking precedence over its character as a collective defense institution. However, as
shown through its history, NATO has never nor can it now function as a pure alliance or
solely as a collective security arrangement. Ultimately, the future ofNATO is based on
both features, intertwined: collective security and an alliance.

What is the pattern of the interaction between the two narratives of collective
security and defense? What are the drivers that dictate the behavior of those narratives?
To answer these questions, this project looks at four different time periods in the history
ofNATO. In each of those time periods, the development of each of the two narratives is
analyzed. The alliance narrative is closely linked with the perception of threat. As the
perception of threat rises, NATO behaves as an alliance designed to prepare and counter
that threat. In the same time, with the high degree of commonality of values among the
member states, NATO acts as a collective security arrangement. Starting with the origins
ofNATO through most of its history, the two narratives of the Transatlantic Alliance
have been reinforcing each other.
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OPERATIONALIZATION of the concepts

The alliance narrative is operationalized through characteristics of alliance
behavior, generally based on the neorealist assumptions and corresponding actions,
namely, maximization ofpower in the face ofpotential danger and agreement of
members on policies and actions to stop that potential threat. Generally, those policies
and decisions address short to medium term goals.

The collective security narrative, on the other hand, is operationalized through
decisions and actions ofNATO that have little or nothing to do with protection of the
members from an outside threat. Rather, they are focused on creating a framework of
norms and rules of behavior within the Alliance and extending that structure to other

neighbors in an attempt to bind them by the same standard of behavior. The goal, then, is
to set a collective security environment that would provide peace and stability in the long
term by awarding benefits of security, based on transparency and trust, which would be
very costly to lose.

PERIODS OF ANALYSIS

The tale ofNATO is divided into four periods, determined by the watershed

events. The first period starts with the end of World War II and ends on June 25th, 1950.
Shortly after the conclusion of WWII, the American, Canadian and European statesmen
began discussing the creation of an organization for the defense of Europe. That first
period, then, looks at the forces and ideas that led to the creation ofNATO and its first
year of existence. By examining those fundamental years ofNATO's existence, one is
able to see the basic principles ofboth alliance behavior and collective security goals
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guiding the birth ofNATO, proving that from its conception, the organization was driven
by and balanced effectively the dual nature of an alliance and collective security
arrangement.

On June 25th, 1950, the Korean War began and drastically increased the
perception of the Soviet threat, while also changing the scope and character ofthat threat
in the eyes of the members. Given this new perception, the environment in which NATO
saw itself operate, and its factors, changed. This essential transformation, therefore,
provides a viable watershed mark. This period ends in December 1991.
On December 12 , 1991, the Belavezha Accords were ratified by the Congress
of Peoples' Deputies of the Russian Federation, effectively denouncing the 1922 treaty
which created the Soviet Union. This event marked the end of the tangible threat which
served as one of the main causes for the birth of NATO. As Richard Holbrooke writes:

"The end of the Cold War, which can best be dated to that symbolic moment at midnight

on December 25l , 1991, when the Soviet flag came down over the Kremlin for the last
time, began an era of change ofhistoric proportions."3

The third period, therefore, begins on December 26th, 1991, initiating the new
international environment without the Soviet Union, the original external threat against
which NATO was created. The end ofthat period is marked by yet another event that
redefines the shape and nature of the international environment in which NATO would

operate in the future, namely the attacks of September 1 1th, 2001.
The attacks in the US on that day did not begin a period of struggle against
intangible, transnational threats. Rather, they highlighted those threats and forced the
2 Belavezha Accords were signed by the leaders of Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian Republics

on December 8th, 1991, dissolving the Soviet Union and creating the Commonwealth ofIndependent States.
3 Richard Holbrooke, "America, a European Power," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (1995): 38.
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Americans and Europeans to put them as a priority in their security agenda. From then
on, NATO would be forced to address the non-state threats and plan for appropriate
capabilities and strategies to protect against the dangers of non-state-centric security
risks.

STRUCTURE AND PURPOSE

The theoretical discussions conducted in this project relate to NATO specifically,
not to all alliances or collective security organizations in history. Therefore, the purpose
of this project is not to create a new theory; rather, the goal here is to look at the history
and development ofNATO over time and apply the lessons learned to its future. This
approach goes a bit against the traditional scholarly works regarding NATO's future in
that it uses the past to speculate what is possible in the future, whereas normally the
discussions are focused on what NATO should be and not on what the Alliance has been
and is.

This project is broken into two large sections: the first one addresses the theory,
while the second one focuses on the empirical evidence to support the theoretical
speculation. Therefore, chapter two provides the literature review regarding the
scholarship on collective security and alliances, and concludes with the most recent
theoretical approach of security communities. Furthermore, chapter two exposes the gaps
in literature to date and positions NATO in the context of the theoretical concepts
discussed.

The theoretical discussion, then, provides an opening for the empirical
substantiation of the theoretical arguments. Chapter three, therefore, presents the story of
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NATO's birth, accounting for the narratives of collective security and the collective
defense, their roles in the creation of the Alliance, and impact on and interaction with
each other in the immediate post-WWII environment. The discussion here is framed in
the context of collective security structure and alliances, with the factual history of

NATO's origins guided by the narratives mentioned above. The first part of this chapter

focuses on dialogues and discourses prior to April 4th, 1949, the date the when the North
Atlantic Treaty was signed. The second section addresses the North Atlantic Treaty itself
and the organizational arrangement of the Alliance. Both sections are structured around
and centered on the concepts of collective security and collective defense, and the
relation of those two narratives to each other.

The factual story ofNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization begins not in April 1949
but rather with the end of the World War II and the need to create a stable and secure

world order. If one were to examine the beginnings of NATO from the perspective of

power, the account appears to be simple. On one hand, there is the Soviet Union and its
conquered European satellites, balanced on the other side ofthe Iron Curtain by the
United States and Western Europe. Each side tries to maintain and maximize its security
in the face of threat from the enemy. However, the narrative of the North Atlantic

Alliance is incomplete without accounting for the more complicated and intangible
normative nature ofthe organization focused on collective security.
NATO's birth was preceded by a long line of sometimes successful and at times
futile attempts at collective security institutions, such as the Concert of Europe, the
League ofNations, and the United Nations. One of the goals of those institutions was to
establish and promote collective security environment, setting certain standards of
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acceptable behavior among nations, conducive to resolving disagreements and disputes
through peaceful means, rather than resorting to conflict. Therefore, it would be foolish
and rather superficial to say that NATO was created only to counteract the power ofthe
Soviets and protect Europe against their aggression. It would be equally imprudent to
assume that NATO's role today is only to show other organizations, regions, and the
world, how the international security environment should operate. Rather, the story of
NATO combines both, the collective security and alliances narratives, as it has been

proven through its past and present, and which certainly applies to its future.
Chapter three, therefore, presents the story of NATO's birth, accounting for the
narratives of collective security and the collective defense, their roles in the creation of

the Alliance, and impact on and interaction with each other in the immediate post-WWII
environment. Furthermore, this chapter shows that at the point ofNATO's creation,
collective security and defense characteristics were reinforcing each other to such an
extent that neither would have been possible and durable without the other. The unique
circumstances based on the combination of commonality of goals and values inside the
Alliance, and the common perception of threat from the outside, allowed and encouraged
the collective security and defense to harmonize. In other words, this specific
combination of collective security and collective defense showed a direct structural
dependency on the international environment.
The fourth chapter follows NATO's history in regards to its nature as an alliance
and a as a collective security organization in the next period of its existence, namely the
Cold War. This chapter begins with the day considered by some to be the effective

beginning ofthe Cold War; namely, June 25th, 1950 which is remembered in history as
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the day when the North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel and invaded South Korea.
As previously indicated, the beginning ofthe Korean War was a watershed moment in
the history ofNATO as well. Given the change in the external environment, in June
1950, the Alliance was faced with a more immediate sense of threat from the side of
communism, threat that carried potentially more wide-spread and heavy consequence
than thought before. Accordingly, NATO would have to prepare to respond to this new
scope ofpotential threat. At this point, the story of the East-West conflict extended from
Europe to Asia. The Soviet Union and China appeared much stronger to the West, and
the potential of communist expansion in the Asian continent presented a vital threat to the
US and European security.
The interaction between the collective security and defense narratives in this

period support the patterns shown in the previous period, centered on NATO's creation.
The case of Germany's accession into the Alliance demonstrates that those two narratives
are still running parallel and reinforcing each other. Furthermore, they are as imperative
for each other's existence as was the case with the origins ofNATO. In addition, both of
the narratives still show high degree of dependency on the structural environment. The
increased perception of threat coming out of the Soviet Union in the wake of the Korean
War pushed the alliance narrative. The symptom or sign ofthat push was Germany's
joining.

In the same time, despite concerns from Great Britain and France about German
propensity for conflict, Germany was incorporated into the Alliance as a democratic state.
From the position of other allies, Germany would be from now on kept in check as well
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and socialized to behave according to the internal security standards of the Alliance—
here the narrative of collective security is clearly displayed.
The second case discussed in this chapter, NATO's policy regarding nuclear

capabilities, and the long-stretched process of disagreements and negotiations, was
guided not by the incompatibility of goals and values, but rather by the divergent
perceptions ofwhat is the best policy for the European members given the Soviet threat.
Therefore, this case shows that despite protracted periods of discord, the alliance and
collective security natures ofNATO remained untouched. Even the French withdrawal
from the command structure of the organization did not leave any long term negative
effects. France remained in the political structures ofNATO, was still covered under
NATO's umbrella in terms of external security, and in 2009 returned into the command
structure.

The two cases chosen for this time period represent the pattern of cohesion and

agreement among the NATO allies, interrupted by the dissonance and disagreements over
means but not goals—the goals still remained those of internal and external security. The
example of West German accession into the Alliance and the MLF story show the
organization in its time of cooperation, albeit characterized by heated discussion and
negotiations. In both cases, it is important to mention the structural environment. In
1955, the perception of threat coming from the Soviet Union was heightened, pushing for
a more cohesive combination of collective security and defense.

On the other hand, during the MLF negotiations, the Cold War was going through
the period of détente and changed nature of cooperation between the West and the East.
For the Europeans, this meant a perception of decreased threat. Within the Transatlantic
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Alliance at that time, there was a divergence of opinions as to the means that the internal
and external security can be accomplished, but not the divergence of opinions as to the
need for those types of security. Therefore, despite heated discussions and disagreements
on means, alliance and collective security progressed, albeit at a slower pace.

In chapter five, the narratives of collective security and collective defense exit the
Cold War environment and enter the decade of uncertainty regarding the past enemies
and future allies. In this decade, the rationality and utility ofNATO's existence will be

questioned, and the Alliance emerges from this barrage with an expanded number of
members and undefined set of goals. The second part of NATO's nature, however, the

collective security component, will become clearer and will overshadow the alliance
character, redefining the organization's role in Europe. In regards to the international
environment, another set of unknowns emerges. The political fate of Central and Eastern

Europe remains to be determined; Russia will slowly embark on the path towards illiberal
democracy, and a set of intangible transnational threats will come to the forefront of
decision making regarding NATO's strategy for the future.

Again here, the structural changes are important to emphasize. The perception of
threat changes in the post-Cold War environment. Not only is the threat intangible, in
contrast to the Cold War period when the Soviet Russia was the clear and predictable

enemy, but that threat is also hard to understand and define. After 1991, the threat
acquires a hybrid nature, combining many immeasurable elements of transnational
nature. Subsequently, the scope of internal and external security goals changes as well
into the area of basic human security.
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With this changing structure, we also begin to see a different pattern ofbehavior
between the narratives of collective security and collective defense. In that sense, we see
the reinforcement of the structure of the international environment as the driver in that

relationship. In this period, collective security narrative starts to play a more integral role
over the collective alliance element. This change is a direct result of the inability to pin
down, define, and measure the new concept of threat. Rather, the threat becomes a
multifaceted set of threats which needs to be address by multifaceted capabilities and
structures.

Despite all the knowns and unknowns, to use the words or Robert McNamara, one
thing became clear in this first post-Cold War decade ofNATO's existence; namely, that
the role ofNATO as a collective security arrangement not only overshadowed its
function as an alliance, but effectively left it in the dust. One of the major and most
detrimental developments ofNATO in that period, enlargement of the organization to
Central and Eastern Europe, had very little to do with its nature as an alliance and
everything to do with its character as a collective security. While the political shape and
stability of Russia remained uncertain, the push for inclusion of Central and Eastern
European region in the Alliance, a process which continues still today, had as its
fundament the spread ofnorms of peaceful behavior based on the principles of
democracy at its heart.

The last empirical section, chapter six, looks at NATO in the post-2001
environment. As discussed earlier, the international environment in this most recent

decade is characterized by more intangible, transnational threats and issues, quite
different than the nature of threats during the Cold War and the immediate post-Cold War
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decade. In that respect, NATO must readjust its scope, goals and means to meet those
new threats. The year 2001, marked by the 9/1 1 attacks on the United States, serves as
the watershed moment. For the first time in the history of NATO, the Article V was
evoked in defense of the United States.

Given the trends of the collective security and collective defense narratives

prevalent in the 1990s, the natural assumption would have been that NATO continues to
absorb more and more collective security characteristics at the expense of the alliance
narrative. While that is the case in reference to the Alliance's engagement in

Afghanistan, the out-of-area NATO operation under the auspices of the UN, the Allies
themselves have an increasingly difficult time agreeing on the Alliance's goals and
means in Afghanistan. Furthermore, there is an increasing discord regarding the role of
NATO in European and international security. Therefore, while the members seem to
appreciate the idea ofNATO as a collective security organization, spreading its collective
security principles outside of Europe, they are not willing to provide practical and
financial commitment to realize that noble idea.

In chapter six, NATO's involvement in Afghanistan serves as the framework for
analysis of its dual nature as an alliance and a collective security organization. Going
back to the elements used in the previous chapters, we look at the international
environment, internally and externally first. Internally, the expansion ofNATO in
Europe in continuing, encompassing more and more democratic states who see NATO as
an effective vehicle for security. Externally, however, the international system is still
operating in the structure ofunipolarity, with the US at the helm, albeit the power of the
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US is slowly declining. Furthermore, the external threats in this environment remain
intangible and hard to define, and encompass both state as well as transnational threats.
In this environment, what is happening with the narratives of collective security
and collective defense in the framework of NATO? The pattern of development from the
last decade of the twentieth century, discussed in the previous chapter, continues.

NATO's role as a collective security arrangement, or more as a security community for
Europe, grows, whereas its role as an alliance remains in decline. NATO members have
an increasingly difficult time agreeing on what constitutes an external threat, how to deal
with it, and who is going to pay for the capabilities to deal with that threat.
The involvement of the organization in Afghanistan shows a few possible
directions for the Alliance in the future: Afghanistan's issues with political instability,

terrorism, and opium trade present threats to Europe and, as such, belong in the realm of
NATO's responsibilities, despite the fact that Afghanistan is outside ofthe European
area. If that is the case, then it is clear that the nature and scope of threats are changing

and NATO is responding to that change. The second direction is that ofNATO as a
collective security organization—in this case, NATO is broadening its scope and area of
operations to Afghanistan. In this scenario, Afghanistan poses a threat to the broader
international community and needs to be addressed as a practical and moral obligation.
As a prolonged effort which is in its eight year now, Afghanistan serves as a test case for
NATO members' ability to come to agreements on policies and carry those policies
effectively. The jury is still out on the success of NATO's mission in Afghanistan, and in
a similar fashion, on the role of NATO in European and international security.
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Having said that, the fact that despite all the disagreements and problems NATO
remains a key security institution in Europe, still bringing together the Transatlantic
partners, shows that the utility ofNATO has not diminished. However, the picture is not
quite that rosy. On the other hand, NATO has sustained a significant loss of authority in
the eyes of the members' domestic audiences and external partners, significantly
undermining the practical effectiveness of the Alliance in the international environment
and its ability to spread its norms of democratic peace and stability. All allies seemed to
agree that the future of the alliance rested, in large part, on the success ofthe mission in
Afghanistan.

However, NATO has moved slowly to deal with the problems in Afghanistan,
contrary to its public statements on the importance of the mission in Afghanistan.
Furthermore, rather than emphasize the connective nature of collective security and
alliance, which would be beneficial to both NATO and Afghanistan, NATO members
continue to disagree on the means and goals of the organization, to the detriment ofboth,
the Alliance's relevance and purpose, as well as its effectiveness.

Chapter seven, finally, provides the summary ofthe main arguments made
throughout this project and concludes with speculation on the future shape and role of
NATO, given its most recent development regarding transformation and extension of
partnership encompassing many states, other external international organizations, and
issues. Furthermore, the main thesis of this project, namely that NATO throughout its
history has displayed characteristics of an alliance and a collective security institutions;
and secondly, that ifNATO wants to remain relevant and effective for the external and
internal security of the Transatlantic area, it must continue its development and
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integration in the direction of collective security organization, while maintaining the
functional structure of the alliance, will be reinforced again.
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CHAPTER II

THEORY OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE
RECONSIDERED

As the meaning andpurpose ofpower begins to shift,
so, too, does the meaning andpurpose ofsecurity.
Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 1998

INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides the theoretical framework of alliance and collective security
concepts, outlining the interaction of those two ideas, and leading into the discussion of
security communities. The first section presents a general introduction into and review of
literature on alliances and collective security theories. Section two discusses NATO's

dual nature as an alliance and a collective security arrangement as presented in the
literature to date. The third part of this chapter, in turn, introduces in detail the concept of
security communities, which, in the context of this paper, is used as the beginning and
final point for collective security institutions, and, consequently as a basis for explaining
NATO as a combination of a collective security institution and an alliance.

Subsequently, this chapter exposes the gaps in the literature to date addressing NATO in
this dual light and the ways in which this research fills in some of those gaps.
The focal approach of this chapter, namely the security communities, begs an
explanation. The concept of security communities, as explored by Van Wagenen,
Deutsch, Adler, and Barnett mainly, indirectly brings together the elements of alliances
1 Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, 3.
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and collective security, and with that, serves as the theoretical framework that best
addresses and explains this dual nature ofNATO. Especially the most recent approach to
security communities developed by Adler and Barnett account for the fundamentals of
NATO's creation and the direction in which the Alliance is going today. However, the

literature on security communities does not talk about the interaction of those two
elements of alliances and collective security, and most importantly their exclusive nature

as represented by the literature to date. Furthermore, Alder and Barnett do not focus on
tracing this particular type ofNATO's development through the history of the Alliance.
This project, therefore, fills in those two particular gaps.
Also, one must ask: if NATO through its history displayed the characteristics of
both a collective security arrangement and an alliance, why has its dual character not
been recognized in the theoretical and practical literature on the Alliance? The answer
that comes to mind is simple: the two theoretical concepts, collective security and
alliances, traditionally have been treated as distinctly separate, and oftentimes as
mutually exclusive. This chapter directly addresses the distinct groups of scholars who
treated those two concepts as mutually exclusive and inclusive of each other.
The structure of this chapter follows the logical path of theoretical development in

terms of chronology, as well as causality. The discussion of alliances begins and focuses
on neorealism, followed by the neoliberal institutionalism. Chronologically,
neoliberalism developed in the footsteps of neorealism and was based on the need to
explain cooperative trends in the international community which neorealism was not
addressing. The section on security communities, in turn, comes directly after the
discussion on NATO in the context of neorealism and neoliberalism, again following the
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chronological path of theory development. The concept of security communities
combines institutionalism and constructivism. Constructivism, a post-positivist theory,

emerged to fill in the gaps in the understanding of the international system, its structures
and actors left open by the positivist theories.

ALLIANCES AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Before we delve too far into the theories of alliances and collective security, we

need to understand the application and practical value of such an approach to NATO and
its future. Traditionally and generally, since its conception, NATO has been seen and
analyzed as an alliance, and, consequently, approached through the lens of the realist
school of thought. However, 'traditionally' and 'generally' do not always mean right or
complete. In the minds ofthe founding fathers of NATO, and as noted in the chapter
three addressing the first years of the Alliance, the organization was created as an alliance
against the threat of the Soviet Union and as a collective security arrangement designed
to uphold and promote the Western values of democracy and capitalism. Similarly, in the
past decade, there has been a noticeable return among scholars and practitioners to
discussing NATO's future, if there is to be one, in the framework of collective security,
rather than a pure alliance.

Although rather infrequently, over the timeline ofNATO's existence, the
politicians involved in the issues of security and defense, and theoreticians alike,
perceived NATO as both: an alliance and a creator of an international security
environment. To mention just a few: in 1954, the first Secretary General ofNATO, Lord
Hastings Lionel Ismay referred to the birth ofthe Alliance in those words: "In signing
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the Treaty, twelve independent sovereign states—later to be joined by others—undertook
pledges which called for immediate and continuous collective action, not only in the

military, but also in the political, economic and social fields."2
After the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the external threat against
which NATO as an alliance was created, Warren Christopher, the US Secretary of State
under President Clinton, saw the central goal of NATO and the US security policy as a

"help to extend to all of Europe the benefits and obligations ofthe same liberal trading

and collective security order that have been pillars of strength for the West."3 In 1995,
Richard Holbrooke, the former US Ambassador to the UN, wrote that "NATO's core

purpose of collective defense remains, but new goals and programs have been added.
Collective crisis management, out-of-area force projection, and the encouragement of
stability to the east. . . have been undertaken. Static forces. . . have been turned into. . .

flexible multinational corps designed to respond to a different, less stable world."4 In
1998, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright positioned NATO as "the broader concept of
the defense of our common interests."5
Holbrooke, along with many other politicians and theorists, puts NATO in the
context of historical developments designed to build security architecture for Europe:
1815 Congress of Vienna; 1919 Versailles Treaty; and the United Nations. However, as

he aptly points out, in 1947 "the most successful peacetime collective security system in
history, centered around the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO, Atlantic

2 Hastings Lionel Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years 1949—1954 (Paris: NATO, 1954), ix.
3 Holbrooke, 40.

4 Ibid., 42-43.
5 Steven Erlanger, "US to NATO: Widen Purpose to Fight Terror," New York Times, December 7,
1998.
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partnership—and American leadership."6 Therefore, it is clear that even if theorists
generally had a hard time classifying NATO as a collective security arrangement,
politicians already saw those traits in the organization from its beginning in 1949.
On the side of the theoretical discussion on NATO, Andrew Bennett and Joseph

Lepgold provide a comprehensive summary ofrealist, liberal and institutional approaches
to collective security and alliances, using the examples of the Concert of Europe, the
League ofNations and the United Nations as collective security arrangements.
However, they effectively exclude NATO from that club, mentioning briefly that NATO
follows in the tradition of those organizations but it is, effectively and practically, an
alliance.

To follow with wide and comprehensive works on the subject, Emanuel Adler and
Michael Barnett wrote in 1998: "Whereas once security meant military security, now

states are identifying 'new' security issues that revolve around economic, environmental,
and social welfare concerns and have ceased to concern themselves with military threats

from others within the community."8 Their premise is that given the change in threat, the
security arrangements that were created originally against a state-centered, tangible threat
have a necessity to shift their nature to accommodate the intangible, transnational threats
for which pure military scope is not sufficient.
This first section of chapter two, therefore, frames the ideas presented in this
project in a larger body of literature on alliances and collective security specifically, in an
attempt to position this paper in the existing research and show how it complements the
6 Holbrooke, 39.

7 See Andrew Bennett and Joseph Lepgold, "Reinventing Collective Security after the Cold War
and Gulf Conflict," Political Science Quarterly 108, no. 2 (1993): 213-237.

8 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Security Communities (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1998), 5.
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field and fills in the potential gaps. While there is somewhat of a disagreement among
scholars whether alliances and collective security belong together, this project treats

alliances and collective security as complementary fields, based on identification of
common goals, assumption, and means between those two concepts.
From the first look it becomes clear that the most dominant approach to both

collective security and alliances are the positivist theories, narrowed down by the
neoliberal institutionalism in case of collective security and neorealist school of thought
in reference to alliances. However, while the approaches to alliances remained relatively
unchanged, the scholarship on collective security has been recently undergoing
significant developments in the direction ofpost-positivist theories, namely culturalism,
constructivism and normative theories. Furthermore, in addition to international relations

theories, the academics have been incorporating elements of comparative theories such as
theories of regionalism and integration to effectively explain the creation of security
organizations and communities.
The fields within the literature on alliances that have been addressed to date

include: alliance formation, alliance configuration/polarization, effects of alliances on
military conflict, connections between alliances and trade, and the economics of

alliances.9 Most notably, however, the potential current or future merger between
alliances and collective security is not addressed at all. Similarly, the post-positivist
approach to the concept of alliances is touched upon very peripherally, mostly in the
literature on institutions and the norms built by those institutions. However, security

9 Christopher Sprecher and Volker Krause, "Alliances, Armed Conflict, and Cooperation:
Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Evidence," Journal ofPeace Research 43, no. 4 (2006): 363.
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institutions are very different in nature, function, and role from the larger body of
institutions and deserve separate consideration.

As is outlined in this chapter, the basic difference in the traditional understanding
of collective security and alliances concerns the reason for their creation—in other words,
their goal. Collective security arrangements are created to establish the internal norm of
behavior within that arrangement that would create and maintain peace and stability.
Alliances, on the other hand, are arrangements with a goal of protecting their members
from an external threat.

As are the cases with both fields of research, in reference to the relationship
between collective security and alliances, more recent works have been showing a

complementary relationship between the two, rather than separate concepts as has been
the case in the traditional approaches. An alternative explanation of the relationship
between collective security and alliances maintains that collective defense arrangements

can progress into collective security institutions. This is especially true in some recent
literature regarding North Atlantic Treaty Organization, although such approaches are
very rare and limited.

This section begins with the general scope of alliances and collective security
places in the scholarly field, followed by the review of specific concepts related to both.
The section outlining the current research focusing on the relationship of those two
concepts follows. This comprehensive overview of research to date, including definitions
and operationalization ofthe terms and concepts used here, then, serves as basis for the
theoretical approach based on security communities in respect to NATO.
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THE FRAMEWORK OF ALLIANCES

The scholarship on alliances focuses on formation, types, performance, and
alliance dynamics. In its most generic, this literature is about cooperation between states
in the security field. More specifically, it tackles the issue of states responses to the
imbalances ofpower they encounter in pursuit of their interests. Alliances are largely
seen as more or less effective answers to states' inherent inability to balance on their own

a superior opposing power. The authors active in the field of alliance theories talk about
patterns of motivations, goals, strategies, resources, and structures which determine and
reinforce the cooperative behavior ofthe alliance members. The existing literature on
alliances shows that the discussion of the alliance management, cohesion, or functioning

does not incorporate much of the interaction between the concepts of alliances and
collective security, and the debate ofnormative factors of security alliances is peripheral
at best.10

10 See: Weitsman, Patricia. Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of War, Weapons ofPeace.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004. Snyder, Glenn. Alliance Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1997. Holsti, Ole, Terrence Hopmann, and John Sullivan. Unity andDisintegration in International
Alliances: Comparative Studies. New York: Wiley, 1973. Walt, Stephen. "Alliance Formation and the
Balance of World Power." International Security 9, no. 4 (1985): 3-43. Walt, Stephen. The Origins of
Alliances. New York: Cornell University Press, 1987. Duffield, John. "NATO's Functions after the Cold
War." Political Science Quarterly 109, no. 5 (1994/1995): 763-787. Duffield, John. "What Are
International Institutions?" International Studies Review 9, no. 1 (2007): 1-22. McDonald, Brooke, and
Richard Rosecrance."Alliance and Structural Balance in the International System: A Reinterpretation."

Journal of Conflict Resolution 29, no. 1 (1985): 57-82. Smith, Alastair. "Alliance Formation and War."
International Studies Quarterly 39, no. 1 (1985): 405-425. Levy, Jack. "Alliance Formation and War
Behavior: An Analysis of the Great Powers, 1495-1975." Journal ofConflict Resolution 25, no. 4 (1981):
581-613. Leeds, Brett, Andrew Long, and Sara Mitchell. "Reevaluating Alliance Reliability: Specific

Threats, Specific Promises." Journal ofConflict Resolution 44, no. 5 (2000): 686-699. Schweller, Randall.
"Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In." International Security 19, no. 1 (1994):
72-107. Schweller, Randall. "New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, Not Refuting Waltz's

Balancing Proposition." American Political Science Review 91 , no. 4 (1997): 927-930. Christensen,
Thomas, and Jack Snyder. "Progressive Research on Degenerate Alliances." American Political Science
Review 91, no. 4 (1997): 919-922. Jervis, Robert. "Security Regimes." International Organization 36, no. 2
(1982): 375-378. Schimmelfennig, Frank. "NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation." Security
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As this work deals mainly with alliances, looking inside and outside of the black

box of this particular security organization, it is only fitting to explain in details what the
concept of alliances means. Going back 2300 years, Indian philosopher Kautilya talked
about alliances as one of six types of behavior of a state in relation to other states, later

reiterated by Machiavelli.11 Although the recognition of importance of alliances goes far
back, the academic literature on alliances can be more characterized by the lack of

agreement, rather than consensus and coherence.
First, the definition of an alliance proves to be a tricky concept. In Nations in
Alliance, the first modern comprehensive study of alliances, George Liska says

"[a]lliances merely formalize alignments based on interests or coercion, but such
formalizations have been more important for the "free world" and its leader than for the

adversary."12 This is as far as he goes in providing a definition of an alliance. George
Modelski criticized this omission in a review of Liska' s book: "We learn here a great
deal about how to make alliances work—for instance there is a most stimulating
discussion of intra-alliance consultations and restraints. But paradoxically, we learn very
little about what alliances in fact are; there is in this book surprisingly little general

information about these arrangements."13 In contrast, Modelski described alliances as
"common defense," with a premise that "defense is use of military power."14

Studies 8, no. 2/3 (1998): 198-234. Anderson, Jeffrey, John Dcenberry, and Thomas Risse-Kappen. The End
ofthe West?: Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008.

1 ' Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, 1 .
12 George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits ofInterdependence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1962), 3.

13 George Modelski, "The Study of Alliances: A Review," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 7,
no. 4 (1963): 769.

14 Modelski, 771.
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Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, the authors of the second attempt at a
methodological study of alliances, point out that in many cases the terms alliance,
alignment, coalition, pact, bloc, "defensive pact," and "neutrality and nonaggression

pact" are used interchangeably.15 They settle on defining an alliance as "a formal
agreement between two or more nations to collaborate on national security issues."1 The
third and last major comprehensive work on alliances, Stephen Walt's The Origins of
Alliances, identifies an alliance as "a formal or informal relationship of security

cooperation between two or more sovereign states."17
In the more recent years, Glenn Snyder combined the concept of alignments with
alliances. He described alignments as "expectations of states about whether they will be

supported or opposed by other states in future interactions."18 Snyder, then, categorizes
alliances as "simply one of the behavioral means to create or strengthen alignments.
Thus alliances are a subset of alignments—those that arise from or are formalized by an

explicit agreement, usually in the form of a treaty. The formalization adds elements of
specificity, legal and moral obligation, and reciprocity that are usually lacking in informal

alignments."19 In 2004, Patricia Weitsman, in Dangerous Alliances, another attempt to
comprehensively look at alliances and address gaps in the literature to date, defines
alliances as "bilateral or multilateral agreements to provide some element of security to

the signatories."20

15 Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, 3.
16 Ibid., 4.

17 Walt, The Origins ofAlliances, 1.
18 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 6.
19 Ibid., 8.
20 Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances, 27.

In his review of literature on alliances, Michael Ward provides a very useful
combination of characteristics that define alliances. Namely, he centers the definition of
alliances on four features:

1 . a collaborative relationship between at least two nation-states;

2. (potential) aggregation of military forces;
3. commonality ofnational security interests, typically viewed via a mutually
perceived threat;
4. belief in the value of collective over individual action.

The definition of alliances, then, includes both formal and less explicit security

arrangements, including, as outlined by Singer and Small in their composition of the
Correlates of War Project:
1 . non-national security arrangements;

2. neutrality pacts entailing non-intervention against signatories;
3. entente which requires mutual consultation should inter-state hostilities
involving co-signatories arise;

4. mutual defense pacts which obligate nations to militarily assist an ally if it is

attacked by others.22
Given this broad scope of formal and informal definitions of alliances, it is clear
that the academic community is yet to agree on one uniform definition of an alliance.
However, the discussion of the concept itself provided above forms a solid basis for
21 Michael Ward, Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics, Monograph Series in WorldAffairs 19
(Denver: University of Denver Press, 1982), 5.

22 J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "Formal Alliances, 1815-1939: A Quantitative Description,'
Journal ofPeace Research 3, no.l (1966): 1-31. See also: "National Alliance Commitments and War
Involvement," Peace Research Society Papers 5 (1966): 109-150; "The Composition and Status Ordering
of the International System, 1815-1940," World Politics 18 (1966): 236-282; and The Wages of War, 18161965: A Statistical Handbook (New York: Wiley, 1972).
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understanding alliances for the purpose of this project, as well as conceptualizing the
interactions among the members of this type of security organization, as well as the
institutions and the outside environment. The next concept addressed here, therefore, is
the alliance formation presented in the next section.

It is important to address the literature on alliance formation in the context of
NATO, as the first case study in this project attempts to determine what elements

impacted the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance. For this purpose, it is pertinent to
understand the theoretical reasons for alliance creation. The explanations of alliances

formation fall into two groups: external environment reasons and domestic, internal
factors. The first group focuses on the structure of the international system and the type
and level of threat—or its perception. The second group emphasizes the types of

domestic systems more and less favorable to creating alliances and the power of national
interests. While there is an ample body of literature regarding alliance formation, no

single analytical framework exists.23 However, one would be hard pressed to find an
explanation for alliance formation that does not fit within the neorealist school of
thought. Furthermore, the fundamental reasons for alliance formation, in turn, provide
the rationale for the internal functioning of alliances.
The first most prominent causal basis for states' alignments fitting in the first

group outlines in earlier is the balance ofpower theory.24 Within this approach, the
reasons for alliance formation are determined by the external environment, namely the

Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances, 1 1 .

24 For the comprehensive essay on theoretical, practical, normative, conceptual, and descriptive
nuances of balance ofpower theory, see Ernst Haas, "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, and
Propaganda," World Politics 5, no. 4 (1953): 442-477.
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number and power of state actors in the international system.25 In Nations in Alliance,
George Liska says: "In theory, the relation of alliances to the balance ofpower is simple
enough. Put affirmatively, states enter into alliances with one another in order to
supplement each other's capability. Put negatively, an alliance is a means of reducing the
impact of antagonistic power, perceived as pressure, which threatens one's

independence."26 Edvard V. Gulick argues that the perceived imbalance ofpower within
the international system gives rise to creation of alliances.27
To show a slightly different approach to the issue, Organski writes: "Alliances

are formed when the balance ofpower is threatened."28 In other words, merely the
potential of a power imbalance, rather than the perception or existence of one, may push
states to ally.

Hans Morgenthau sees alliances as a symptom of the balance ofpower in the
international system: "The historically most important manifestation of the balance of
power. . . is to be found not in the equilibrium of two isolated nations but in the relations

between one nation or alliance ofnations and another alliance."29 In his understanding,
therefore, alliances are a vehicle through which the balance of power in the international

system is carried out. He further argues that alliances and coalitions are a function of the
John Duffield, "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Alliance Theory," in Bruce Bueno de
Mesquita and Ngaire Woods, ed., Explaining International Relations Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996), 339.

26 Liska, 26. See also: Sven Groennings, E.W. Kelley, and Michael Leiserson, eds., The Study of
Coalitions Behavior: Theoretical Perspectivesfrom Four Continents (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and
Winston, 1970) and Inis Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House,
1962).

27 Edvard V. Gulick, Europe 's Classical Balance ofPower: A Case History ofthe Theory and
Practice ofOne ofthe Great Concepts ofEuropean Statecraft (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955), 6162.

28 A.F.K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1968), 277.
29 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Strugglefor Power and Peace (New York:
Knopf, 1967), 175.
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balance ofpower guiding a multi-state international system.30 Kupchan and Kupchan
point to two primary venues through which states can increase and maintain their
security, namely "domestic mobilization" and "formation of temporary alliances."

To

sum up in the words of Kenneth Waltz: "If balance ofpower politics are pursued

earnestly, the eventual result will be two nations or two alliances."32 Alliances, therefore,
in the neorealist theory, are an essential element of balance ofpower.
The second group of authors specializing in alliance literature generally maintains
that alliances are born in response to a threat or a state's perception of threat. Walt
pointed out that alliances are not created in response to power, but rather to prevent and

protect against a threat to that state.33 He defined this causal link in more specific terms
two years later in his seminal work The Origins ofAlliances. There, he writes:

States form alliances primarily to balance against threats. ... In anarchy,
states form alliances to protect themselves. Their conduct is determined
by the threats they perceive, and the power of others is merely one element
in their calculations (albeit an important one). The power of other states
can be either a liability or an asset, depending on where it is located, what
it can do, and how it is used. By incorporating the other factors that create
threats to national sovereignty, balance ofthreat theory provides a better
explanation of alliance formation than does balance ofpower theory.

30 Ibid.

31 Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of
Europe," International Security 16, no. 1 (1991): 117.

32 Kenneth Waltz, "International Structure, National Force, and the Balance of Power," Journal of

International Affairs 21, no. 2 (1967); 217.

33 Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," 4.
34 Walt, The Origins ofAlliances, vi-viii.
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With his theory, Walt set up the predominant framework for nature analysis of alliance
formation.

Glenn Snyder and Randall Schweller represent the rationalist approach to alliance
formation. Schweller, in "Bandwagoning for Profit," shows that bandwagoning and
balancing are not only motivated by the need of states to achieve greater security, but also
"balancing is driven by the desire to avoid losses; bandwagoning by the opportunity for

gain."35 Accounting for gains and losses, the author uses the basic cost-benefit analysis
of the rationalist approach, building onto the realist theories of alliance formation.
Glenn Snyder, on the other hand, talks about capability aggregation where the
central value of alliances lies in the "enhanced deterrent from external attack as well as

the greater capability to defend oneself."36 He goes on to outline other costs and benefits
the allies might pay and receive from one another, not necessarily related to security,
again expanding on the realist approach. "[A]Hies may give each other "side payments"
on matter unrelated to their mutual defense commitments, such as free hand in some

colonial venture or a promise to support the partner diplomatically in realizing interests in

conflict with a third party."37 In addition, Snyder lists perception costs of alliances:
"ideologically similar states gain satisfaction by creating alliances; for adversaries,
alliances oftheir opponents mean psychological costs. Furthermore, in terms of domestic

factors, external alliances can strengthen or weaken the domestic regimes in power."38

Schweller, 74.

Snyder, Alliance Politics, 44.
Ibid.

Ibid., 45.
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Slightly different take on alliance formation is introduced by Patricia Weitsman in

what she calls an "alliance paradox."39 While the main goal of alliances is to increase the
security of its members, sometimes states will enter into alliances with their enemies in
order to either face an external threat or to contain each other—the old fashioned wisdom

of "keeping your friends close and enemies closer." A fitting example of such an alliance
was the Concert of Europe designed by Great Britain at the end ofNapoleonic Wars and
after the fall of France. One of the goals of the Congress System, if not the most
important one, was to contain France, Austro-Hungarian Empire, Russia and Prussia—a
group ofnatural enemies who warred each other for most of their existence as sovereign
states—and establish an institution where they would keep one another in check.

Following the reasons for why states may choose to form alliances, the questions
of the size of alliances comes to mind. This question especially brings up to light the

recent expansions ofNATO and their effect on the effectiveness and overall functioning
of the Alliance. William Riker, in Theory ofPolitical Coalition, talks about the "size

principle."40 In the frame of "?-person, zero-sum games in which side payments are
permitted and for which players are assumed to be rational and possess complete

information,"41 states will form minimal winning coalitions only. Minimal winning
coalitions are those which "will no longer win were any member to withdraw from or fail

to join the coalition."42 Using the rationalist explanation, "the primary motivating reason
for this is that member will seek to maximize the size of the individual payoffs; the fewer

the number of members among which the payoffs must be shared, the larger they will
39 Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances, 2.
40 William Riker, Theory ofPolitical Coalition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), 3.
41 Ward, 24.
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be."43 It is also important to account for the costs of implementing an alliance. Siverson
and McCarty posit that states will form alliances larger than minimum required in order

to spread the costs of alliance formation.44 However, they do not address the later stages
of alliances in terms of number of members.

This section outlined the major theoretical approaches which explain the reasons

for alliance formation, including balance of power, balance of threat, and extending the
realist theories to rationalism. The inquiry ofwhy states enter into alliance, then, begs to
question with whom one should ally and how those particular security institutions
operate. The next section explores the way in which states choose their partners, be it
major, medium or small powers.
One of the fundamental concepts introduced in this project is the role of the

alliances. Hence, the questions ofhow a state chooses its security partners and what sorts
ofpartners are chosen must be addressed. While so far the major discourse on the
concept of alliances and alliance formation was dominated by the realist and neorealist
approaches, the choice ofpartners in alliances is explained mainly by cultural factors and
commonalities. And here again, the theoretical discussion sets the stage for later
accounts of NATO's choices of members at the moment of its creation, as well as in the
later years.

The choice ofpartners depends, first and foremost, on the degree of commonality
of security interests, and the type and strengths ofdangers which the potential memberstates face. Weaker states will align with stronger once they find themselves in face of
perceived threats; states that do not posses significant military capability will enter into
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
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collaborative arrangements with those that do. New states, underdeveloped, and

developing nations tend to avoid entering into alliances.45 On the other hand, "politically
and economically stable nations are more likely to join alliances than are unstable
ones."46
More in tune with neorealism, Rothstein addressed the behavior of small powers

in alliances, as opposed to major powers. In his book, Rothstein posits that generally
small powers are less likely to enter into alliances, because ofunprofitable distribution of
costs and benefits. On the other hand, great powers were likely to court small powers in
an effort to ally with them only in cases where the outbreak of war was imminent.
Hans Morgenthau talks about ideological solidarity that binds states together. In
other words, states will enter into alliances with other states who share similar political

and cultural traits.48 Walt defines ideological solidarity as "a tendency for states with
similar internal traits to prefer alignment with one another to alignment with states whose

domestic characteristics are different."49 Russett proposes that social, political and
cultural similarities among nations lead to comparable policies and positions in the

international system, and, therefore, will entice actors to align.50 Gulick extends the
commonalities of goals and interests to territorial proximity, arguing that effective

45 Robert Good, "State Building as a Determinant of Foreign Policy in the New States," in
Lawrence Martin, ed., Neutralism and Nonalignment: The New States in WorldAffairs (New York:
Praeger, 1962), 8-9.

46 Henry Teune and Sig Synnestvedt, "Measuring International Alignment," Orbis 9 (Spring,
1965): 189.

47 See Robert Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press,
1968).

48 See Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations.
49 Walt, The Origins ofAlliances, 181.
50 Bruce Russett. "Components of an Operational Theory of Alliance Formation," Journal of
Conflict Resolution 12 (September, 1968): 258.
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security arrangements, including alliances, happen within the same region.

But then

again, as Fedder states, "ideology is at best inadequate in explaining why or how an
alliance comes into existence."

Here again, it is clear that in a similar fashion to the lack of agreement on the
definition of alliances, the reasons for why states enter into such arrangements spread
over a wide range. However, the reasoning of states can be boiled down to one simple
equation: as Liska aptly points out "[a]lliances are formed primarily for security rather

than out of sense of community."53 And as Morgenthau qualified it: "Community of
interests is a necessary but not sufficient condition for alliance."
From the wide range ofperspectives presented here, it becomes apparent that the
authors in the field of security do not provide any one unified approach to the question of
alliance formation. While this particular field ofresearch on alliances is dominated by
neorealism, other theories, including culturalism, and factors, such as geographical
proximity, provide complementary explanations and analytical approaches.
Alliance commitments present yet another aspect of alliances which needs to be
addressed. The extent to which allies fulfill their commitments represents the strength

and effectiveness of an alliance, one ofthe concepts utilized in this project. Furthermore,
fulfillment of commitments implies not only the physical cohesion of an alliance, but also
the ability to set the acceptable rules ofbehavior and carry enough built-in punishment
and reward mechanism for states to follow those rules within the alliance. The normative

51 See Gulick.

52 Edwin Fedder, "The Concept of Alliance," International Studies Quarterly 12 (March, 1968):
86.

53 Liska, 12-13.
54 Hans Morgenthau, "Alliances in Theory and Practice," Arnold Wolfers, ed., Alliance Policy in
the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959), 186.
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factor discussed below, therefore, provides the connecting piece for later discussion of
the factors and concepts associated with the collective security arrangements.
One of the commitments allies pledge to uphold is security; specifically, allies
will not attack each other and provide assistance when another member faces threat.

Singer and Small showed that "allies are more likely to come to the aid of and less likely

to fight against one another than are nonallies."55 Oddly enough, their systematic study
of alliances demonstrated that "allies are more likely to remain neutral in international
conflicts involving alliance members. That is, allies are most likely to avoid situations in

which alliance members are involved directly in conflict."56 However, on a more
positive note, the authors also showed that "if a state does become involved in a conflict
that also involves an ally, the level of commitment is a relatively good predictor to

whether military aid will be rendered.57 Similarly, Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan posit
that when a member of an alliance is attacked, the commitments of individual states in
the alliance are more likely to be honored.

The impact of alliances on international system is a disputed territory in the
alliance literature. One school ofthought maintains that alliances create stability and
eliminate factors which may potentially lead to military conflict. Singer, Bremer, and
Stucky explain this relationship in the following terms: "The argument rests on the
assertion that peace will be a consequence of an international system having a clear
structure ofpower relationships. Alliances. . . tend to increase the certainty ofthe
structure of the international system by clarifying the positions of each of the potential
55 Singer and Small, "Formal Alliances, 1815-1939," 1-2.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.

58 See Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan.
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friends and foes to one another."59 In other words, alliances contribute to finding balance
of power in the international system, and they provide transparency of behavior,
increasing predictability and with that decreasing the chances of war.
Among proponents of this view is Henry Kissinger who applied this logic to the
counterbalance between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
The sets of alliances created around each of the poles, NATO in reference to Washington
and Warsaw Pact in case of Moscow, provided foundation for the Cold War stability,
unparallel in any other distribution of power in the international system—unipolarity or
bipolarity. Osgood expanded on this logic proposing that "alliances reduce the potential
for international conflict by minimizing the possibilities for major shifts to occur in the
distribution of power in the international system."

In other words, as institutions,

alliances would change slowly and rarely.
On the other hand, Kaplan, Liska and Waltz, among others, maintain that

alliances tend to hamper the development of crosspressures which are

thought to be beneficial in reducing both conflict and its escalation. Thus,
because alliances create bondings which tend to serve as defining referents
through which ingroup and outgroup distinctions are developed by
national decision markers, they also lead to generation of conflicts which

are not mediated by the influence ofcrosspressures.61

J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, James Ray, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution,

Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965" in Bruce Russe«, ed., Peace, War and Numbers (London:
Sage, 1972), 19-48.

60 See Robert Osgood, Alliances andAmerican Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1968).

61 See Liska and Waltz, "International Structure."
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Alliances, therefore, lock states in arrangements which stop the natural shifts of power in
the international system, which in turn, can lead to a different set of conflicts.
Morgenthau expands on this view arguing that "alliances reduce the possible range of
coalitions, thereby leading to a reduction of the ways in which conflicts may be
peacefully resolved, and increasing the probability that they will be resolved through
violent means. Thus, the process through which conflicts are escalated into wars is
enhanced."62
As can be ascertained from the discussion above, the field of research on alliances

is largely dominated by realism and neorealism. Furthermore, alliance literature is

plagued by a vast array of definitions and approaches. As the neorealist and neoliberal
schools of thought developed somewhat parallel with each other historically,
complementing each other in the areas where they were lacking insights, this project also
expands into the neoliberal assertions on institutions to explain the concepts of collective
security and its role maintaining international peace and stability.

THE FRAMEWORK OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

The regional security arrangements, such as alliances and concerts, have worked
in the past to stabilize and protect the areas in question. They also have served as
stepping-stones for or a structural arm of a more comprehensive global security

arrangement, as was the case with NATO and the UN. Europe is often used as a model
for a regional security, with a hope that a similar system can be established in other
regions, leading eventually to a global security arrangement.

Morgenthau, Politic Among Nations, 45.
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The current security arrangement in Europe was established with the help of the
United States, offering the European nations its own power and legitimacy as a loan.
Inherently, therefore, Europe and United States tied their security goals, even if the
means for achievement are not the same. Divided by the Atlantic, in the post-Cold War

environment, the US and Europe have supplemented each other's capabilities63 in an
attempt to install and maintain international stability. The question remains, however, if
this collective security arrangement carries the potential to be extended beyond the
borders of Europe.

The goal ofupholding peace through collective security arrangements resurfaces
after each war, with the focus on preventing yet another devastating conflict. The notion
of collective security is a generally contested one, with as many as 12 different

definitions, as Barry Buzan aptly points out.64 In order to define security, one must first
ask: who is threatened, who is threatening, what is the threat, and what can stop that
threat? Kupchan and Kupchan maintain that "collective security rests on the notion of all

against one."65 In other words, collective security is a regulated and institutionalized
group of states that provide security for each other.66 Downs calls it an arrangement of a
group of states to reduce security threats by first, agreeing on the norms and rules, and

second, punishing a state that violates those norms and rules.67 He defines collective
security as "collective commitment of a group to hold members accountable for the
63 Robert Kagan, OfParadise and Power: America andEurope in the New World Order (New
York: Knopf, 2003), 4.

64 See Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International
Relations (Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1991).

65 Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and Europe," 118.
66 Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," International
Security 52, no. 1 (1995): 53.

67 George Downs, Collective Security Beyond the Cold War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1994), 2.
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maintenance ofan internal security norm."68 The major conditions for security regime, in
his opinion, include the willingness of the hegemon to uphold the system, other states'
compliance and cooperation, as well as mutuality of goals.
As one can see, there is a broad scope of understanding what constitutes collective

security. The broadest definition applies to international institutions such as the League
ofNations or the United Nations. In this respect, collective security is understood as a

comprehensive organization, incorporating all states and regions, and designed to
maintain stability and peace in the world system. In the case of collective security

organizations, no one state is considered a threat; rather, threats are perceived on a
systemic level. In a more narrow scope, some scholars argue that collective security may
include coalitions, concerts and alliances, where the main goal of the organization is still
to maintain stability and peace in the system, but they are created, and oftentimes
sustained, because of a tangible threat, possibly presented by a state or a group of states.
Collective security encompasses different types of arrangements, based on

structure, region, or issue. Berts writes that the term of collective security over time has
been applied in reference to "I) the Wilsonian or ideal concept associated with. . . the

League ofNations; 2) the Rio Pact, the United Nations, and anti-communist alliances
including the UN Command in Korea, NATO, the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty,
SEATO, the Baghdad Pact, and CENTO; and 3) current proposals for organizations to

codify peace in Europe."69 Therefore, collective security arrangements can be loose or
rigid international institutions with a specific focus on internal security.

68 Ibid.

69 Richard Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and
the New Europe," International Security 17, no.l (1992): 6.
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Within the literature on collective security, irrespective of the approach, there is

an assumption that collective security must encompass a broad scope of states.70 The
examples oftentimes brought up in reference to collective security arrangements are the
League of Nations, or its successor, the United Nations. However, the Concert of
Europe, despite its regional limitations, already displayed very strong characteristics of
the collective security arrangement in its design to create an international triangulation in
Europe that would prevent conflict among its powers. In essence, the Concert of Europe
had the same principle as collective security organizations at its heart: to provide a
mechanism within an organization of states to maintain peace and security internally—in
Europe. The assumption that collective security must encompass the whole or majority
of the international system, therefore, should not be taken as a given. A collective

security arrangement can be applied to a regional setting, such as is the case with NATO
in regards to Europe. It might be that with time the arrangement might find itself in a
position where the spread of its scope beyond North America and Europe might be
welcomed or needed.

Moreover, when the question of global versus regional scope of security

organization arises, Andrew Hurrell writes:

The notion of a global community of states is unreal and. . . regionallybased collective security systems are most likely to prove effective:
because such groupings have a greater understanding of the causes and
nature of security problems affecting the region; because the incentives for

See Steven Hook and Richard Robyn, "Regional Collective Security in Europe: Past Patterns
and Future Prospects," European Security 8, no. 3 (1999): 82-100.
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managing conflict are likely to be higher; and because
there will be a
71
greater degree of consensus over basic values.

While this was the case in the past, globalization is impacting that assumption. Many of
the crises that face various regions of the world are the same. That does not, however,
mean that there are no regional differences. It is possible to create an umbrella collective
security organization which sets a certain standard ofbehavior regarding peaceful
settlements of disputes, with smaller regional subgroups designed to target the security
problems endemic to that particular area.
Secondly, one of the largest obstacles to conquer in terms of any international
institution, and even more when security issues are concerned, is sovereignty. Alliances
imply less forfeiting of sovereignty and less external control of the organization over the
domestic politics. On the other hand, collective security arrangement carries with it more
external control over domestic politics of a state. The main question that arises here is
this: Is security against the threats dominant in the international system externally and
internally worth enough as a benefit to give up sovereignty to the degree required to
establish a legitimate and reliable collective defense and security organization?
The basic idea of institutions comes from the neoliberal school of thought,

somewhat counterintuitive to the general approach to international security dominated by
neorealism. Institutions are defined as "rules and norms around which actors

expectations converge."72 Kupchan maintains that institutions channel interests of strong

71 Andrew Hurrell, "Collective Security and International Order Revisited," International
Relations 11, no. 37 (1992): 40.

72 See Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).
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states, but also bind and legitimize their power.73 This idea is also supported by John G.
Ikenberry, who talks about security institutions after each war to limit the power of the

hegemon, balance against the possible threat, and uphold order.74 John Mearsheimer, on
the realist side, argues that collective security arrangements contradict the natural state of

international relations—namely anarchy.75 Security institutions are more difficult to
create than arrangements that deal with "low politics" issues because of greater
competitiveness among states; impact of security and prisoner's dilemma; blur between

offensive and defensive goals; and difficulty in measuring achieved common security.76
As mentioned earlier, Stephen Walt pointed out that ideology binds states

together.77 This importance of common ideology is nowhere more clearly visible than in
Europe and the creation of the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
As pointed out by Gulick and explained earlier, aside from geography and commonality
of interests, the similarities in historical, cultural, and political ideologies made the
creation of the EU and NATO as institutions, effective and functioning over long period
of time, possible.

In terms of security, the more similar ideologically states are, the more they are
likely to ally to balance what they perceive as a threat. Stephen Walt finds that balancing
behavior explains best pattern of alliances in post-WWII Middle East.

Although the

Middle East can hardly serve as an exemplary region for peace, similar idea was used in
73 Charles Kupchan, "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources
of a Stable Multipolarity," International Security 23, no. 2 (1998): 40-79.

74 G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order
after Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
75 John Mearsheimer, "False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3
(1994-95): 5-49.

76 Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," International Organization 36, no. 2 (1982): 357-378.
77 See Walt, Origins ofAlliances.
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the post-Napoleonic Concert of Europe. However, while common ideology and
legitimacy are easier to find regionally, globally they are much more difficult to maintain.
Here, the example of the League ofNations comes to mind. Based on Wilsonian

idealism, the two major European powers, Germany and Russia, were not members.
While Germany later joined and withdrew, Russia never was a member of the League of
Nations. And, as E.H. Carr aptly pointed out in The Twenty Year's Crisis, legitimacy

cannot exist without the support ofthe power.79 The off-spring ofthe League ofNations,
the United Nations, has been internationally recognized for setting the norms and rules in
an attempt to create a universal ideology, even if the enforcement mechanism is still
rather weak.

However, despite commonality of values and goal, the question that remains to be

answered regards the issue of one of the members of the collective security arrangement
potentially becoming an aggressor. At this point, the two fundamentals of collective
security, the concert and enforcement are compromised and at odds with each other.
Here, Inis Claude provides an answer. Claude points out that a collective security

arrangement should never run into a problem of states going against the regime because
collective security assumes a concert that occasionally becomes a concertminus-one-or-a-few; it relies upon the expectation that, in any given
situation, most states—enough to constitute a preponderant force—will

remain loyal to the system and will act upon the beliefthat their interests
require them to join in suppressing a challenge to the order ofthe
system. ... Every system of law and order prescribed obedience to rules
and provides for the contingency of disobedience. ... No system for the
maintenance of order needs to work unless some violators of rules are

79 See E. H. Carr, Twenty Year's Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study ofInternational
Relations (New York: Palgrave Mcmillan, 2001).
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likely to appear, or can work unless most of its members obey and support
the effectuation of its rules.

The next question brings up the ideas ofjustice and the relationship between

legitimacy, power, and responsibility. If we have an international collective security
arrangement where a few major powers monitor the behavior of states, is this system
based on fairness and justice or is it based on the dominance ofpower? "The questions
of availability and desirability of collective security are linked, operationally, in the
conditions for its establishment and functioning, and in our willingness, and that of other

nations, to make the necessary investment."81 The answer to this can be found in the
levels of commitment and the longevity ofboth the institutions and stability of the
internal system. "If the goal of an international regime of collective security will never
command the investment, then it cannot really be a policy, no matter how unarguable it
may be as a need, or how attractive it may be as a remedy."
Furthermore, the responsibility for upholding stability and peace in the
international system, and in this case in the regional context, has traditionally been

assigned to major powers, again by scholars such as E.H. Carr, Earl Ravenal or John
Ikenberry, and political leaders such as Presidents Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Delano
Roosevelt or Harry Truman. Inis Claude holds the responsibility of major powers for the
international system as a whole as self-evident. "Singly and jointly, the great powers are

responsible for managing the international system. Like it or not, they constitute its
80 Inis Claude, "Comment on 'An Autopsy of Collective Security'," Political Science Quarterly
90, no. 4 (1975-76): 716-717.

81 Earl Ravenal, "An Autopsy of Collective Security," Political Science Quarterly 90, no. 4 (197576): 713.
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board of directors, as has been clear at least since the 1815 Congress of Vienna."

In

more specific and practical terms, the major powers "bear the burden of restraining the
unruly—a category that might include themselves or each other but is not limited to their

own ranks. It is their task to protect the weak and to feed the poor."84 Inis Claude goes
even further in assigning the responsibility for international peace and stability to the
powerful by accounting for both realist and liberal values: "The prospects of political
freedom, human rights, and social justice. . . depend largely upon what they do and refrain
from doing. The. . . international system, the rules of its operation, and the way it is
organized are determined in considerable measure by their policies. Credit or blame for
the state of the world devolves largely upon the great powers."

In practical terms, there is a need for leadership within institutions of any kind,
especially when they are created and before they reach full maturity—in the case of
collective security, before they become fully integrated and institutionalized.

There have. . . been repeated arguments that an effective collective security
system requires leadership and that collectivity that matters will consist of
a smaller group of like-minded states with the effective (as opposed to
theoretical) power to enforce their decisions. On this more limited view
collective security is no more than the willingness of one bloc of states to
uphold international law on the basis of motives that will inevitably be
mixed.86

83 Inis Claude, "The Common Defense and Great-Power Responsibilities," Political Science
Quarterly 101, no. 5 (1986): 728.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.

86 Hurrell, "Collective Security and International Order Revisited," 39.
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This position can be expanded to a group of states with varied degrees ofpower but of
the same or similar mindset and willing to enter into an organized institution providing
collective security.

However, not all international systems would allow for such a collective security
community to work. Is it possible that globalization equalizes the power among states to
the extent that while there might be a major power or two, no state would be able to gain
preponderant power? Stephen Ambrose and Douglas Brinkley argue that while the
United States is still a major power, the economic decline ofthe 1990s, combined with a
fundamental change which effectively decreased the gap between the United States and
other major powers had introduced the international environment where the US will not
be able to become again a preponderant power in any short or distant foreseeable future.
The same argument can be extended to other major states. Therefore, when we think of
the longevity of any collective security organization and we take into account what we
consider to be foreseeable future, it is plausible to argue that no state will be strong
enough to stand up to the collective.

QO

Who should be encompassed by collective security? Again, in the past the focus
has been on states that sought to ensure their sovereignty and non-intervention, the
concepts that have defined majority of international relations history but that are rapidly
changing today. Going back to the goal of collective security discussed earlier, the
current international environment sets a stage for conflict between the principle of
sovereignty and the potential threats that have a tendency to disregard boundaries.
87 Stephen Ambrose and Douglas Brinkley, Rise to Globalisai: American Foreign Policy since
1938 (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), 380.

88 Here, the distance of foreseeable future is applied to the environment in which, given the current
level of theoretical understanding and factual knowledge, we can account for the variables determining the
conditions.
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Hurrell writes in 1992: "Rousseau. . . could see all too clearly that, whilst leagues of

states might create peace between their members, they might also serve to reinforce and

exacerbate broader patterns of conflict."89 If you have an organized group of states, the
countries that are not included might see the organized group as a potential threat,
increasing the level of conflict. And here again, involuntarily, the international actors
would fall into the realist security dilemma. However, in such a case, the collective
security arrangement would be providing the internal stability and peace, while the
alliance component would target the external threat.
Once we have already established some sort of loose or rigid collective security
arrangements among a group of states, what form of collective action would be
appropriate and acceptable? "Collective security involves a shared understanding of
what kinds of force have been proscribed and also a shared acceptance that a breach of
the peace threatens the interests of all states. It also involves a shared willingness to act
effectively to enforce the law and to protect those interests. ... Rationality would ensure

compliance."90 For the same reason why most states follow the guidelines of
international law, enforcement might not be necessary in all instances. Simple shadow of
the future element, characteristic of international institutions, would provide build in

benefits to cooperate and punishments in cases of defection. It might also be that in case
of security, traditionally considered to be high politics, the degree of benefit and
punishment would be higher in instances of collective security arrangements. The benefit
of cooperation is security of the group, internal and external, while the punishment is the
lack ofthat same security, internally and externally.
89 Hurrell, "Collective Security and International Order Revisited," 39.
90 Ibid., 41.
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While the goal of alliances is easy to define, as it is focused on the tangible,
external threat, the goals of collective security arrangements are more difficult to identify,
especially in the current international environment. The changing nature of sovereignty
is one ofthe dominant trends in the scholarship in and practice of international politics.
With that, the field of international security is not impervious to the changing, and
challenged, concept of sovereignty. Kenneth Thompson very aptly points out the
application of this change to the concept of collective security:

The soul of collective security has been formed by the growth ofpractical
morality. The chief characteristic of social behavior in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century has been the increasing attention paid to all
forms ofhumanitarian projects. In medieval society the thoughts of
eliminating war or poverty was rarely given serious attention. War and
poverty were conceived of as abiding moral problems and defects and
flaws in a universal moral order. ... This philosophy, as well as the

theological concepts undergirding it, was swept away by the Age of the
Enlightenment. In its place the West seemed to accept the creed of
democratic liberalism with its aim of abolishing all ills and diseases

disturbing the body social.91
This trend has been embodied even more clearly and seen more prominently in

the recent talk about the concept ofresponsible sovereignty.92 Responsible sovereignty
or the responsibility to protect, in Ban Ki Moon's definition, is a concept build on
understanding sovereignty as a responsibility, rather than a right of a state to be taken for
granted. Adopted in 2005 by the World Summit, the concept ofresponsible sovereignty
91 Kenneth Thompson, "Collective Security Reexamined," The American Political Science Review
47, no. 3 (1953): 754.

92 Ban Ki Moon, "Responsible Sovereignty," Global Policy Forum, July 15th, 2008,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/154/26074.html.
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indicated that states recognize their moral and legal obligation to "protect their
populations—whether citizens or not—from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity, and from their incitement. They declared. . . that [they] accept
that responsibility and will act in accordance with it."

The concept ofresponsible sovereignty rests on three pillars. The first pillar is
outlined above. The second pillar refers to the collective strength of the United Nations
as an institution and its comparative advantage. In other words, the UN as an
international community commits itself to "assists states in meeting these obligation"
proactively, rather than "just to react one they have fail to meet their prevention and

protection obligations."94 The third pillar takes into consideration the need for a response
in a "timely and decisive manner, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to help

protect populations from the four listed crimes and violations."95 The response could
involve any of the whole range of UN tools such as "pacific measures under Chapter VI
of the Charter, coercive ones under Chapter VII, and/or collaboration with regional and
subregional arrangements under Chapter VIII. They key lies in an early and flexible

response, tailored to the specific needs of each situation."96
While this understanding and application ofresponsible sovereignty was adopted
by the UN, in academic field the concept ofresponsible sovereignty provided the new
foundations for international security, taking into account the new triangulation of threats
and capabilities. In this context, responsible sovereignty means that "sovereignty entails

93 Ibid.
94IWd.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
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obligations and duties to one's own citizens and to other sovereign states."

There is an

associated with this concept need of states to cooperate across borders to safeguard
common resources and prevent common threats.

The idea ofresponsible sovereignty was initially introduces by Francis Deng in
1996. He wrote: "national governments are duty bound to ensure minimum standards of
security and social welfare for their citizens and be accountable both to the national body

public and the international community."98 This concept vastly differs from the
traditional understanding of sovereignty as determined by the Treaty of Westphalia, or
what is commonly referred to as Westphalian sovereignty. In that respect, sovereignty
meant equality of states as international actors and non-interference in each other's
territories, based on the principle of state's right to independent decision-making.
The goal of sovereignty was to provide a framework or a principle for the stability
and the security of the international system. Today, given the inseparable link between
national and international security, "the sovereign state's responsibility and
accountability to both domestic and external constituencies must be affirmed as
interconnected principles of the national and international order. Such a normative code
is anchored in the assumption that in order to be legitimate, sovereignty must demonstrate
responsibility. At the very least that means providing for the basic needs of its people."
While there is a need for the normative principle for behavior for a collective

security arrangement, there is also the basic practical need. In his 2007 book Security
97 Bruce Jones, Carlos Pascual, and Stephen John Stedman, Power and Responsibility: Building
International Order in an Era ofTransnational Threats (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press,
2008), 8.

98 Francis Deng, Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1996), 3-4.

99 Ibid., xvii.
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First, Amitai Etzioni makes a very strong case for basic human security as a necessary

prerequisite of domestic and international stability.100 By basic security, he means "the
conditions under which most people, most of the time, are able to go about their lives,
venture onto the street, work, study, and participate in public life (politics included),

without acute fear ofbeing killed or injured—without being terrorized."101
The concept ofbasic human security, in turn, brings to focus the problems of
changing nature of threat, which goes hand in hand with the concept of sovereignty
undergoing such a strong transformation and being under such an attack by the
practically of the international system and the scholarly community alike. As Bruce
Jones et al point out: "This is the world of transnational threats, where the actions—or

inaction—ofpeople and governments anywhere in the world can harm others thousands
of miles away. It is a world where sovereign states acting alone are incapable of
protecting their citizens.

When talking about the question of changing nature and perception of threat and
potential institutions to protect against that threat, the simple question of "protection
against what" comes to mind of academics and political leaders, especially those
responsible for getting the funding and selling the concepts to their audiences. The
mechanism against the state threats is already built in the fundamental concept of

collective security—namely, both its mindset and institutional organization. However,
the issue of non-state threats opens a new can of worms, so to say. Robert Keohane says:

Amitai Etzioni, Security First: For a Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy, New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2007.

101 Ibid., 2.
102 Jones, Pascual, and Stedman, 3.
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In discussing nonstate threats, I emphasize such human actions as the use
of nuclear weapons by terrorists and the creation of diseases through
biological processes. I distinguish between "threats"—which I limit to
potentially very harmful conditions created deliberately by human
beings—and two other categories ofproblems: (1) adverse changes in our
social or natural environment created inadvertently by human beings (such

as climate change, or violence possibly engendered by increasing
acceptance of violence in the media); or (2) more fundamental social
problems, such as world poverty and premature death due to preventable
disease. The latter two categories ofproblems are very serious—quite
possibly more so than nonstate threats—but I focus in these briefremarks
on threats as defined above.103

Once the definition of threat has been established, we need to be able to determine when

a threat becomes dangerous enough to warrant an action from the collective community
or under what specific conditions is that action necessary. Here again, Keohane comes
with an answer:

When it could directly affect all of us (such as biological terrorism); When

the enormity of intentional harm is so great as to profoundly affect our
view of the human race (such as the Holocaust during World War II,
Rwanda in 1994, or a possible explosion of a nuclear weapon by

terrorists); When clear abuses are preventable at moderate cost (such as
Bosnia in 1993, or probably Sudan now). In such cases, a failure to act

implicates us and affects our fundamental view of ourselves and our
species.
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This list brings to light the necessity to establish clear definitions and rules ofbehavior
for potential collective security organizations, which will be discussed below.
Robert Keohane, "Decisiveness and Accountability as Part of a Principled Response to
Nonstate Threats," Ethics and International Affairs 20, no. 2 (2006): 220.
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The effect of such an international environment and nature of current and future

threats bring again the inseparability of international and national security. 105 Because of
that reality, the need for organized collective security arrangement has become not only a
wish, but also a need. "Rebuilding international order will require focusing on specific
institutions for addressing specific threats—and making them effective. But as a
prerequisite it also requires a vision, a foundational principle that gives a moral value to
order and brings coherence to expectations about how sates should act across multiple
issue areas. Such a principle must appeal to diverse populations in every region of the

world [and] win the support ofkey states."106 In other words, while the alliance
component of a security organization bring the tangible means to providing security, the
collective nature of such an institution would bring with it the legitimacy and moral
value.

Given this triangulation of threat and sovereignty, the problem with collective
security is whether in the future it would act as a pro-active versus reactive element to
stop aggression. "The critical points are whether one can predict action by an
international agency to repress or punish any significant aggression, whether nations can
rely on such action to the extent of delegating or pledging their essential security powers
to such an agency, and whether each nation can expect all others to support exercises of
? r\n

collective enforcement even if they contradict those other nations' immediate interests.

Therefore, the reactive versus proactive character of a collective is closely related with
reliability and legitimacy of such an institution, and therefore, with the support and
commitment it will be able to earn from its member states. Again, this is vastly different
105 Jones, Pascual, and Stedman, 4.
106 Ibid., 8-9.
107 Ravenal, "An Autopsy of Collective Security," 703.
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from the traditional approach to threat as exercised by alliances, where that threat was
determined ahead of time and tangible.
What should be the goal of collective security today? In the past, "collective

security was conceived as a response to the dangers of formal interstate violence and, in
particular, to the problem of the aggressive use of force by states. At its heart was the
idea that states should either proscribe the aggressive use of force by states or at least

severely curtail the right to use armed force and that they should take collective measures

to enforce that proscription."108 Collective security in the past had as its goal protection
against inter-state conflicts and domestic unrests. Is it still the case today? The inter-state
war is not the problem these days. The main problems are non-tangible and hard to
contain to a territory or a government. Issues such as terrorism, energy security,
environmental damage, human security, and disease control dominate the security
discussion.

Similarly to the literature on alliances, the body of research on collective security
shows a wide array of definitions and approaches. However, what is the most important
to remember is that collective security arrangements are designed to provide security

internally to the members, while alliances protect the group from external threats.
Furthermore, whether it is alliances or collective security institutions, states join them

because they receive more benefits from such arrangements than costs they have to pay.
Both, neorealists and neoliberals in their respective approaches to security organizations

approach the members, states, as rational actors. The countries that created NATO were
no different. The Alliance originated and continued because the benefits of external and
internal security it provided outweigh by far the benefits of having the same level of
108 Hurrell, "Collective Security and International Order Revisited," 38.
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security unilaterally or bilaterally. Furthermore, the costs of creating this organization
and binding one another together were much lower than the security benefits.

COLLECTIVE DEFENSE AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY: MUTUALLY
EXCLUSIVE?

Recently, more scholars have attempted to categorize and define NATO in terms
of security organizations, their nature and scope. Some still argue that NATO is an
alliance and look at the organization purely as an alliance. Following on the earlier point,
there is a danger of misconstruing alliances with collective security arrangements, for
better or worse. "Indeed, the (mis)use of the term to describe alliance politics has been a

recurring criticism ofthe attempts to implement collective security."109 Political leaders,
especially those who are responsible for NATO's present function and shape, as well as
those who must rally the domestic support for the Alliance, have a hard time selling
NATO as a collective security arrangement to their domestic audiences, simply because
the concept itself is hard to define, much less to show the tangible benefits of such an
organization. NATO itself, therefore, struggles with management ofboth collective

defense and collective security narratives for its future.110
Scholars engaged in the discussion on NATO tend to emphasize the role the
organization has played in collective defense, obscuring the collective security
component. The two concepts, as mentioned before, are as different from one another as
the ideas of security promoted by the neorealist school of thought and the neoliberal
institutionalism. So how was NATO able to reconcile this dual role as an alliance and a

109 Ibid., 39.
1,0 See David Yost, "The New NATO and Collective Security," Survival 40, no. 2 (1998): 135160.
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collective security arrangement if the literature treats those two concepts almost entirely

mutually exclusive of each other? In the case ofNATO, a slow moving transition in
approaches was noticeable already prior to the end of the Cold War, with few scholars
attempting to bridge a gap between collective defense and collective security. Below, the
arguments for and against the mutual exclusivity of those two concepts are outlined.

Mutually Exclusive: YES

Here, we first start with Arnold Wolfers whose work provided often-used
exclusive differentiation between collective defense and collective security. Secondly,

we will utilize the ideas of Earl Ravenal who positioned collective security combined
with defense in the realist framework. From there, we will transfer to Robert Jervis, who

applied the neoliberal approach of security regimes to issues of international peace and
stability and John Ikenberry who successfully combined both realism and institutionalism
to develop a mechanism for security in the post-war environments. Tracing the above
mentioned approaches, in turn, provides the next building block for establishing the
connection between the collective security and collective defense in the case ofNATO.
In the 1 960s, Arnold Wolfers in Discord and Collaboration provided a very
detailed discussion on the fundamental differences between collective security and
collective defense.

Both in the case of alliances, now usually called collective defense
arrangements, and in the case of collective security... countries commit
themselves to assist others against attack. ... And yet the two policies
differ fundamentally in respect to both intent and modes of action, so that
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the cases in which they are complementary and helpful to each other are
largely a matter of happy coincidence.

Wolfers places the two concepts essentially in mutually exclusive positions because of
different intents and modes of operation. However, this paper argues that their
complementarities and reinforcements are not mere coincidences. Rather, the
commonality of geopolitical, values that the members display will put them in the
position where the internal cooperation will strengthen the external defenses.
According to Wolfers "nations enter into collective defense arrangements to ward
offthreats to their national security interests, as traditionally conceived, emanating from
some specific country or group of countries regarded as the chief national enemy, actual

or potential."112 As he explains in more detail, "the motive behind such arrangements is
the conviction that the creation of military strength sufficient to ward off the specific
threat would be beyond their national capacity or would prove excessively and
unnecessarily costly in view ofthe opportunities for mutual support and common

defense."113 Collective defense, therefore, belongs to the realist school of thought, where
rational actors make a clear cost-benefit analysis to maximize their security in an
anarchical environment.

Collective security, on the other hand, belongs to the normative world of "what
should be," propagated by Wilsonian idealists. It is difficult to find a place for such an

1 ' ' Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 182-183.

112Ibid., 183.
1,3 Ibid.
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approach in realism. Wolfers, again, would be the first to disagree that the two can
coexist or even cooperate with each other. According to Wolfers:

it is not the goal of collective security arrangements to provide their
members with strength either against their national enemies or for the
defense of their national interests, unless one redefines the terms 'national

enemy' and 'national interest' in accordance with the philosophy upon
which collective security rests. Collective security is directed against any

and every country anywhere that commits an act of aggression, allies and
friends included.114

Furthermore, Wolfers does not account for the possibility that collective security can be
limited to a number of states or a region, which will be discussed in a later part of this
chapter.
In their nature, therefore, collective security and collective defense are

contradictory. From the 1960s assumptions regarding the relationship between collective
security and collective defense to the 1990s mentality, not much has changed. Another

support for the difference between collective security and collective defense is offered by
Steven Hook and Richard Robyn:

Collective defense and collective security are most often distinguished on
the basis of alliance focus and scope. Collective defense is generally held
to be based upon the presence of an explicitly identified outside nationstate or bloc that is widely perceived as threatening to actual or
prospective alliance members. By contrast, the focus of collective security
is on the members of the alliance themselves, with concerns including

ways they can assure nonaggression within the alliance and promote

4Ibid.
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internal cooperation. In this respect the scope of collective-security
arrangements is inherently broader and more ambitious.

As the authors point out, the mutual exclusivity lies in the threats targeted by the

arrangement; in the case of alliance, the potential threat is external, whereas in the case of
collective security, the goal of the institutions is to provide the internal security for its
members by setting a certain standard ofbehavior.

Mutually Exclusive: NO

A decade after Arnold Wolfers, Earl Ravenal attempted to merge the concepts of
collective security and collective defense. He argued that an essential condition of
collective security is a concert and essential function is enforcement. He looked at the
collective security purely from the approach of realism: he assumed that the international
environment was dominated by one or two powers, organized into stable blocks or semi-

permanent alliances, or multipolarity. In such an international triangulation ofpower, he
defined collective security as "a regime. . . based, at least, on a "concert" ofpowerful

nations or, at most, on a global federation."116 In that type of environment, "the undue
aggregation of improper use ofpower is typically restrained by the assembling of a
contrary and "benign" preponderance ofpower. Thus, "collective security" is both a
shorthand description of a type of international system, and an identification of its
essential adjustment mechanism."

117

115 Steven Hook and Richard Robyn, "Regional Collective Security in Europe: Past Patterns and
Future Prospects," European Security 8, no. 3 (1999): 84.

116 Ravenal, "An Autopsy of Collective Security," 697.
1,7 Ibid., 698.
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Attempts were made in the past at collective security after major wars by
preponderant powers: after Napoleonic wars, the Concert of Europe, after WWI—the
League ofNations, after WWII—the UN. After each of the conflicts, there were
conditions favorable to creating that sort of international order: "1. The victorious
powers are momentarily in concert; this provides the basis for equating their provisional
coalition to a disinterested concern for universal order; 2. The defeated powers are, by

consensus of the victors, clearly labeled the "aggressors." But of course this situation
does not last."118
Ravenal was not alone in his assumption of international order after the wars.

However, before we go into security institutions as described by other authors, the basic
definition of institutions needs to be refreshed. The most often used definition of

institutions is the one provided by Stephen Krasner, as mentioned earlier. He defines
institutions as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making
procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international

relations."119 Keohane and Nye define them as "sets of governing arrangements,
networks ofrules, norms, and procedures that regularize behavior and control its

effects."120 Hedley Bull expands this definition with describing institutions as "general
imperative principles which require or authorize prescribed classes ofpersons or groups

to behave in prescribed ways."121 Furthermore, institutions "secure adherence to rules by
formulating, communicating, administering, enforcing, interpreting, legitimizing, and
118 Ibid., 699.

119 Krasner, International Regimes, 2.
120 Robert Keohane, and Joseph Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence (New York: Longman,
2001), 19.

121 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1977), 54.
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adapting them."122 The authors on the liberal end ofthe theoretical scale agree that
institutions reduce uncertainty in the anarchical world of mistrust and are important

means of cooperation.123 States enter institutions for purely rational reasons—namely
those of cost-benefit analysis. Simply put, institutions minimize costs of 'doing
business,' while maximizing the benefits.

John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan, among others, talked about similar
institutional arrangements to those outlined by Ravenal. Ikenberry specifically provides
an example of institution-building after major wars. He applies the domestic structure of
institutions (hierarchy), a form of a constitutional political order, to international
institutions (with the international system ruled by anarchy). Such a constitutional
political order manifests itself through three characteristics:
1) shared agreement on the principles and rules of order;
2) rules and institutions bind and limit the exercise ofpower;
3) the rules and institutions are entrenched in the wider political system and they
are not easily altered.

Oddly enough, he uses the same logic to international institutions (based on domestic
patterns) as Karl Deutsch used for building international communities.
This so-called constitutional approach, applied to states, creates a system in which
"power is restrained through binding institutions that tie states down and together and

thereby reduce worries about domination and abandonment."125 An international order
with strong constitutional characteristics is one in which the power and capabilities of the
122 Ibid.

123 See David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate
(Columbia University Press, 1993).

124 Ikenberry, After Victory, 5.
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relevant states are highly constrained by interlocking institutions and binding agreements.

This order is also based on consensus among states.126 Ikenberry explains the logic ofhis
arguments in the following words, emphasizing willingness of all sides to enter into the
arrangement, as well as a necessity for shared values:

The more extreme the power disparities. . ., the greater the capacity of the
leading state to employ institutions to lock in a favorable order; it is in a
more advantaged position to exchange restraints on its power for
institutional agreements and to trade off short-term gains for long-term
gains. Also, the greater the power disparities, the greater the incentives for
weaker and secondary states to establish institutional agreements that
reduce the risks of domination or abandonment. Likewise, democratic

states have greater capacities to enter into binding institutions and thereby
reassure the other states in the postwar settlement than non-democracies.
That is, the 'stickiness' of interlocking institutions is greater between
democracies than between non-democracies, and this makes them a more

readily employable mechanism to dampen the implications ofpower

asymmetries.127
Kupchan furthers the argument for self-binding of preponderant power as an
attributing element to peace and stability by providing a set of defining characteristics—
or measurements—for self binding of hegemons. Self-binding is the mechanism through
which states render their power benign. Quantitatively, it means states are willing to
withhold power, to refrain from fully exercising their resources and influence.
Qualitatively, it means that states seek to manage rather than maximize power, to
promote joint gains rather than to behave in an extractive and exploitative manner, and to
build order based on the notion that the spread of shared norms and identities and the
126IbId.
127IbId.
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formation of community at the international level can overcome competitive relations
among states. "In terms ofprocess, it means that that hegemons prefer multilateral over
unilateral action, favor consensual initiatives, and resort to unilateral decision-making
only when multilateralism fails to produce an acceptable outcome."
With willingness, commitment, and shared values, benign exercise ofpower gives
rise to trust, shared interests and identities, and international institutions "essential to
escaping anarchy and fostering a community of states within which the rules of self-help

competition no longer apply."129 Institutional hegemony, therefore, represents a means of
combining the right structure with the right character—encompassing characteristics of
both, realist and idealist, worlds. It provides a structure through which power of states is
channeled and restrained, building a secure environment. In an anarchic world,
institutional hegemony offers hierarchy within the system it builds. The structural
hierarchy that accompanies power distribution carries a powerful peace-causing potential,
since the incentive for conflict is minimized. But, as Kupchan warns, hierarchy alone is
not enough—the stability of the system also depends on the core's willingness to create
that order and the periphery's agreement to share the system and its values with the core.
Robert Jervis put the same idea in context of security regimes. In 1982, he
provided a definition of a security regime: "By a security regime I mean. . . those
principles, rules, and norms that permit nations to be re-strained in their behavior in the
belief that others will reciprocate. This concept implies not only norms and expectations
that facilitate cooperation, but a form of cooperation that is more than the following of

Kupchan, "After Pax Americana," 42.
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short-run self-interest."130 His concept of security regimes connects the Deutsch' s idea of
community and the neoliberal idea of institutions as proposed by Ikenberry and Kupchan,
and along with both approaches, provides a sound basis for establishing a security
organization that would encompass both collective security and defense.
Jervis goes on to discuss the condition that best serve the formation and
continuation of a security regime.

First, the great powers must want to establish it-that is, they must prefer a
more regulated environment to one in which all states behave
individualistically. . . . Second, the actors must also believe that others
share the value they place on mutual security and cooperation. Third, . . .
even if all major actors would settle for the status quo, security regimes
cannot form when one or more actors believe that security is best provided

for by expansion. The fourth condition for the formation of a regime is a
truism today: war and the individualistic pursuit of security must be seen

as costly.131

In other words, security institutions, as Robert Jervis rightly asserts, are most difficult to
form because of greater competitiveness among states in the security arena; higher impact
of prisoner's and security dilemma; difficulty in measuring achieved security; and a blur
between offensive and defensive motives.132 The traditional neorealist concerns of states
are the hardest to overcome in the most vital of subject—the area of security. The major
conditions to establish a security regime include the willingness of great powers to do so,
participants' willing compliance and cooperation, precipitated by mutuality of security
goals. Finally, war and individual pursuit of security must be seen as costly, for only
130 Jervis, "Security Regimes," 357.
131 Ibid., 360-362.

68

then will institutions fulfill their role of minimizing the costs, while maximizing the
benefits.

In essence, the preconditions that Jervis sees as necessary for creation of a
security regime are already present in case ofNATO. The first condition has been
fulfilled with the mere creation ofNATO as a balancing alliance against the threat of
Soviet Union and a body for stabilizing the North Atlantic area. The second condition is
self evident in the degree to which geopolitical, cultural, and economic values have been
shared by NATO members. In the case of the third condition, expansion, Jervis meant
territorial expansion in the context of imperialism. While NATO has expanded over the
years, it has done so in an attempt to extend the normative value of security and stability,
not to fulfill imperialist motivations of one or more of the members. And lastly, the
fourth assumption goes back to the rational actor behavior of states, that is maximizing
profit, in this case security and stability, while minimizing the costs—namely the conflict
and war.

In 1999, Steven Hook and Richard Robyn introduced an argument that NATO is a
hybrid between collective defense and a regional collective security arrangement.

NATO has effectively promoted solidarity among its member states,
discouraged the renationalization of European politics, and enhanced the
capacity of governments to cooperate in social, political, and economic
areas. In so doing, the alliance has abetted the parallel process of 'cooperative security' that has produced a previously unseen degree of
collaboration among European governments.

Hook and Robyn, 82.
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In its nature and role, therefore, NATO has served as an alliance as well as a collective
security arrangement throughout its history. The collective security role is especially
important to acknowledge in the post-Cold War environment, in terms of lack of the
original Soviet threat that served as the basis for establishing NATO and the expansion of
liberal values of freedom and democracy. Furthermore, the welcomed by the Eastern
Europeans expansion ofNATO and the push for keeping the Alliance alive and
functional points to the fact that its normative role is already not only acknowledged and
accepted, but also welcomed and wanted.

This argument was furthered by Richard Rupp in 2006, who argued that NATO
suffers from the lack of agreement among its various leadership bodies as to what sort of
security arrangement it is and what it should be in the future. "One ofthe principle
factors undermining NATO in 2006 is the presence of competing perspectives among
member-states, officials in Brussels, and NATO supporters, on the fundamental nature

and purpose ofthe Alliance."134 In his analysis, the author goes back to the beginning of
NATO, which was established as a military alliance and until the end of the Cold War the
organization's "security guarantee and identity remained unchanged and resolute. In the
1990s, NATO governments gradually altered the organization's structure and mission,
shifting the Alliance's moorings toward collective security as NATO enlarged its
membership."

Perhaps the words ofEarl Ravenal best show the complicated nature of collective
defense and collective security, and the mixed feelings of scholars as to the relationship
between the two.

134 Richard Rupp, NATO after 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2006), 193.
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The animating idea of collective security is that each outbreak of
aggression will be suppressed, not by a partial alliance directed
specifically against certain parties, but by a universal compact, biding all
to defend any. ... Although, conceptually, collective security can be
regarded as a limiting case of collective defense (in the sense that it
represents a universalization of a military alliance—an alliance of all
members against, potentially, each), and though, historically, these two
kinds of regimes have coincided for limited periods, the two modes of
international organization are quite distinct and have widely differing
consequences. Collective security is the essential function of a distinct
structure of international system; collective defense, or the contracting of
bilateral or multilateral security pacts, is an instrument available to states

in systems ofbipolar confrontation or multiple balance ofpower.

This project extends this connection that Ravenal, Jervis, Ikenberry and others
discussed, in that collective security and collective defense work together to form a
complementary arrangement to protect a group of states, small or large, from an external
threat, while providing a set ofnorms and rules, commonly and willingly agreed upon, in
order to ensure the internal stability and security.

And this complementary arrangement can be found in the form of security
communities, as originally proposed by Van Wagenen and Deutsch, and most recently
explored anew by Adler and Barnett. Security communities combine the elements of
institutions and ideology, and in terms of causality, reinforced one another. Institutions
are created by states that have common sets of interests. Over time and continues
interactions with one another, members will share more and more interests and

characteristics, creating communities. Those communities, on the other hand, will have
built-in institutional mechanisms in them. NATO developed over time to display
characteristics of an institution and a community. Hence, this concept of security
136 Ravenal. "An Autopsy of Collective Security," 672.
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communities is able to explain NATO better than any other because it accounts for all
elements ofNATO: structure, institutions, common goals, common identity, common

values, democracy, and geography. The section below, therefore, positions NATO in the
context of security communities to bring the concepts of alliances and collective security
together.

SECURITY COMMUNITIES AND THEIR APPLICATION TO NATO

The recent changes in approaches to collective security and alliances have been
driven by changing foci in the scholarly approaches; namely, the research and analysis
have been moving away from neorealism and toward post-positivism and critical
theories. This transition has been caused to a large extent by a shifting nature and
perception ofpower and threat. As Adler and Barnett put it:

By marrying security and community. . . states are revising the
conventional meaning of security and power. ... Some states are revising
the concept ofpower to include the ability of a community to defend its
values and expectations ofproper behavior against an external threat and
to attract new states with ideas that convey a sense of national security and

material progress.137
Not only is the relationship between the two concepts changing, but also the
concepts themselves are evolving. In reference to power, the authors said, "some states
are revising the concept ofpower to include the ability of a community to defend its
values and expectations ofproper behavior against an external threat and to attract new

Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, 5.
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states with ideas that convey a sense of national security and material progress."

In

essence, they married the concept of security against an external threat with the idea of
internal security, embodied in the concept of security communities. This project adds to
Adler and Barnett's idea by tracing that marriage of internal and external security through
the history ofNATO in an attempt to assess the effectiveness ofthat relationship for the
future of the Alliance.

With the shifting perception of threat and power, among other variables in the
international system that have recently undergone significant transformation, the ideas of
Karl Deutsch resurfaced again.

Constructivist scholars have been most prominent in resurrecting
Deutsch' s concept of security community: urging the that international
relations scholarship recognize the social character of global politics;
forwarding the need to consider the importance of state identities and the
sources of state interests; suggesting that the purpose for which power is

deployed and is regarded as socially legitimate may be changing; and
positing that the cultural similarities among states might be shaped by
institutional agents. Consequently, constructivist scholarship is wellsuited to consider how social processes and an international community
1 ^O
might transform security politics.

The concept of security communities was initially introduced by Richard Van

Wagenen in the early 1950s.140 But it was not noticed until the work of Karl Deutsch et
al in 1957 in which Van Wagenen also participated. Richard Van Wagenen and Karl

139Ibid., 12. See also: Alex Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social
Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 46 (Spring 1992): 391-425; Peter Katzenstein,

ed., Culture ofNational Security: Norms andIdentity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1996).

140 Donald Puchala, International Politics Today (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1971), 165.
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Deutsch defined security community as "a group which has become integrated. . .
[Integration] is the attainment, within a territory, of a sense of community."

The

authors argued that states can get integrated to such an extent that they have a sense of

community; this sense of community, in turn, assures, that when they disagree, they will
resolve their differences without using military means; rather, they will find a peaceful
and institutionalized way to resolve their differences. Therefore, states that are members
ofthat community have created a stable peace, and not just a stable order.
Deutsch and his team identified two types of security communities: amalgamated
and pluralistic. "An amalgamated community is the formal merger oftwo or more

independent units into some type ofa unitary or federal government."143 They pointed to
the United States as an example of an amalgamated security community. On the other
hand, "a pluralistic security community, e.g., the combined territory of the United States
and Canada, retains legal independence for the separate governments."

In both

instances, what holds the communities together is the high degree of communication
among the members. "Communication alone enables a group to think together, to see

together, and to act together,"145 claimed Deutsch.
In 1957, Deutsch and his colleagues applied to concept of security community to
the North Atlantic area in an attempt to gage its degree of amalgamation and integration.
They found that the North Atlantic area was not integrated. Although it was not a
security community, it contained several security communities within. It was considered
141 Karl Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1969), 3.

142 Ibid., 4.
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144 Ibid., 27.
145 Ibid., 36.
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a political community, however, with NATO serving as one of the amalgamating factors.
In their assessment, the authors took into account the compatibility of major values
(defined as main values which are considered to be of importance in the domestic

systems of the states in question), commonality of political ideology (constitutionalism
and democracy), and economic values (capitalism or socialism with free enterprise).
They remarked on a high degree of communication and mutual responsiveness among
some nations but not the others, which indicated a movement toward a security

community, even though one was not achieved yet at the moment the study was
conducted.

Adler and Barnett especially have been expanding on the ideas of Karl Deutsch
and their application to the current triangulation of power, threat, and security. Going
back to the concepts of communities, they define pluralistic communities as
"transnational regions comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable
expectations ofpeaceful change. Pluralistic security communities can be categorized
according to their depth oftrust, the nature and degree of institutionalization oftheir
governance system, and whether they reside in a formal anarchy or are on the verge of

transforming it."147 In case ofNATO, it is the pluralistic communities that are of
importance, as the Alliance's make up is a grouping of sovereign states.
Following in the footsteps of Deutsch, the authors identify two types ofpluralistic
security communities: loosely coupled and tightly coupled.

Ibid., 118-161.
Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, 30.
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Loosely coupled security communities observe the minimal definitional
properties and no more. ... Tightly coupled security communities,
however, are more demanding in two respects: First, they have a "mutual
aid" society in which they construct collective system arrangements.
Secondly, they possess a system ofrule that lies somewhere between a
sovereign state and a regional, centralized, government; that is, it is
something of a post-sovereign system, endowed with common
supranational, transnational, and national institutions and some form of a
collective security system.

NATO definitely is not just a loosely coupled pluralistic security community; however,
categorizing the Alliance as a fully integrated tightly coupled security community should
not be taken as a given, either. While NATO does meet some ofthe specifications of a
tightly coupled community as set by Adler and Barnett, the degree of cultural integration
and legitimacy ofthe supranational governing bodies have not reached their full
potential. However, the main and distinctive feature of what identifies a group of states
as a security community, namely "that a stable peace is tied to the existence of a

transnational community,"149 has been met in the case ofNATO.
Three characteristics define a community: first, members share identities, values,

and meanings.150 Second, there are multi-faceted direct relations between the members in
the community. Third, reciprocity based on long-term interest, knowledge of the

partners, and a sense ofresponsibility for the wellbeing ofthe community. 151 Members
will act in their own interests and the interests of the group, which—because of the

shared characteristics—will have a large degree of overlap. However, within
148 See: John Ruggie, Winning the Peace (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 81-82.
149 Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, 31.
150 Michael Taylor, Community, Anarchy, and Liberty (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1982), 25-33.

151 Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, 31.
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communities, there will be a different degree of peaceful conflict resolution and that
degree will depend on the degree of integration of the community and the legitimacy of
the supranational governing institutions.
As shown above, Adler and Barnett, in their work, returned to and built on the

idea of security communities introduced by Richard Van Wagenen and Karl Deutsch in
the 1950s. Given the recent return to this concept, the analysis of NATO's nature as a

collective security and an alliance should begin at the commencement of the idea of
security communities and its first application to the North Atlantic area. The main goal
of this project is to show the dual narrative ofNATO as a collective security organization
and an alliance, rather than inventing the concepts of collective security and alliances
anew. In that context, Deutsch' s concept of security community serves as a basis for

understanding the idea itself and NATO's role as a collective security institution.
However, how do we know that a security community has been effectively

established? How do we measure the degree of integration that would warrant to be
called a community? Deutsch et al applied the integration of domestic societies,
including their causal mechanisms and processes, to the integration among states in the
international environment. The authors measured the "sense of community" by

quantifying transaction flows. By transaction flows, the authors meant trade, migration,
tourism, cultural and educational exchanges, and use ofphysical communication
facilities. Furthermore, they put a particular emphasis on the volume of those transaction
flows within and among the nations in the community. Then, they compared the growth
in transaction flows within the societies in the states to the growth of transaction flows

among states. They used the level of integration within societies as a benchmark for the

77

degree of integration among states, which in turn indicated the growth of new
communities.

The next step in the process of analyzing communities is establishing a sound
connection between a sense of community and security. Here again, Karl Deutsch

applied the dynamics of peaceful change domestically to the international environment.
He assumed that at the international level the system is changing and the transformation
is caused by the formation of communities and the sense of 'we-ness'. In some instances,
the process of integration has reached such a high degree that the nonviolent change is
taken for granted. In his assumption, Deutsch challenged the realist school ofthought
dominant in the international relations at the time and advocating a state-centric analysis

of the international system, introducing the concepts of identity, and cultural and
ideological community among states that may lead to the unified behavior of those states
based on norms and rules.

In a similar fashion to Karl Deutsch, Kenneth Thompson sees the application of

the domestic order to international system as the means to create a collective security
system.

If the individual is threatened or endangered in municipal society, he turns
to the legitimate agents of law enforcement, the police. The comparatively
successful operation of this system has meant relative peace and tolerable
harmony for most local communities. Through the action ofpolice or "fire
brigades" on a world scale, collective security has as its goal two
comparable objectives. It would prevent war by providing a deterrent to

aggression. It would defend the interests ofpeace-loving states in war if it
came, by concentrating a preponderance ofpower against the aggressor.
152 Ibid., 7.

153 Thompson, "Collective Security Reexamined," 755.
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Deutsch' s ideas of creating collective communities did not catch on for various
reasons. First, there were substantial problems with his conceptualization.

As Arend

Lijphart points out, Deutsch "looked to transactions as the source of new identifications,
but his emphasis on quantitative measures overlooked the social relations that are bound
up with and generated by those transactions. His commitment to behavioralism. . .
overwhelmed the demand for a more interpretive approach at every turn."

Furthermore, Deutsch did not account for the influence of domestic politics on the
international behavior of states. In other words, Deutsch' s model ignored "social groups

or classes, decision-makers, business elites, and the mixture of self-interest and self

image that motivates their behaviors."156 By discounting these factors, the author did not
acknowledge "the complex and causal way in which state power and practices,
international organizations, transactions, and social learning processes can generate new
forms of mutual identification and security relations."
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Also, at the time of Deutsch's project, "scholars began adopting new theories and
concerning themselves with new research puzzles that shifted the ground away from it.

Increasingly, scholars interested in ideas of regional integration and international
cooperation used the vehicles of international interdependence, and later, international

regimes."158 Deutsch's idea, therefore, collided with the beginnings ofneoliberal
institutionalism. In addition, as Adler and Barnett point out, "any talk of a community of
154 Donald J. Puchala, "Integration Theory and the Study of International Relations," in Richard
Merritt and Bruce Russett, eds., From National Development to Global Community: Essays in Honor of
Karl W. Deutsch (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), 157.

155 Arend Lijphart, "Karl Deutsch and the New Paradigm in International Relations," in Richard
Merritt and Bruce Russett, 246.
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid.

158 Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, 9.
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states, not to mention a security community, seemed hopelessly romantic and vividly

discordant against the backdrop ofthe Cold War and the prospect ofnuclear war."159 In
other words, the field was not ready for neoliberal approaches or post-positivist theories.
"Quickly distancing themselves from the sociological spirit ofthese studies, the
discipline became enamored with structural realism, rational choice methods, and other
approaches to political life that excluded identities and interests as phenomena requiring

explanation. Deutsch's study was often cited but rarely emulated."160
However, for the purpose of this study, the positive contributions of Deutsch's
study take the central role, not the shortcomings of his methods. In 1957, Deutsch et al
applied the concept of security community to the North Atlantic area in attempt to gage

its degree ofamalgamation or integration.161 He found that the North Atlantic area was
not integrated to the extent that the term security community could be applied. Although
it was not a security community, it contained several security communities within its
geopolitical area. The North Atlantic area at the time was considered a political
community, with NATO serving as one of the amalgamating factors.
In their assessment, the authors took into account the compatibility of major

values (defined as main values which are considered to be of importance in the domestic
systems of the states in question), commonality of political ideology (constitutionalism
and democracy), and economic values (capitalism or socialism with free enterprise).
They remarked on a high degree of communication and mutual responsiveness among
some nations but not the others, which indicated a movement toward a security

IUJU.

Ibid.

Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, 118-161.
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community, even though one was not achieved yet at the moment the study was
conducted.

There is a fundamental difference between the neoliberal institutionalist approach

toward collective security discussed later and Deutsch' s proposal of security
communities. For the neoliberals, states build institutions and integrate "to encourage

cooperation and to further their mutual interest in survival."163 Adler and Barnett put it
this way:

Although neoliberal institutionalists are focusing on many ofthe same
variables discussed by Deutsch, their general commitment to how selfinterested actors construct institutions to enhance cooperation prevents

them from considering fully how: a community might be forged through
shared identities rather than through pre-given interests and binding
contracts alone; or, interstate and transnational interactions can alter state
identities and interests. While neo-liberal institutionalism shares with neo-

realism the assumption of anarchy, it is more interested in how selfinterested states construct a thin version of society through the guise of

institutions and regulative norms in order to promote their interests.

Given Deutsch's finding, combined with more detailed account of the mindsets of
political and military leaders at the time of the NATO conception as outlined in the
following chapters, in its early stages already, the Alliance was displaying characteristics
of a collective security organization, not merely an alliance. The degree of commonality
of cultural, political, historical, and economic values enhanced the sense of community

See: Bull, The Anarchical Society and Krasner, International Regimes.
Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, 11.
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among the member states, while the military alliance agreements contributed to its
external security.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter outlined the developments of collective security and collective
defense approaches over time, based on a wide range of theoretical schools of thought.

Beginning with realism, through institutionalism, to post-positivism, collective security
and alliances have been seen as separate ideas, oftentimes mutually exclusive. Some
scholars thought of collective defense as a subset of collective security or collective
security as a next step in the future of alliances. This paper posits that, contrary to
traditional approaches, those two concepts are not only complementary to each other, but
also mutually reinforcing, as is shown in the case ofNATO.
In 1953, Kenneth Thompson put the nature and evolution of the relationship
between the collective security and alliances in those words: "Approached in imaginary
and figurative terms, collective security may be said to have found its soul in the
revolution in beliefs, its body in the revolution in techniques, and its mind in the
revolution in contemporary international institutions taken place in the last three quarters

of a century."165
Let us look at each of the aspects Thompson mentioned. "The soul of collective

security has been formed by the growth ofpractical morality." Here, the author addresses
the normative socialization of the members based on the necessities pressed on them by

the international environment. In other words, he merges the practical necessities with
moral values. Collective security found its "body" in "revolution in techniques and
165 Thompson, "Collective Security Reexamined," 753.
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economics" or industrialization.166 This development essentially refers to globalization or
shrinking of time and space, increasing the economic, political and, most important to
this study, security interdependence of states. And what Thompson categorizes as the
"mind" of collective security is represented in the rapid growth and importance of

international institutions.167 Although written in the early 1950s, Thompson's passages
carry a very strong predictive nature of current characteristics ofrelationship between
different parts of a collective security organization.

However, today as it did throughout history, the concept of collective security
carries with it inherent problems. Mearsheimer rightly points out that "it is difficult to

find scholarly work that makes the case for collective security without simultaneously
expressing major reservations about the theory, and without simultaneously expressing

grave doubts that collective security could ever be realized in practice."168 However, his
criticism of collective security does not end there. The author paints the theory of
collective security as an incomplete one because

it does not provide a satisfactory explanation for how states overcome
their fears and learn to trust one another. ... The very purpose of a
collective security system. . . is to deal with states that have aggressive
intentions. In effect, collective security admits that no state can ever be
completely certain about another state's intentions, which bring us back to

a realist world where states have little choice but to fear each other.169

166 Ibid., 754.
167 Ibid.

168 Mearsheimer, "False Promise of International Institutions," 27.
169

Ibid., 31.
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Mearsheimer, however, is a realist in the most deep sense and meaning ofthat concept
and he approaches the concept of security only from a realist point of view. He continues
his criticism with outlining the difficulty in recognizing who the victim and aggressor are.
Also, he questions whether all kinds of aggression are wrong. In addition, the rapid
•

response to aggression is difficult to guarantee in a collective security system.
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From the perspective of realists and neorealists, therefore, NATO should have
dissolved after the end of the Cold War, since the external threat of the Soviet Union

disappeared. The continuing existence and transformation ofNATO, in that sense, are
generally explained by neoliberal institutionalist and post-positivist theories. NATO,
shows how the trends, generally characteristic to separate specific theories come can
work together—NATO bridges the gaps between the positivist and post-positivist
theories. "From a social constructivist perspective, NATO did not fragment as
neorealists had predicted because the shared democratic norms and identities of the
members meant that they did not perceive each other as threats with the end ofthe Cold

War."171 From this viewpoint, "NATO's continuation is seen as demonstrating the
Alliance's enduring and institutionalised patterns of co-operation, the existence of
common 'regulative' and 'constitutive' norms and values within the organisation, and the
continuing impact of the shared democratic identities upon which the Alliance is

based."172 Thomas Risse-Kappen adds to that by saying: "the Western Alliance

171 Michael C. Williams and Iver B. Neumann, "From Alliance to Security Community: NATO,
Russia, and the Power of Identity," Millennium: Journal ofInternational Studies 29, no. 2 (2000): 358.
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represents an institutionalization ofthe transatlantic security community based on
common values and a collective identity of liberal democracies."

1 7^

However, those competing perspectives and approaches in the case ofNATO also
complicate its further development and decisions regarding its future. "One of the

principle factors undermining NATO in 2006 is the presence of competing perspectives
among member-states, officials in Brussels, and NATO supporters, on the fundamental

nature and purpose ofthe Alliance."174 NATO was established in 1949 as a military
alliance based on the tenets of collective defense, as is shown in the chapter referring to

the creation ofNATO. "For the next forty years, NATO's security guarantee and identity
remained unchanged and resolute. In the 1990s, NATO governments gradually altered
the organization's structure and mission, shifting the Alliance's moorings toward
collective security as NATO enlarged its membership."
In reference to NATO, which since its conception has been showing the

characteristics of both collective security and alliances, scholars, analysts and politicians
have tended to ignore the fact that NATO has consistently performed both roles—

collective security and collective defense.176 The academics and practitioners alike
gravitate toward generalizations and extremes; in that sense, a collective security is only
viable and effective if it encompasses everything and everyone, and never fails. As Hook
and Robyn write: "This skewed analysis has discouraged consideration of a more
comprehensive rationale for NATO, as for other regional organizations that may one day
173 Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Identity in a Democratic Security Community," in Peter Katzenstein,
ed., The Culture ofNational Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1996), 395.

174 Rupp, NATO after 9/11, 193.
175 Ibid.

176 Hook and Robyn, 87.
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assume NATO's stature. Conventional analysis has neglected the possibility of

evolutionary patterns by which alliances complement collective-defense functions with
those pertaining to internal cohesion and the projection of shared interests, values, and
resources."177

It is enough to look into 1991 and 1999 NATO's strategic concepts which already
emphasized the collective defense as well as collective security roles of the Alliance.
The emphasis on internal cohesion in Western Europe persisted as the communist bloc
was weakening, with German reunification and the possible inclusion of Eastern
European states emerging as primary concerns. This new approach was elaborated further
in the Strategic Concept approved at the April 1999 Washington Summit, which noted
that a "new Europe of greater integration is emerging and a Euro-Atlantic security
structure is evolving in which NATO plays a central part." The statement emphasized the
importance of "solidarity within the Alliance through daily cooperation in both the
political and military spheres' and called for NATO to 'prevent the renationalization of
defense policies'. Both the 1991 and 1999 statements placed European security in a
broader context than previous articulations, stressing the importance of political,

economic, social and environmental factors as well as military defense."178
In summary, NATO from its birth has displayed characteristics of and acted as an
alliance and collective security institutions, with variant degrees of both at various times.
In the international environment where the nature and perception of threat are changing

178 See "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept 1991." NATO.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm and "The Alliance's Strategic Concept
1992."NATO. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm.
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and where the concept of sovereignty and power are being challenged, a combination of
collective security and collective defense in one organization provides an optimal
security arrangement and NATO has all the tools at its disposal to become that optimal
security organization in the future. The alliance nature, with its traditional focus on
external threat, provides the means and material power, whereas the collective security
part addresses the internal stability and supplies the legitimacy to the organization and the
accepted norms of behavior. Therefore, the two security concepts are complementary
and mutually reinforcing. To return to the words of Earl Ravenal:

In the bipolar environment, it was "characteristic ofproponents of
collective security to opt for, and also predict, an evolution of the
international system through increasing specific cooperation among
adversaries leading to general détente and, eventually, an underlying
concert—whether formal or not—that might support a universal regime of
authoritative management and restrain of power. It is the confluence of
the objectives of all possible major rivals (who would be adversaries in
several other types of system) that makes—and, historically, has made—
collective security possible. Thus, such a concert is both the1 7Qlimiting case
and the minimum condition of a collective security system.

This review of literature framed the concepts of collective security and alliances

as traditionally separate, yet recently complementary fields in the scholarly literature on
international security and stability. Furthermore, the outline ofthe existing research on
alliances exposed the gaps in the literature and showed where the triangulation and
intersection of the concepts of collective security and alliances, introduced in this project,
fit and how they complement the field. Most recent research on collective security and
Ravenal, "An Autopsy of Collective Security," 704.
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alliances addresses new theoretical, conceptual and empirical approaches to the NATO's

dual conceptual nature or alternatively, development of collective security from the
original objectives of collective defense. However, even with these most recent
developments in the field, the more comprehensive and systematic study of parallel or
subsequent development of collective security and collective defense natures or one
organization, especially in relations to NATO, is sparse and limited at best.
In 1997, Stephen Walt wrote:

During the Cold War, the clarity of the Soviet threat and the relatively
static nature of the global balance ofpower kept the main coalitions more
or less fixed for over four decades. The end of the Cold War has

eliminated the original rationale behind many of these arrangements (most
notably NATO), leading to a lively debate over their future prospects. For
the most part, however, this debate has not been informed by 1 a80
sophisticated theoretical understanding of alliance dynamics.

Although, over a decade has passed since he criticized the gaps in the literature
and research on alliances and collective security, not much has improved. In 2006, the

Journal ofPeace Research published a special issue concerning alliances. The six
articles included there addressed alliance formation, alliance polarization, alliances and

democratization, trade among allies, alliance obligations and regional economic
organizations, and defense policies of military alliances. While this wide range of
approaches provided a considerable expansion ofthe existing research on alliances,
again, nowhere in that issue was the relationship between the concepts of alliance and
collective security, presented in this project, mentioned or analyzed.
Stephen Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse?" Survival 39, no. 1 (1997): 156.
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CHAPTER III

NATO IN THE 1945 TO 1950 PERIOD

INTRODUCTION

The factual story ofNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization begins not in April 1949
but rather with the end of the World War II and the need to create a stable and secure

world order. If one were to examine the beginnings ofNATO from the perspective of

power, the account appears to be simple. On one hand, there is the Soviet Union and its
conquered European satellites, balanced on the other side ofthe Iron Curtain by the
United States and Western Europe. Each side tries to maintain and maximize its security
in the face of threat from the enemy. However, the narrative of the North Atlantic
Alliance is incomplete without accounting for the more complicated and intangible
normative nature of the organization focused on collective security.
NATO's birth was preceded by a long line of sometimes successful and at times
futile attempts at collective security institutions, such as the Concert of Europe, the
League ofNations, and the United Nations. One of the goals of those institutions was to
establish and promote collective security environment, setting certain standards of
acceptable behavior among nations, conducive to resolving disagreements and disputes
through peaceful means, rather than resorting to conflict. Therefore, it would be foolish
and rather superficial to say that NATO was created only to counteract the power ofthe
Soviets and protect Europe against their aggression. It would be equally imprudent to
assume that NATO's role today is only to show other organizations, regions, and the
world, how the international security environment should operate. Consequently, the
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story ofNATO combines both, the collective defense and security narratives, as it has
been proven through its past and present, and which certainly applies to its future.
This chapter presents the story ofNATO's birth, accounting for the narratives of
collective security and the collective defense, their roles in the creation of the Alliance,
and impact on and interaction with each other in the immediate post-WWII environment.
Furthermore, this chapter shows that at the point ofNATO's creation, collective security
and defense characteristics were reinforcing each other to such an extent that neither
would have been possible and durable without the other. The unique circumstances
based on the combination of commonality of goals and values inside the Alliance, and the
common perception of threat from the outside, allowed and encouraged the collective
security and defense to harmonize. In other words, this specific combination of
collective security and collective defense showed a direct structural dependency on the
international environment.

The discussion here is framed in the context of collective security structure and

alliances, with the factual history ofNATO's origins guided by the independent variables
mentioned above. The first part of this chapter focuses on dialogues and discourses prior

to April 4th, 1949, the date the when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. The second
section addresses the North Atlantic Treaty itself and the organizational arrangement of
the Alliance. Both sections are structured around and centered on the concepts of

alliances and collective security respectively, and the relation of those two narratives to
each other.

Given the relatively short period of time discussed in this chapter, the narratives
of alliance and collective security within NATO remained relatively constant. In the span
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of five years, the military, economic, and political strength of the United States in relation
to Western European countries continued unchanged. On the other hand, the perception
of relative power between the West and the Soviet Union was quite different. The West
perceived Moscow to be much stronger than it really was. As Lord Ismay wrote in 1954:
"On the other side of the Iron Curtain, Russia had about 25 divisions stationed outside the

Soviet Union, supported by about 6,000 aircraft available for immediate attack, the whole
under a centralized command: and behind these 'forward' Russian units was the massive

bulk ofthe Red Army and air forces."1
From the beginning of the discussion on the creation ofthe collective defense and
collective security institutions for Europe, the normative undertone was very strong. In
2000, Peter Duignan described the Alliance in those words:

NATO was, above all, more than a military alliance. It developed an

extensive system of committees dealing with subjects as varied as political
collaboration; the settlement of intra-alliance disputes; consultation on

foreign policy; economic, scientific, technical, social, and cultural
cooperation. ... The alliance united policymakers and executives of many
different nationalities in a common task. No other alliance in history had

comprised such a diversity ofpartners or cooperated on such a broad range
of subjects, nor lasted as long.

While in the period of 1945-1948, there was a relative disparity ofperceived
threat between the Americans and Canadians on one side, and Europeans on the other,

events of 1948 brought those three regions closer together, speeding up the process of
negotiations and decision-making. In terms of impact of alliance and collective security
1 Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years 1949—1954, 29.
2 Peter Duignan, NATO: Its Past, Present, and Future (San Francisco: Hoover Press, 2000), 20.
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natures on each other, those two variables complemented each other, while enhancing the

cooperation between the states engaged in the creation ofNATO.
As mentioned in the beginning of this study, the first period discussed here starts

with the end of World War II and ends on June 25th, 1950—the start of the Korean War.
The beginning date of this time period centers on spring of 1945, namely the end of
World War II in May and singing of the Charter ofthe United Nations in June. Those
two events, so close in time to each other, are very representative of the general spirit of

this project, for they represent the two main foci: collective security and collective
defense. Realist aspects of alliances are embodied in war and conflict, and their

conclusion in May 1945, while the collective security elements shine through the creation
of the United Nations, an international institution that set the stage for the future
international environment.

The date recognized as the beginning of the Korean War was a fundamental
watershed which changed the direction ofNATO. June of 1950, therefore, provides a
convenient point concluding the first period of analysis of the two narratives of collective
security and defense. After that date, the relationship between those two narratives
within NATO changes its course. This segment, therefore, with its introduction to and
explanation ofNATO's raison d'être at its conception, provides a much needed
background to understanding the Alliance in its Cold War and post-Cold War existence.
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EUROPEANS AND THE TREATY OF BRUSSELS

On June 26th, 1945, the Charter of the United Nations was signed in San
Francisco. The UN was created as the last deed of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt,

who was committed to establishing an international institution based on "Wilsonian
Idealism," main task of which was to uphold peace and stability in the world. In FDR's

own words, "great power involves great responsibility."3 In other words, as he stated in
his State of the Union Address in 1945, the necessity and usefulness of power are
undeniable; however, he equally emphasized the responsibility that came with that

power, especially in a democratic world, for which the United States served as a beacon
at the time.4 The Security Council, made of the major powers, carried the responsibility
to preserve peace and stability in the world, as designed personally by Roosevelt. Those
major powers, the former WWII Allies often referred to as "United Nations," bore the
duty ofprotecting states from potential aggressors. NATO, by extension, inherited that
task from the moment of its creation under the UN Charter.

In addition to the practical component of security, UN and NATO were created to
establish the norm for peaceful behavior. In 1954, the first Secretary General ofNATO,
Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay, wrote in his account ofthe conception and birth of the
Alliance:

The signature of the North Atlantic Treaty in April, 1949, marked the

beginning of a revolutionary and constructive experiment in international
relations. In signing the Treaty twelve independent sovereign states—later

to be joined by others—undertook pledges which called for immediate and
3 John Grafton, ed., Franklin Delano Roosevelt: Great Speeches (Dover: Dover Thrift Editions,
1999), 163.

4 Henry Commager, ed., Living Ideas in America (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 703.
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continuous collective action, not only in the military, but also in the
political, economic and social fields. ... Let it not be thought for a moment
that the present arrangements are final: on the contrary they can, and will,
be improved at times goes on and further experience is gained.

In Lord Ismay's understanding, NATO was to serve as protection against potential threats
and as an institutional pioneer in the set-up of the international norms of behavior.
Lord Ismay was not alone in his vision for the Alliance. Louis St. Lauren,
Canadian Minister of External Affairs and later Prime Minister, emphasized in April

1948 that the purpose ofthe North Atlantic alliance, in addition to providing security for
the Western, democratic world, "would create the dynamic counter-attraction to

Communism—the dynamic attraction of a free, prosperous and progressive society, as

opposed to the totalitarian and reactionary society ofthe Communist world."6 In the
words of both of those men, the future NATO would combine the role of a security

provider in the power-oriented, realist-based world, as well as construct a pattern of
behavior to follow: a blueprint founded on the principles of Western civilization,
democracy, and liberalism, all of which would lead to a peaceful, conflict-free world.
But the idea of collective security, or collective security and defense in one
organization, was not widely accepted by the political leaders in the beginning. In 1946,
Winston Churchill rejected the idea of "a defensive alliance between like-minded nations,

within the framework ofthe United Nations."7 It was not until September 1947 that the
idea was brought back by St. Lauren in an address to the UN. In his speech, St. Lauren
5 Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years 1949—1954, ix.
6 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1948, IV, 3449 in Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years
1949—1954, 15.

7 Nicholas Henderson, Birth ofNATO (Boulder: Westview, 1983), 77.

was concerned about "the inability of the Security Council to ensure the protection" for
peaceful Western democracies. He suggested that "these nations may seek greater safety
in an association of democratic and peace loving states willing to accept more specific
O

international obligations in return for a greater measure of national security." Again,
from the beginning of the discussions on NATO's creation, the underlying discourses
were not only focused on providing security against the threat posed by the Soviet Union.
Rather, there was a clear emphasis on uniting Western, democratic nations, who would
accept certain international obligations, while receiving collective protection in return.
While the United States and Canada fell into the category of democratic states

responsible for international peace and security, as Roosevelt maintained, it was the
Western European nations who found themselves in the direct and immediate threat of
the Soviet politics and military. Although it was in the best interest of the United States
to rebuilt Europe economically and ensure its security from the Soviets, in terms of the
actual tangible threat or the perception ofthreat, the Western Europeans and Americans
were in quite different positions. The US was separated by two oceans from the Soviet
Union and its extensive conventional forces. It would have taken considerable time and

effort for Moscow to launch an attack on the US. Furthermore, at this point Washington

was in possession ofthe only nuclear capability in the world. Economically, the US was
in a much better shape than the Soviet Union, and definitely better than war-damaged
Europe.
On the other side of the Atlantic, the situation was vastly different. In terms of

geography, the Soviets were right next door without much room to spare in case of a
Russian attack, nor much time to prepare. The Europeans also grossly misunderstood
8 Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years 1949—1954, 7.

95

and misperceived the strength of Russian conventional force, thinking it was much
stronger than it was. Politically, Russia was establishing communist regimes in Eastern
and Central Europe, creating its fiiture satellites. And economically, although depleted
and damaged by war, with the massive expanse of land, resources, and Stalin's policy of
rapid and forceful industrialization, Moscow was dominating over Europe.
Given this political, economic, and security triangulation between the United
States and Canada on one side, Western Europe in the middle, and the Soviet Union on
the other side, it is no surprise that originally the United States was not eager to tie itself
up militarily in the security of Europe. US Secretary of State, General Marshall, in his
1947 Harvard speech said to the Western European governments: "Try and help

yourselves and we will try to see what we can do. Try and do the thing collectively, and

we will see what we can put into the pool."9 In other words, while General Marshall
recognized the need for security in Europe and its benefit to the United States, it was the
responsibility of Europeans to collectively fend for themselves. Only in the case ofthe
inability on the part of the Europeans to ensure their security against the Russians would
the United States get involved.

However, to the European governments, the message from General Marshall
provided a positive incentive. In the words of the British Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, Ernest Bevin, Washington's position "meant the beginning of Europe's salvation,
and Europe will go on until it has restored itself and reestablished its culture, its
influence, and in turn that gift will become an investment, because in the years to come
we will return to the United States, for all of the gifts you have made, the blessings that
9 Don Cook, Forging the Alliance: NATO, 1945-1950 (Ann Arbor: Arbor House Publishing,
1989), 88.
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Europe can still give."10 European statesmen understood that it was their responsibility to
collectively provide for security in Europe; however, given the economic and military
shape of the continent relative to the United States, many of them were rather pessimistic
as to their potential capabilities, if left alone without the American assistance.
That first step, European collective security, recognized by both Americans and
Europeans as necessary, was introduced in January 1948 by Ernest Bevin in the House of
Commons. He proposed to form a western union built on the network ofbilateral
agreements among the Western European governments. As a blueprint for his proposal,

Bevin used the example ofthe Dunkirk Treaty11 of 1947, extending the cooperation
between France and Great Britain to include Belgium, Luxemburg and the Netherlands.

In addition, he also put forward an example ofthe Rio Treaty,13 a collective defense
arrangement "aimed against any aggression" between the US and the Latin American

states.14 With those two treaties as basis, combining the framework ofbilateral defense
against a pre-existing threat and principles of "attack against one is an attack against all,"
Bevin provided a solid collective defense structure for the Europeans.
Furthermore, he emphasized the historical, civilizational, and political unity of
Western Europe. "We shall have to consider the question of associating other historic
member of European civilization, including the new Italy, in this great concept. ... We are

thinking ofWestern Europe as a unit."15 Again here, in the words ofBevin, the more
10 Cook, 88.

1 ' Lawrence Kaplan, NATO 1948: The Birth ofthe Transatlantic Alliance (Unham: Rowman and
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007), 12. Signed in 1947, Dunkirk Treaty was a fifty-year pact signed by
Great Britain and France against potential resurgent German nationalism.

12 Ismay, 7.
13 Lawrence Kaplan, 28.
14 Ismay, 8.
15 Henderson, 77.
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normative undertone of discourse complements pure security concerns in the narrative of
what later would become the North Atlantic Alliance. The countries here were not

considered as separate national entities; rather, there was a drive for establishing a
common identity.

In March 1948, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Great
Britain met in Brussels to launch a structure for mutual assistance. While the leaders

feared that this would not be possible without American assistance, General Marshall
again stressed that while Washington shared the concerns ofthe Europeans, the European
states must be able to "do for themselves and for each other before asking for further

American assistance."16 Despite doubts and uncertainties, the Treaty of Brussels, which
later server as basis for the North Atlantic Treaty, was signed by Belgium, France,

Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom on March 17th, 1948. Article IV
of this Treaty stated that if any of the members were attacked, the other members would
support the attacked states with "all the military and other aid and assistance in their

power."17
The states pledged to "set up a joint defensive system as well as to strengthen

their economic and cultural ties."18 In that statement, the cultural and constructivist
attitudes accompany the neorealist security issues. Although the main focus of this treaty
was to provide a joint defensive system for Western Europe, the goals ofpreserving
democracy and Western cultural values was not unrecognized. The words of General
16 Ismay, 8.
17 Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, Article IV,
Brussels, 17 March 1948. This Treaty was signed by France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the
Netherlands and Luxembourg. Although it provided only for cooperation between the signatories and it did
not provide for the establishment of an international organization, in practice it lead to the creation of the
Western Union.

18 Ismay, 8.
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Marshall summarize well the importance ofthe Treaty of Brussels: "United Europe can
stand on its feet as a powerful united states of Europe. Divided Europe can only repeat

its own history."19

AMERICANS AND THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE

In February 1948, the communist party in Czechoslovakia, with the support of the
Soviet troops, took control of Prague. This event exposed the intentions of Stalin in
regards to Eastern European governments—namely, Stalin had no intentions of allowing
free elections in the countries occupied by the Soviets, despite earlier promises made to
President Harry Truman. Along with further solidification of the East-West division, the
Czech coup d'état provided the first strong push for Washington to revisit the question of

support for Western European defense system.20 The second push came four months
later with the Berlin blockade, which begun in June 1948 and reinforced the US
reexamination ofjoining the Europeans in their effort to collectively defend the Western

culture and values.21 Starting in July 1948, Americans and Canadians started attending
the meetings of the Brussels Powers.
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Given the involvement and intentions of Moscow in Prague and Berlin, the Soviet
threat shifted from potential to direct in the perceptions ofboth, the Europeans, the
Canadians and the Americans. From that moment, the decisions and actions on the side

of all three happened relatively quickly. In April 1948, Secretary of State George
Marshall and Under-Secretary Robert Lovett started talking with Senators Arthur
19 Ray Sawyer, Hearings on Economic Recovery Plan, January 21, 1948, House Committee on

Foreign Affairs, 678; February 5, 1948, HR, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, 1388—99.

20 Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking Press, 1951), 387.
21 Cook, 171.
22 Lawrence Kaplan, 14.
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Vandenberg and Tom Connally regarding security issues in the North Atlantic region.
At the end of April that year, St. Lauren introduced the idea of an organization including
the US, Canada, and the Brussels Powers to the Canadian House of Commons. A week
later, Bevin did the same at Westminster. At the same time, Vandenberg prepared a

resolution involving the US in a collective security arrangement with Canada and
Western Europe "contributing to the maintenance ofpeace by making clear its
determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defence under Article
51 (of the United Nations Charter) should any armed attack occur affecting its national

security."24 Despite the subsequent negotiations, this resolution effectively marked the
US entrance into the Atlantic Alliance.25
The treaty proposed by Vandenberg would operate under the framework of the
UN Charter. As Lord Ismay stated, the treaty would be designed to "promote peace and
security; express determination of the parties to resist aggression; define the area in
which it should be operative; be based on self-help and mutual aid; be more than military:

that is, promote stability and well-being of the North Atlantic peoples; provide machinery

for implementation."26 Between the military and defense elements ofthe proposed treaty
and its goals to promote peace and security, again here the conception ofNorth Atlantic
Treaty displays the elements of realist alliances and institutionalist collective security.
While empirically it would be hard to determine which took precedence in those
formative years, it is safe to assume that in terms ofpracticality security and defense
23 Escott Reid, Time ofFear and Hope: The Making ofthe North Atlantic Treaty 1947-1949
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, Co., 1977), 37.

24 The Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty. Hearing in Executive Session before

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 80th Congress, 2nd Session; on Senate Resolution 239; May 19,
1948. Vandenberg Resolution, also known as Resolution 239, passed in the US Senate by 64 to 4 vote.
25 Ibid.

26 Ismay, 10.

against the apparent threat from the East provided the needed reason and catalyst to unite
Americans, Canadians, and the Western Europeans.
In March 1949, the Brussels Powers, Canada and the US invited Denmark,

Iceland, Italy,27 Norway and Portugal to partake in the Treaty. The following month, on
April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed by Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Within five months, the parliaments of the member
states ratified the treaty. In 1952, Greece and Turkey joined the Alliance. The pace of
the process ofnegotiation and ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty was representative
of the perceived need to unite forces against the tangible threat from the Soviet Union.

THE NATURE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE
AT NATO'S CONCEPTION

The narrative of the NATO's conception prior to the signing of the North Atlantic
Treaty speaks loudly to the interaction ofneoliberal and neorealist variables of collective
defense and security. Lord Ismay talked about the degree ofunity among NATO
members, spanning from military individuals to politicians. He saw this as a great
accomplishment five years after NATO's conception, along with the creation of the
governing bodies and the infrastructure of the organization. In 1954, he wrote:

27 Issues with Italian communism provided the reason for the perceived necessity to quickly
involve Rome in the North Atlantic Treaty and make it effectively dependent on the West. President
Truman was worried about Italy falling into the Russian hands and was set on preventing that from
happening. "The Position ofthe United States with Respect to Italy," NSC 1/1, November 14, 1947,
FRUS, 1948, III: 726.

There is another achievement which is perhaps even more valuable—

namely the remarkable degree of unity which characterizes all the NATO
agencies. A visitor to the NATO Defence College will see officers of
eight or ten different nations working in the same study group and
lunching together afterwards, learning each others' view points and
making friendships that will endure perhaps for a lifetime. There is the
same atmosphere at all NATO military headquarters. . . . [M]en belonging
to different nations, speaking different languages, wearing different
uniforms, carry out together, with admirable precision, exercises of
impressive magnitude. The forces ofNATO are no longer a dream, they
are a reality. On the civil side, no member ofthe International Staff
regards himself as a national of his own country. They all feel themselves
member of an international team dedicated to the service of the Alliance as

a whole.28

Especially the last sentence strays away from purely security-oriented role of
NATO. Lord Hastings talks about the culture of common identity, where nationalism
does not find a place, where the military and civilians operate as an "international team"
designed to protect and promote the same set of cultural and political values. Lawrence
Kaplan in his book on the first years ofNATO reinforces the same idea. While there
indisputably was the perception of threat from the Soviet Union and a sense of
encroaching danger, "there was also a mix of idealism and realism that transcended the
sense of crisis in 1948. After World War II, the United States believed that they could

help create the peaceful and prosperous world the United Nations failed to secure. A
United States of Europe, no matter how distant its realization, was expected to become a
political and economic partner of the United States."

Ismay, x.
Lawrence Kaplan, x.

This partnership would span from culture to security, from politics to economics.
Nobody was disputing the dependence of Europe on the military, economic, and political
power ofthe United States. However, there was a growing sense of interdependence of
European and US economies, based on the basic principle of supply and demand: the US
needed a market, and the Europeans needed the supplier. "The Alliance was, therefore,
primarily an answer to the great disparity of strength and purpose between the
Communist-dominated countries to the East and the weakness and fragmentation of

Western Europe. It was also a response to the overall problem ofrecovery in Western
Europe and the lack of any current prospect of working effectively with the Soviet Union
to achieve a European-wide settlement."

The founding fathers ofNATO had ambitious plans for the alliance.

In the past, alliances and leagues have always been formed to meet
emergencies and have dissolved as the emergencies vanished. It must not
be so this time. Our Atlantic union must have a deeper meaning and

deeper roots. It must create the conditions for a kind of cooperation which
goes beyond the immediate emergency. Threats to peace may bring our
Atlantic pact into existence. Its contribution to welfare and progress may

determine how long it is to survive.31
With this approach, from the moment of its conception, NATO was more than an
alliance, assuming the route of a comprehensive collective security institution, designed

30 John McCloy, The Atlantic Alliance: Its Origin and Its Future (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1969), 26, 27-28.

31 Speech given by Lester Pearson, the Canadian Minister ofExternal Affairs, on February 4th,
1949 to the Canadian Parliament to explain the Washington Treaty. In Lester Pearson, Words and
Occasions: An Anthology ofSpeeches andArticles Selectedfrom His Papers (Toronto: Toronto
University Press, 1970), 86.
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to not only defend from an external threat but also to promote the ideal of peace and
security in the world.
Lester Pearson, the Canadian Minister of External Affairs, in a speech given at the

ceremony of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, said: "The North Atlantic Treaty
was born out of fear and frustration; fear of the aggressive and subversive policies of
communism and the effect of those policies on our own peace, security, and well-being;

frustration over the obstinate obstruction by communist state of our efforts to make the

United Nations fonction effectively as a universal security system."32 But the fear and
frustration expressed by him did not tell the whole story ofNATO. "This Treaty, though
born of this fear and frustration, must, however, lead to positive social, economic, and

political achievements if it is to live; achievements which will extend beyond the time of
emergency which gave it birth, or the geographical area which it now includes."
Furthermore, he emphasized the concept of community, bound together by values.

We, in this North Atlantic community, the structure of which we now

consolidate, must jealously guard the defensive and progressive nature of
our league. There can be no place in this group for power politics or
imperialist ambitions on the part of any of its members. This is more than
a treaty for defence. We must, of course, defend ourselves, and that is the
first purpose of our pact; but, in doing so, we must never forget that we are
now organizing force for peace so that peace can one day be preserved
without force.34

Ibid., 88
Ibid.
Ibid.

Here again, the normative elements of establishing international peace and security
complement the practical security concerns. Bevin's phrase "spiritual federation of the
West"35 in reference to NATO serves as an apt conclusion to Pearson's remarks and a
suitable summary of NATO's inherent nature.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY: CONVERSATIONS ON STRUCTURE AND
DESIGN

The discussions and negotiations on the structure ofNorth Atlantic organization
also show the elements of collective security and collective defense. While the US was a

hegemon in terms ofpolitical, military and economic power and could push for a design
more favorable to Washington and representative ofpurely a collective defense
organization, the neoliberal and normative components influenced the building of the
Alliance structure in a visible way. The Preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty states:

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purpose and principles
of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with

all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the
freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on

the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They
seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They
are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the

preservation ofpeace and security.

From the first paragraph, the North Atlantic Treaty clearly combines the elements
of collective security and collective defense. The cultural components of common
Lawrence Kaplan, 15.

North Atlantic Treaty. Preamble. Washington DC, April 4th, 1949.
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heritage, civilizational and historical values, and Western principles of democracy, liberty
and the rule of law take an equally important place in the design ofNATO as do the
tangible threats. Again, it would be hard to determine at this point which set, the
collective security or the collective defense, takes the precedent over the other. The
question here, therefore, is not really about which is more important than the other.
Rather, the difference is in the immediate needs versus long-term goals, in the practical
necessities and future potential effects. The alliance components satisfy the immediate
needs, while the collective security undertones set the stage for common basis and future
goals.
Furthermore, Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty provides four binding

commitments that speak directly to the collective security nature: "1. to strengthen their
free institutions; 2. to bring about a better understanding of the principles on which those
institutions are founded; 3. to promote conditions of stability and well-being; 4. to seek to
eliminate conflict in their international economic policies, and to encourage collaboration

between any or all ofthem."37 Therefore, it is safe to say that the neoliberal and
normative elements of NATO are visible not only in the Preamble, but also throughout

the rest ofthe text of the Treaty, reinforcing the importance ofnorms beyond the
appeasement of obligatory and superficial wording characteristic of international
documents.

The need for security in face ofpotential tangible and intangible dangers echoes
throughout the Treaty as well. In Chapter VII Article 5 1 , it is written:

37 North Atlantic Treaty, Article II. Washington DC, April 4th, 1949.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures

necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by
members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately

reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain and restore international peace and security.

The first part of Article 51 emphasizes the connection ofNorth Atlantic Treaty
Organization to the United Nations, and its goals of international peace and security. In
its collective security structure, the principles of self-defense and membership in an
organization for mutual assistance do not exclude one another. In its character, therefore,
NATO was not designed purely as a military alliance. Using the words of Lord Ismay,

NATO's first appointed leader: "It is, of course, true that the Treaty was born of
collective insecurity and that the energies of the Treaty Powers have hitherto been

primarily directed to strengthening their collective defence against aggression."39
However, he could not avoid adding the cultural unity and commonality of the

universal values among the members. As he points out "the Preamble and the first two
articles of the Treaty make it crystal clear that the member countries believe they belong
to a community of nations within which cooperation should be developed not only for

defence, but in all fields."40 Along with other founding fathers ofthe North Atlantic
Alliance, Lord Ismay had long-terms plans and hopes for the organization, extending

38 Charter of the United Nations. Chapter VII. Article 51. San Francisco, June 26th, 1945.
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/intro.shtml.

39 Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years 1949—1954, 15.
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beyond simply providing security against the Soviets. Rather, Ismay wrote, "[p]eace is
not merely the absence ofwar: its maintenance requires continuous cooperation by

governments in economic, social, and cultural, as well as in the military field."

CONCLUSIONS

Given the post-WWII geopolitical environment in Europe, there is no question
that it was to the benefit of the West—the Americans, Canadians, and the Western

Europeans—to cooperate and support each other in the creation of a security system
designed to deter the Soviet from an attack on Europe. While the Europeans felt the
more immediate need of defense system, this could not have been effectively

accomplished without the power of the United States. However, from the perspective of
Washington, the US could have provided the necessary military reinforcement for Europe
to defend itself against the Russians.
Why did Washington choose to bind itself to the European governments through
the North Atlantic Treaty? Why did Americans not simply loan their conventional and
nuclear forces, combined with economic strength, to Europe? The answer lies in the
other independent variable utilized in this study—namely the collective security
narrative. From the beginning, NATO was not only about the security in Europe against
the evil forces of the USSR; rather, as apparent in the Preamble and many Articles of the
Treaty, and exemplified in the words of Bevin, Pearson, Marshall, and Vandenberg,

among other founding fathers, the ambitions, hopes, goals ofNATO reached out to
setting the international standard of behavior that would promote peace and stability,
along with Western values of liberty, freedom, and democracy. In other words, in those
41 Ibid.

108

early stages ofNATO's development, the collective security and collective defense
mechanisms were not only reinforcing each other; rather, they were dependent on each
other.

This dependency was especially evident in the months following the 1948
communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade. The speedy pace at which
the United States and Canada decided to join the Brussels Powers under the umbrella of a
comprehensive organization and structures ofNATO was further increased by the
amplified sense of threat from the Soviet Union, leading to a relatively smooth process of
negotiating and making decisions regarding the future shape of the Atlantic Alliance.
The effort of the founding fathers proved successful; the originally planned conclusion of
the organization, set for 1969, is long gone; despite the disappearance of the major threat
against which NATO was created as an alliance, the North Atlantic Alliance is still in
existence, taking on increasingly wider scope of responsibilities, and functionally and
practically extending its role and nature from a collective defense to collective security
institution to an even great extent.
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CHAPTER IV

NATO IN THE 1950 TO 1991 PERIOD

INTRODUCTION

This chapter begins with the day considered by some to be the effective beginning

ofthe Cold War; namely, June 25th, 1950 which is remembered in history as the day
when the North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel and invaded South Korea. As the
previous chapter indicated, the beginning of the Korean War was a watershed moment in
the history ofNATO as well. Given the change in the external environment, in June
1950 the Alliance was faced with a more immediate sense of threat from the side of

communism, threat that carried potentially more wide-spread and heavy consequence
than thought before. Accordingly, NATO would have to prepare to respond to this new
scope ofpotential threat. At this point, the story of the East-West conflict extended from
Europe to Asia. The Soviet Union and China appeared much stronger to the West, and

the potential of communist expansion in the Asian continent presented a vital threat to the
US and European security.

As pointed in the discussion ofNATO's beginnings, the narratives of collective
defense and collective security, combined with and impacted by the perception ofthreat,
all played a significant role in the direction that the Alliance took throughout its history.
The decisions made before the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty were impacted in an

equal measure by the high degree of commonality of interests among the future allies,
based on the perception of threat coming from the Soviet Union, as well as the need to
uphold Western values and norms within the Western block, characteristic of collective
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security communities. At this point, the unequivocal superiority of the US power within
an alliance was an added benefit, which provided the Alliance with a clear leader who
could use power to nudge the decision-making process and speed it up.
The interaction between the collective security and defense narratives in this
period support the patterns shown in the previous period, centered on NATO's creation.
The case of Germany's accession into the Alliance demonstrates that those two narratives
are still running parallel and reinforcing each other. Furthermore, they are as imperative
for each other's existence as was the case with the origins ofNATO. In addition, both of
the narratives still show high degree of dependency on the structural environment. The
increased perception of threat coming out of the Soviet Union in the wake of the Korean
War pushed the alliance narrative. The symptom or sign ofthat push was Germany's
joining.

In the same time, despite concerns from Great Britain and France about German
propensity for conflict, Germany was incorporated into the Alliance as a democratic state.
From the position of other allies, Germany would be from now on kept in check as well
and socialized to behave according to the internal security standards of the Alliance—
here the narrative of collective security is clearly displayed.

Would economically-needed Germany be allowed to enter the Alliance if it were
not showing the same set of democratic values, aversion to military conflict and potential
for building security community based on peaceful solution of disagreements with other
countries? Probably not. Would democratic Berlin be incorporated into the NATO
structures if its military and economic resources were not needed for the alliance?

Ill

Probably not. Germany at the point of its accession possessed a perfect combination of
values and material components to be wanted by and allowed into the Alliance.
This chapter, therefore, uses the cases of German accession to the alliance and
NATO's nuclear policy as examples of the interaction ofthe two historical narratives of
collective security and collective defense in the second period ofNATO's existence. The

beginning date ofthis phase is June 25th, 1950, which as explained earlier, served as an
important event in the life ofthe Alliance. To determine the end of this time period, the

official dissolution of the Soviet Union is used. On December 12th, 1991, the Belavezha
Accords1 were ratified by the Congress of Peoples' Deputies of the Russian Federation,
effectively denouncing the 1922 treaty which created the Soviet Union. This event
marked the end of the tangible threat which served as one of the main causes for the birth
ofNATO.

The second case discussed in this chapter, NATO's policy regarding nuclear
capabilities, and the long-stretched process ofdisagreements and negotiations, was
guided not by the incompatibility of goals and values, but rather by the divergent
perceptions ofwhat is the best policy for the European members given the Soviet threat.
Therefore, this case shows that despite protracted periods ofdiscord, the alliance and
collective security natures ofNATO remained untouched. Even the French withdrawal
from the command structure ofthe organization did not leave any long term negative
effects. France remained in the political structures ofNATO, was still covered under
NATO's umbrella in terms of external security, and in 2009 returned into the command
structure.

1 Belavezha Accords were signed by the leaders ofRussian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian Republics
on December 8th, 1991, dissolving the Soviet Union and creating the Commonwealth of Independent States.
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The two cases chosen for this time period represent the pattern of cohesion and
agreement among the NATO allies, interrupted by the dissonance and disagreements over
means but not goals—the goals still remained those of internal and external security. The
example of West German accession into the Alliance and the MLF story show the

organization in its time of cooperation, albeit characterized by heated discussion and
negotiations. In both cases, it is important to mention the structural environment. In
1955, the perception of threat coming from the Soviet Union was heightened, pushing for
a more cohesive combination of collective security and defense.

On the other hand, during the MLF negotiations, the Cold War was going through
the period of détente and changed nature of cooperation between the West and the East.
For the Europeans, this meant a perception of decreased threat. Within the Transatlantic
Alliance at that time, there was a divergence of opinions as to the means that the internal
and external security can be accomplished, but not the divergence of opinions as to the
need for those types of security. Therefore, despite heated discussions and disagreements
on means, alliance and collective security progressed, albeit at a slower pace.
Don Cook, in his book Forging the Alliance, points out to the cycles of
cooperation and dissention in the Alliance.

The first 'NATO cycle' was set off by the Soviet test explosion ofthe
atomic bomb in 1949 followed by the Korean War in 1950, ending on the
downside in the Eisenhower presidency. The second cycle was set off by
Sputnik, Soviet resumption of nuclear testing and the threat to Berlin at the
start of the Kennedy presidency, and ended on the downside in détente in
the 1970s. The third cycle began under President Carter, in response to
the Soviet conventional buildup and its growing nuclear superiority with
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massive deployment of the SS-20 under way against Europe—all of this
culminating, then, in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

This cyclical pattern is best summarized in the words of Reimund Seidelman who
wrote in 1985: "Atlantic cooperation has always been characterized by consensus and

dissensus."3 Or maybe after all, aside from the external threats and internal
disagreements, the North Atlantic Alliance has always had at its heart the caring
cultivation of the transatlantic culture, values and unequivocal historic link between

Europe and the United States. As Helga Haftendorn says: "[A]fter the demise of an
acute military threat, NATO continues to have a raison d'être and a mission: to ensure a
close link between America and Europe. ... At the end of the East-West conflict, the
Alliance could again, as in the 1966-7 NATO crisis, use its flexibility and adaptability to
assume a new role as the guardian of an all-European stability." So again, despite the
disagreements and heated disputes, the allies remain connected not only through mutual
military reinforcement, but also through commonality of values, effectively extending
NATO from an organization of collective defense to one of collective security.

INTERNATIONAL STAGE: THE KOREAN WAR

June 25th, 1950 had a "profound influence on the evolution ofNATO."5 The
North Korean army crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea, effectively invading its
2 Cook, 271.
3 Reimund Seidelman, "Europeanizing European Security? A Political Demythologicalization" in
Robert Jackson, ed., Continuity and Discord: Crises and Responses in the Atlantic Community (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1985), 141.

4 Helga Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution: A Crisis ofCredibility, 1966-1967
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), v.

5 Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years 1949—1954, 31.
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neighbor after a long period ofpolitical strife. In response, the United Nations Security
Council ordered ceasefire which was ignored. Given the lack of reaction by either side of

the conflict, on June 27th, President Truman instructed the US air and naval forces to
support South Korean forces; furthermore, on the same day, the UNSC denounced North
Korea as the aggressor, decided on military and economic sanctions against it, and called
on all member states to send aid to South Korea.

For the first time in history, an international organization took a military action.
As Lester Pearson said to Dean Acheson in July 1950: "The struggle ahead should not be
one of the United States vs. the Communist world. The American people could be

convinced of this if we all acted together on the Korean front as members ofthe United

Nations, and ifwe worked together to strengthen our defenses generally."6 Subsequently,
Acheson suggested that NATO should lead a collective, coordinated effort to bring
stability and security to the conflict between the Koreas.
Besides historical significance, the beginning of the Korean War, and the
subsequent UNSC decision, provided a push for NATO to start organizing quicker than it
was doing up to that date. Before that, while the Treaty was signed and decisions
regarding structure and policies were being made, especially the Americans were not
ready to act. "It was the Europeans who were pushing and pleading for a reluctant
America to move in, take over and dominate. But the United States was trying. . . to get

Europe back on its own feet to look after its own economic and security problems." The
two steeples of the economic and security support, as outlined by President Truman, were
the Marshall Plan and military support for Western Europe.
6 Elizabeth Sherwood, Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 34-35.

7 Cook, 225.
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This was why General Marshall had urged Bevin to launch a security
arrangement in Europe with the Brussels Treaty before turning to the
United States. This was why George Kennan and Chip Bohlen had
opposed the North Atlantic Treaty idea, and contended instead that the
United States should confine itself to a unilateral guarantee of support for
Europe if it were attacked but should not become more deeply involved.
Q

From the above evidence, it is clear that NATO was not designed to be a purely
military security arrangement. If that was the case, then the US would have no reason to
commit as deeply as it did. Washington could, after all, provide the unilateral support for
Europe only and not bind itself by the structures ofNATO. The reason that more was
accomplished in the framework of an institution was because the mindset of the founding
fathers ofNATO had at its core the normative roots of the Alliance, going beyond

neorealist power and security agenda and into the field of neoliberal and constructivist
collective security arrangement. Robert Osgood writes: "On the eve of the Korean War,
NATO already embodied a degree of military collaboration that was unprecedented
among peacetime coalitions. ... The United States, sharing an identical interest with the
enfeebled countries of Western Europe in their economic recovery and security, extended
them the assurance of an entangling alliance."

Given the immediate need presented by the outbreak of the Korean War, in July,
1950, the Council Deputies met under the leadership of the US Ambassador Charles
Spofford and emphasized the need to increase effort and contributions from each
member. In the same time, the Brussels Treaty Powers met to discuss rearmament. The
8 Ibid.

9 Robert Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962),
47.
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speed of response was remarkable: all members responded by the end of August, 1950
with their propositions for increase of armament despite economic and financial
concerns. During the September meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the members
repeatedly expressed a fear of aggression similar to North Korean attack on South Korea.
They emphasized the need to prepare, especially given the inadequacy of existing forces
and structures of the Alliance at the time. "The Council decided that members should

take urgent measures to increase their military strength. ... An 'integrated force under a
centralized command, adequate to deter aggression and to ensure the defence ofWestern
Europe', was to be created and placed under a Supreme Commander to be appointed by
NATO."10

Here again, it is important to point out the speed of decisions made in the face of
an outside threat, with the unanimity in action and the prospect of very real and tangible
threat in near sight. As the Korean War continued and the fear ofthe domino theory
taking effect in Asia prevailed, the Truman Doctrine was shaping and impacting the
cooperation between the Allies in Europe. In the background ofthose events and

mindsets, West Germany was invited to join the North Atlantic Alliance on May 5th,
1955.

WEST GERMANY'S ACCESSSION INTO NATO

In the case of West Germany's joining the ranks ofNATO, the perception of
threat greatly influenced both of the narratives, the collective security and the alliance
one, playing a critical role in the behavior of the Alliance. The US was pushing strongly
for including Bonn in the Alliance, simply because NATO needed to reinforce its military
10 Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years 1949—1954, 32.
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capability in the face of danger coming from the communist bloc. In the same time, West
Germany under Chancellor Adenauer was taking a political course oriented toward a
western-style democracy. Given the ideological fundamentals ofNATO, it was only
logical that West Germany should be allowed to join the Alliance, since it shared the
basic normative values of its members, namely the cultural and historical heritage, the
geopolitical closeness, and the democratic political system. Although the negotiations
among the existing members took five years, the process of West German accession was
not as troublesome as the nuclear policies and related issues outlined later in the chapter.
The case of Germany well represents the fundamental and general issue of the Alliance.
Earl Ravenal describes it well, when he writes:

The alliance of Atlantic nations, in its history, has been beset by many

kinds ofproblems. There have been the periodic recrudescence of
commercial and agricultural disputes; the irreconcilable antagonisms of
pairs of nations, such as Greece and Turkey; the threat of
Eurocommunism; the acrimony revolving around burden-sharing; the
complaints about the "one-way street" of American military production
for the alliance; the assaults of neutralists and anti-American political

groups; the failures of "consultation" and the recriminations about
American "hegemony." But whatever else is wrong with the Atlantic
alliance, its essential problems are strategic. ... In NATO the principal
problem is that the United States and Europe have persistently failed to

resolve their discordant strategic conceptions. l x

In December, 1949, Bonn asked the Brits, the French, and the Americans what is

being done to protect Germany against potential attack from the Soviet Union. At that
time, however, "the Bonn government. . . did not indicate any desire to rearm in order to
11 EarlRavenal, "NATO: The Tides of Discontent," Policy Papers in International Affairs 23,
Institute of International Studies, 1985, 5.
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defend its own territory."12 Four months later, in March, 1950, Prime Minister Churchill
told the British Parliament that "the effective defense of European frontiers could not be
achieved if the German contribution were excluded from the thoughts of those who were

responsible."13 His concerns were supported by Dean Acheson, who introduced the
position ofthe US as prepared to "participate in the immediate establishment of an
integrated force in Europe, within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty, adequate
to ensure the successful defence of Western Europe, including Western Germany, against

possible aggression."14 Lord Ismay concurred with this opinion: the Allied forces should
include "the participation of German units and the use of German productive resources

for its supply."15 In effect, NATO needed both German territory and human power to
increase in military strength and capability, because "without German terrain, the
strategic plans of the NATO command would lack sufficient depth for defensive

maneuvers."16 As the French General Billotte pointed out in March, 1950, in the event of
attack from the Soviet Union, NATO should fight as far as possible to the east and this

could not be accomplished without a degree ofrearmament by Germany. However, he
also was very specific in stating that the other NATO signatories would have to be
provided for first.

i *7

The initial framework of integrating Germany in the NATO structures called for
each German unit's incorporation into larger Allied forces; furthermore, the size of units
12 Norton Kaplan, The Rationalefor NATO: European Collective Security—Past and Future
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute Press, 1973), 16.

13 Ibid., 17.
14 Acheson, Dean. Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department. 1969,508,552,
565-71,573-77,628-31.

15 Ismay, Hastings Lionel. NATO: The First Five Years 1949—1954. 1954,32.
16 Kaplan, The Rationalefor NATO, 15.
1 7 James Richardson, Germany and the Atlantic Alliance: The Interaction ofStrategy and Politics
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 18.
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would be limited; German military would be dependent on other members for equipment;
and Germany would not reopen any military-supporting industries. In addition, "the
United States proposal entailed a reversal of the Allied policy of disarmament and
demilitarization of Germany. German participation in Western defence had been mooted
several times in the preceding months, and the anxiety caused by the Korean War had
I Q

brought the question to a head."

In the same time, the Russians planned for East Germany to generate the people's

militia amounting to around 50,000 heavily armed men.19 Again, in the face of more
tangible and imminent danger, the decision was made quickly and without much
opposition. To the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Secretary of State Acheson said
in the summer 1950: "The strength of the free nations is potentially great—more than
enough to deal with this threat. But we must translate that potential into defense in being,

with the greatest speed."20 Therefore, despite heated debates, the pressure from the
United States, the need associated with risk, overwhelmed the historical differences and

potential veto from France, Great Britain, and other states who just recently concluded a
large scale war with, combined with occupation by, Germany.
After a long discussion, all but the French were ready to accept Germany's
rearmament. French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman believed that "the raising of

German troops would at this stage do more harm than good."21 After some debates, the
occupying powers in Germany issued a statement that they would increase and reinforce
their own forces in Germany. Furthermore, they would consider "any attack against the
18 Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years 1949—1954, 32.
19 Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance, 69.
20 Ibid., 70.
21 Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years 1949—1954, 33.

Federal Republic or Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon themselves."

In support

of the French dissent, the occupying powers agreed that building of German national
force would not be beneficial to Europe at that time.

At the end of September, 1950 when the North Atlantic Council met again, it
decided that Germany "should be enabled to contribute to the build-up of the defence of

Western Europe,"23 intentionally using rather vague language as to not limit its options.
In October, the French Prime Minister René Pleven introduced to the French Assembly a
plan for "the creation of a European army linked to the political institutions of a united

Europe. . . with a complete fusion of all the human and material elements."24 A European
Minister of Defense would be appointed by participating states and responsible to a
European Assembly, with a financing from a common budget. "The European forces
would be placed at the disposal of the unified Atlantic force and would operate in
accordance with the contractual obligations of the Atlantic Pact."

This idea of European army, including the German forces, was introduced to
NATO's Defense Committee in October, 1950 as an alternative to the American proposal

of creating the German army.26 The French and the Americans could not come to a
compromise at that particular Defense Committee meeting, led by Secretary of State
Marshall, so they opened the issue for further study. In December, 1950, the North
Atlantic Council met in Brussels and issued a communiqué that "German participation

Ibid., 34.
Ibid., 35.
Ibid., 33.

Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance, 73.
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would strengthen the defence of Europe without altering in any way the purely defensive

character ofthe North Atlantic Treaty Organization."27
Although, the decision to invite West Germany into the Alliance was made in
December, 1950, it would take another four years ofnegotiations regarding the specific
form in which German forces would join the European defense structure. The process
NATO's expansion into Germany was slowed down by the stagnant character of the
Korean War and decreasing sense of threat which initially was spurred by that conflict.

Finally, in October, 1954, the Paris Treaties were signed, providing a structural formula
under which Germany would enter the Alliance.
Although the invitation of Germany to join the alliance was motivated by the
increased sense of threat from the Soviets in the environment set by the outbreak of the

Korean War, the two elements ofNATO's nature, the collective security and the
collective defense were mutually reinforcing. Despite the history of aggression and war
which marred West Germany, the cultural and geopolitical commonalities made the
accession of Germany into NATO's collective security component possible.
Furthermore, the need for German army in the face of danger from the East made Bonn's
membership in the Alliance necessary.

Ismay, 34.
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NATO'S ROUGH ROAD TO NUCLEAR POLICY

Gregory Traverton, in his book Making the Alliance Work, writes:

NATO's nuclear dilemma is nearly as old as the Alliance itself. It is
rooted in the fundamental paradox of geography: most ofNATO's
ultimate deterrent, American strategic nuclear forces, resides an ocean

away from the likely point of attack or political pressure. The dilemma is
also an anomaly: it crystallized the exceptional situation of the 1950s and
with it the military dependence of Europe on the United States.

One would be hard pressed to find a better review of the fundamental issues of the
nuclear policy NATO faced in the 1950s and the 1960s.
The 1950s also brought about the economic and financial problems. The US was
spending over 50% of its budget on military and the Europeans were still recovering from
the devastating effects of World War II. With the expenses associated with the Korean
War, the prices of imports to Europe increased, as the producers in the United States
faced scarcity of raw materials. The increasing prices, combined with decreasing
resources, caused deterioration of Western Europe's economic system. The apt critique
of this trend came from the French Deputy Alphand, according to whom NATO had
responsibility to "recommend and supervise the execution of future measures designed to
ensure not only the security but also the economic equilibrium ofthe Atlantic
Community."
In terms of raw numbers, in 1953, 176 million North Americans still accounted

for a total economic output about three times that attained by the 208 million citizens of
28 Gregory Treverton, Making the Alliance Work: The United States and Western Europe (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1985), 25.

29 Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years 1949—1954, 41.

the European NATO states.

Furthermore, France and Great Britain were spending 10%

of their GNP on defense,31 whereas the United States, under NSC-68 passed in April
1949, was putting well over 20% of its GNP, amounting to $50 billion, to rearm the US

and NATO.32 In effect, "the gap between the productive capacity ofthe United States
and the other NATO members encompassed every field of activity from nylon stockings
to bomber aircraft."33

However, even more pressing than economic hardship, yet closely connected to
the economic capacity of the Allies, was the credibility of American nuclear security
shield extending to Europe.

There is another, structural reason for NATO's debility. . . the danger and

yet the incredibility of the American military guarantee of Europe,
including 'nuclear umbrella. ' . . . For the commitment to Europe presents
the United States with a choice between unsupportable costs, associated
with the confident defense of Europe with conventional forces, and
unassumable risks, attributable to reliance on the earlier use of nuclear

weapons.34
The difference in economic, political, and military power between the US and the
European members was so enormous that Western Europe was referred to as an

"American protectorate in Europe."35 Therefore, especially in the sphere of nuclear
30 Duignan, 10
31 Ibid., 17.
32 Ambrose and Brinkley, 1997.
33 Alastair Buchan, NATO in the 1960s: The Implications ofInterdependence (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1963), 34.

34 Ravenal, "NATO: The Tides of Discontent," 1.
35 David Calleo, Atlantic Fantasy: The United States, NATO, and Europe (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1970), 27-28.

capability and economic strength, the United States remained immeasurably superior to
its European allies.

At NATO's conception, Europeans thought that the US would develop more
conventional forces to stop the Soviets in Europe. This assumption was based on the
need to counter what was perceived as extremely strong Soviet conventional army.
However, soon the arms race took precedence. Misperception of the Soviet Union's
conventional forces and their power as too large to counter with conventional means
reinforced the need for nuclear capability. Furthermore, the aforementioned economic
slump would not leave room for a development of conventional forces and their
maintenance. In contrast, nuclear weapons were more affordable. Their projected
tactical and strategic use would stop the Soviet progress into Europe. But on the other
hand, nuclear capability did not give NATO much flexibility. What if the treat from the
Soviet Union was relatively small? Even when the Dulles' policy of massive retaliation,
based on tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence, dominated the US foreign
policy, the Europeans had a difficult time applying that policy to their own situation.
Simply put, the lack of space between Western Europe and the Soviet bloc did not leave
room for potential benefit; rather, it was clear that the costs for the Europeans would be
unbearable.

NATO has relied on the US strategic nuclear weapons as a deterrent to the
Warsaw Pact. Because of this dependence, "nuclear guarantee" was a central issue of
alliance security. If that assurance were to be questioned, the principle of deterrence of
NATO would be challenged. This potential weakness was one ofthe most notorious
instances that threatened the cohesion ofNATO as an effective alliance.

36 Duignan, 10.

In terms of the cohesion as a collective security institution at that particular time,

the discussion on the group's unity is purely speculative. However, given the benefit of
hindsight and the fact that NATO still exists and, what is more important, is assuming
increasingly more role as a collective security arrangement, it is safe to say that the basic
commonalities of the members were already at play in the time of the most aggressive
discussions regarding the Alliance's nuclear capabilities. In the words of David
Schwartz: "Approaches that challenge the grounds for European fears, forcing the allies
to elaborate and to justify those fears, work as well as, if not better than, those that accept
IT

such fears as a basis for interaction."

Given the strategic triangulation of the US, Europe, and the Soviet Union at the
time, the direction that Washington's foreign policy took under President Eisenhower
was hard to stomach by the Europeans, and provided an ample ground for the nuclear
policy dissonance. "The reliability of the US strategic guarantee has been difficult to
ensure. ... [I]ts efforts in the past have raised the opposite fear within the alliance,
namely, that the United State could commit its allies to a nuclear war they neither want
¦JO

nor, given their proximity and vulnerability to Soviet nuclear attack, could survive."
The New Look, Eisenhower's military policy, combined domestic, military, and foreign
considerations and rejected the premise ofNSC-68 in terms of spending 20% of its GNP
on defense; furthermore, eliminating deficit spending, Eisenhower focused on the policy
of containment toward the Soviet Union. Such a policy was passable at the time because

of two reasons: first, the Korean War ended, and second, Stalin died in 1953. In addition,

37 David Schwartz, NA TO 's Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press,
1983), 12.

the US was in possession of nuclear capability and Washington had the capability to
deliver it.

As NATO adopted the New Look policy in the early 1950s, the US pushed for
rapid technical development of nuclear capabilities, infrastructure, technology, which
Washington was more than willing to share with the Europeans. The Deputy Supreme
Commander Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery said in 1954:

I want to make it absolutely clear that we at SHAPE are basing all our
planning on using atomic and thermonuclear weapons in our own defense.
With us it is no longer: 'They may possibly be used.' It is very definitely:
'They will be used, if we are attacked.' In fact, we have reached the point
of no return in regards to the use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons in
a hot war.

Even as they accepted the New Look policy, the Europeans remained concerned about
the nuclear war happening on their ground, something that the Americans did not have to
worry about to nearly the same extent.

In the eyes of the Europeans, the Korean War produced a firm commitment on the
side ofthe US to the defense of Europe. However, due to Dulles' plan of "massive
retaliation" and then the events related to the Suez Canal crisis in 1956, "NATO

stagnated as a military coalition for the defence of Europe and regressed as a political

alliance."41 When Sputnik was launched in 1957, "the years of stagnation were brought
dramatically to a close, and a period of activity throughout the Alliance comparable to

40 Osgood, NA TO: The Entangling Alliance, 110.
41 Buchan, NATO in the 1960s, 35.

that of 1951-1953 has ensued." Again, similar to the outbreak of the Korean War, the
launch of Sputnik provided the needed incentive, in a form of a potential threat, for the
Allies to speed up their policy decisions. In regards to conventional and nonconventional capabilities,

by 1957, NATO had determined that its ground forces—not conventional,
since they were armed with nuclear weapons to offset their supposedly
small size relative to the Pact—would not seek to achieve the tactical

military objective of defeating the enemy on the ground. Instead, those
forces would buy the time required to implement strategic nuclear
retaliation. NATO's 'shield' was relegated to protecting the 'sword' of
national nuclear arsenals.4

In 1956, the Suez Crisis did not help to reassure Europeans that Americans were

committed to the security of Europe nor that the interests of the NATO members on the
two coasts of Atlantic diverged. Rather, the actions of Washington in response to British
and French policies regarding Suez Canal emphasized the inherent conditionality of
American support for Europe. The difference in interests between the allies was clear.
The US would not always support the European efforts; moreover, Washington had the
ability to not only block the interest of Europeans but also counteract them.
Concerned with the possibility ofNasser's nationalization of Suez Canal, Great
Britain and France approached Israel with a prospect of an attack on Egypt. In the same
time, the Russians were extending their influence in the Middle East and the Czechs
started negotiating with Egypt. Dulles, in response to the nationalization of Egyptian

Ibid., 37.
Schwartz, 34.
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industries, offered Nasser aid for the construction of the Aswan Dam. When the

Egyptians refused to give up the deals with the Czechs and the Russians, Dulles withdrew
the aid. In 1956, Nasser seized the control of the Suez Canal.

The French and the Brits were furious—they wanted a complete control over the
Suez Canal, whereas the US wanted to protect its oil interests. Dulles helped Nasser run
the canal without the Brits and the French. In return, London and Paris started planning

invasion of Egypt with Israel without informing Washington of their plans. When the
Israelis attacked Egypt, Great Britain and France supported them with air bombings. To
stop the invasion of Egypt, the US appealed to the UN to enforce a truce between the
warring sides, and imposed oil embargo on Britain and France. The US efforts were
supported by the Russians: Khrushchev threatened an attack on Great Britain and France.
Under the pressure from the UN, lack of support from the Americans and the threat of an
attack from the Russians, the Brits and the French pulled back.

This drastic divergence ofpolicies between the French and the British on one
side, and the Americans on the other, left a long lasting scar on the Euro-Atlantic
relationship. In 1957, in response to the events of the Suez Crisis, London released the
White Paper on Defense, emphasizing "the pursuit and maintenance of the independent
British deterrent as a hedge against the unreliability of the US guarantee of British

security interests."45 The French followed suit, but their response was even more drastic
than London's. The French Ministry ofNational Defense and Commissariat à l'Energie

Atomique finalized a decision to develop nuclear weapons.46
44 For the discussion on the Suez Crisis and the US policy, consult Ambrose and Brinkley, Rise to
Globalism.

45 Schwartz, 60.
46 Wilfred Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 36.

The debate caused the sense of insecurity in Europe, based on questionable
reliability of the US. "This crisis taught different lessons: the British scurried for the
cover of a 'special relationship' with Washington, while the French pursued
independence from Atlantic restraints through their own nuclear force." In effect, the
Alliance welcomed 1957 with increasing dependence on strategic nuclear retaliation in
response to any aggression from the Warsaw Pact without the conviction that the
organization possessed an adequate deterrent. Europeans worried that the US would not
carry through if Western Europe was attacked. Americans, on the other hand, worried
that ifthe US did respond with nuclear retaliation in defense of Europe, it would provoke
the Soviet to attack all ofNATO members—including the US. Furthermore, the
Europeans as a whole were divided in their fears.

The sense of insecurity in Europe was further enhanced by the developments in
the Central and Eastern European states and the Soviet Russia. In 1956, in an address to
the Congress of the Communist Party ofthe Soviet Union, Khrushchev renounced Stalin.
The political and economic relaxation under Khrushchev gave way to the riots in Poland
and Hungary. Especially in the case ofthe uprising in Budapest, the Warsaw Pact
intervention ended in a bloody massacre, setting an example for Central and Eastern
Europe of what the Soviet military is capable of and sending a signal to the West to
watch out. The Soviet threat was also reinforced at the time with the 1957 launch of the

sputnik. "If in general terms sputnik was a dramatic symbol ofthe technological
superiority of the Soviet Union in a particularly threatening military area, it also

Ravenal, "NATO: The Tides of Discontent," 6.

symbolized in specific terms the ever-growing vulnerability of the United States to Soviet
strategic attack.'
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In the light of those developments, the policy of massive retaliation that the
Americans practiced at the time, as well as NATO's concept of countering the potential
attack from the Warsaw Pact, had to be adjusted. The Alliance's goal in fighting against
the Warsaw Pact "would be to prevent the war from degenerating into an all-out nuclear

conflict, which would be so destructive as to negate any political objective."49 Ifthe
conflict was between conventional, not military, forces, the policy of massive retaliation
did not present a believable threat. This pointed to the need of conventional force that
would match the strength of the opponent—at least in the beginning—with a potential

reinforcement with nuclear capabilities in the later stages.50 In other words, the need for
conventional and nuclear capability combined was becoming more and more apparent.

1960 brought even more push from Europeans toward the conventional forces.
However, along with the seeming need for conventional forces came a worry about the
perception of weakness, limiting the strength of deterrence and potentially giving the
Soviets an idea that US is not extending the nuclear umbrella to Europe. At this point,
the US under Kennedy was slowly switching from the policy of massive retaliation to
flexible response. Originally, however, the Europeans did not think that this policy was
financially feasible for them, given the misperceived conventional strength ofthe Soviet
Union. They argued that it is impossible given the post-war situation ofthe allies in
Europe to be able to match the conventional forces of the communist bloc. Rather, the
48 Schwartz, 61.
49 Ibid., 53.
50 William Kauftman, ed. Military Policy and National Security (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1956), 102-36.

51 Maxwell Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), 187-90.
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tactical nuclear power was necessary to balance the Soviet conventional forces.
Combined with that, however, was the need to signal willingness to spare civilian

populations. Therefore, the potential nuclear capability would have to show reliability
and accuracy of delivery into military targets, not urban populations.

The US solution to the nuclear security of Europe, however, was very different.
To address the capabilities of the Warsaw Pact, in December, 1960 Washington proposed
the creation of the Multilateral Force (MLF) in Europe. It was the US response to the

European request to have a greater degree of control over the nuclear deterrence.
NATO's forces would control and man a fleet ofwarships and submarines, equipped with

Polaris ballistic missiles.53 The submarines crews would be composed of multinational
forces of at least three NATO members. While the US would maintain formal custody of

the warheads to assure security, the Allies would have to agree on the process for the
launch. The second goal of the Multilateral Force, aside from the European external
security, would be to stop European members from proliferating and decreasing stability

ofthe system internally.54
For President Kennedy, the MLF was not a priority on the agenda, but he did see

it as the solution to the NATO's strategic problems with nuclear security.55 In 1961,
Kennedy said:

52 See: Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1957).

53 Andrew Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force
1939-1970 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 217-274.
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55 Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (London:
Deutsch, 1966), 842-866.

We must make certain that nuclear weapons will continue to be available
for the defense of the entire Treaty area, and that these weapons are at all

times under close and flexible political control that meets the needs of all
the NATO countries. We are prepared to join our Allies in working out

suitable arrangements for this purpose. To make clear our own intentions
and commitments to the defense of Western Europe, the United States will
commit to the NATO command five—and subsequently still more—
Polaris atomic-missile submarines, which are defensive weapons, subject

to any agreed NATO guidelines on their control and use, and responsive to
the needs of all members but still credible in an emergency. Beyond this,

we look to the possibility of establishing a NATO sea-borne force, which
would be truly multi-lateral in ownership and control, if this should be
desired and found feasible by our Allies, once NATO's non-nuclear goals
have been achieved.56

American support, according to Kennedy, would depend on European approval of
necessity, usefulness, and feasibility of the MLF, and would be pursued after NATO

achieves the non-nuclear goals.57 The Brits were skeptical of the American MLF idea,
and the French continued pursuing their own nuclear capability. Furthermore, Paris
suggested the creation of specifically and independently European nuclear force, rather
than what the US was proposing.

To further their proposals and ensure their realization, the Americans started
negotiations with the Brits, which resulted in the Nassau Agreement. The US would
provide the Polaris missiles to the Brits in return for leasing the nuclear submarine base
in the Holy Loch. Although originally the Polaris missiles were supposed to function
under the MLF treaty, at the end the warheads in the missiles were British and could be
deployed by the Brits without consultations with other NATO members. This gave
56 Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 (Washington,
D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1962), 385.

57 Schwartz, 89.
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London security independence from the Americans, and political dominance over the
French. At the end, the American attempts to implement the Multilateral Force project
failed, increasing the divides among the NATO members.
The final stalemate, however, between the United States and France especially,
came in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and subsequent efforts to limit
vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. "The ensuing Limited Test Ban

Treaty of 1963 marked the realization of a stalemate between the two superpowers at the
strategic nuclear level, with debilitating effects on the American guarantee to defend

Europe."58 However, the French were not alone in the European dissatisfaction with
American nuclear guarantees in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis. London was
not far behind Paris. "The unilateral American decision in 1962 to cancel the Skybolt air-

to-ground missile, upon which the British relied for the perpetuation of their nuclear
deterrent, indicated that the United States might put its own efficiency criteria before its

alliance responsibilities."59
The Cuban Missile Crisis, therefore, effectively changed the relationship between

Americans and the Western Europeans in regards to means and policies to accomplish
security goals, which still remained cohesive and shared by both sides. The years prior to
the fateful events of the late 1962, marked by the multilateral efforts during the Korean
War, were the golden years of the Euro-Atlantic alliance. During that time, the Allies

were consulted, and they trusted the American word. There was willingness to pay the
price for security on both sides. This mindset allowed for the unquestioned support of the
Western Europeans during the Cuban Missile Crisis, although the Americans were
58 Ravenal, "NATO: The Tides ofDiscontent," 6.

informing the Europeans about their decisions and actions, rather than consulting with
them. The decline of this trust begins right after 1962 peak; after that, the Allies would
be more concerned with inequality of security—by definition based on geographic

proximity to the Soviet Union, Europe would insist on protection, but the partnership
would become increasingly troubled.

While during the 13 days of the crisis there was a strong Western cohesion, the
years afterwards witnessed an increasing break in the Alliance. With the decrease in the
external threat from the Soviets, emphasized through détente, the Allies did not have to

pull the ranks together so much. The strategic decisions regarding military capabilities
were increasingly harder to make. However, despite the increasing problems among
members as military allies, the question of the US pulling out its support or the
Europeans dissolving the Alliance never emerged. In the same time, the nature ofNATO
as a collective security organization for Western Europe was also never questioned. It is,
therefore, important to remember that despite disagreement in NATO based on the
collective defense nature ofthe organization and its means, collective security aspect
never weakened.

In January 1963, de Gaulle, in a press conference, "vetoed British entry into the
Community, rejected the American Polaris offer, and refused to participate in any NATO

nuclear force."60 A week later, he signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation

between France and the Federal Republic of Germany.61 He wanted to take Europe as far
away as he could from the British-American domination. In the eyes of Americans, de
Gaulle set back the European integration, discouraging European states from the MLF
60 Schwartz, 107.
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and encouraging them to proliferate instead. David Schwartz explained French logic in
those words:

The French then launched an active diplomatic effort to woo West

Germany, and other European nations, away from the MLF. Two themes
were constantly stressed: any system that relied on a US veto would
suffer from the lack of US credibility, and progress toward European unity

could come only from abandoning the MLF as an instrument ofUS

hegemony and domination.62
By 1965, the MLF was effectively dead.
Eventually, NATO, following the lead of Washington, took on the strategy of
flexible response and applied it to its nuclear capability.

The emphasis of security

moved from pure nuclear weapons onto the spectrum of responses from tactical and
strategic nuclear forces, and conventional capabilities. In contrast to the New Look of
Eisenhower and Dulles' policy of massive retaliation, JFK proposed responses respective
of the scope of attack. There were three stages to flexible response: 1) direct defense by
NATO's European forces based on conventional weapons in case ofthe Soviet attack
with similar conventional forces; 2) deliberate escalation in case of insufficiency of

NATO's conventional forces whereby the tactical nuclear weapons would be used in a
limited scope; and 3) general nuclear response which essentially corresponded to the
mutually assured destruction through a full-scale nuclear exchange.
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As this section showed, the disagreements within the Alliance regarded the

policies not the goals. Those discussions resulted in a temporary lack of cohesion in the
Alliance, but which never resulted in breaking of the alliance structures, ideas of
complete withdrawal from the Alliance, or diminishing collective security component.
The decreased perception of threat simply left more room for divergent policies and more
time for decision-making.

DIVERGENCE OF AMERICAN, FRENCH, BRITISH AND GERMAN POLICIES

This section gives us a look into the fundaments and reasons for the divergent
stances of NATO's members on what the most beneficial policy should entail. The basis
for those differences stemmed mostly from economic and geopolitical disparities between
the American and European members.
France started developing nuclear weapons in the 1930s. After WWII, the French
were focused on rebuilding of their country, so it was not until 1954 that de Gaulle
returned to the French nuclear planning. At that time, Great Britain joined the Russians
and the Americans with their possessions of the nuclear weapons. Given the French
character, Paris they did not want to be behind the British. In the same time, the French
were having trouble in Indochina (Dien Bien Phu). Furthermore, the US was gradually
backing away from the nuclear support for Europeans and there was a consideration of

bringing Germany into the NATO pack. AU those elements provided a fertile ground for

French arguments for acquiring nuclear capabilities.65

See Lawrence Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France under the Fourth Republic
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

France felt threatened by West Germany and the Soviet Union after WWII,
despite the US guarantees—or possibly because of them. During the developmental
phases ofNATO, France wanted to take Federal Republic of Germany into account as a
potential threat as suggested by the Dunkirk Treaty of 1947, but Brussels Treaty did not

include anti-German rhetoric.66 Given this insecurity, France had many arguments for
armament:

1. Nuclear weapons were a symbol ofnational prestige in the international
community;

2. They would provide France with greater leverage and input into the setting of
Western strategy;

3. With respect to other issues, possession of nuclear weapons would provide
France with political leverage;

4. Nuclear weapons would reverse the trend toward Anglo-American domination
ofNATO;

5. They would give France a greater voice in the increasingly prestigious armscontrol discussions between East and West; and

6. They would boost the morale of a French office corps shattered by the
experience of Dien Bien Phu.
In the same time in Bonn, Adenauer was hoping to bring West Germany into the
Alliance on equal terms. He wanted to unify Germany and reconstruct it as a peaceful
power in Europe. France's objections forced Germany to pledge to not develop nuclear
66 See Edgar Furniss, France, TroubledAlly: De Gaulle 's Heritage and Prospects (New York:
Harper, 1960).

67 George Kelly, "Political Background of the French ?-Bomb," OWs 4 (Fall, 1960): 292. Kohl,
29-44.

capability. Therefore, after 1955, there was not much notice in Germany given to the
nuclear armament of Europe. This disinterest in, or even objection to, the nuclear
weapons was further exaggerated by the Operation "Carte Blanche" carried out in
Germany by the US forces. It was a simulated NATO operation using 355 nuclear
weapons in defense of Western Europe. This simulated exercise had "resulted" in 1.7
million German deaths and 3.5 million Germans wounded, and forced the issue of
¿TO

NATO's nuclear strategy onto the German consciousness.
Furthermore, Adenauer was not sure how the New Look policy applied to
Germany and he believed that nuclear weapons could not compensate for the Warsaw

Pact's conventional forces.69 Instead, he thought that becoming a member ofNATO
would shield Germany from a potential attack if the war between NATO and the Warsaw
Pact were to happen, because, in his mind, such a war would quickly turn into a conflict
between the US and the SU.70
London, on the other hand, practiced the policy of graduated deterrence,
introduced by Sir Antony Buzzard. Graduated deterrence would

deliberately distinguish between tactical nuclear responses to aggression,
in which low-yield atomic weapons would be used against military targets,
and strategic nuclear responses, which would involve high-yield
(thermonuclear) attacks on enemy cities. As a deterrent against less-thanall-out local aggression, NATO would threaten tactical nuclear retaliation;
if enemy aggression continued unabated, then the alliance would threaten
strategic nuclear responses. Since tactical nuclear responses would not
necessarily compel enemy retaliation against Western cities—in fact, they
68 Schwartz, 42.

69 Catherine Kelleher, Germany and the Politics ofNuclear Weapons (New York:

Columbia

University Press, 1975), 47.

70 Hans Speier, German Rearmament andAtomic War (Evanston: Row, Peterson, and Co., 1957),
182-183.
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might give the enemy incentives to avoid escalation to counter-city
strikes—the tactical nuclear threat would appear to be more credible and
*
71
hence better able to deter aggression in a wide range of contingencies.

The British policy seemed to be quite in tune with the American one. In October
1957, the US shifted its foreign policy away from massive retaliation in the direction of
flexible response. In an article in Foreign Affairs, Dulles wrote:

[T]he resourcefulness of those who serve our nation in the field of science
and weapons engineering now shows that it is possible to alter the
character of nuclear weapons. . . . [T]heir use need not involve vast
destruction and wide spread harm to humanity. Recent tests point to the
possibility ofpossessing nuclear weapons the destructiveness and79 effects
of which can be confined substantially to predetermined targets.

In lieu of making his argument, Dulles implied that "the threat of massive retaliation had
never presented much of a deterrent to aggressor intent or conventional success: by
implication, he argued that only the recent development of small-yield battlefield nuclear

weapons would deter such an aggressor."73 There is no clear understanding why Dulles
made that shift at that time. Critics of massive retaliation at the time agreed that the

policy itself was not believable, but there was no proposed alternative.
President de Gaulle did not wait long to implement his ideas of what the European
security order should look like—without the Americans. In the beginning of 1963, he
called a press conference, in which he positioned France very decisively against the
71 Schwartz, 50.

72 John Foster Dulles, "Challenge and Response in United States Policy," Foreign Affairs 36, no. 1
(1957): 32.

"Schwartz, 51.

United States and Great Britain. During the press conference, de Gaulle "first. . .

pronounced a one-man veto against Great Britain's joining the European Common
Market. . . . Next he contemptuously rejected an offer by President Kennedy to give
France the American Polaris nuclear missiles for their submarines if they would place

them all under NATO control, and join a proposed NATO multilateral nuclear naval

force."74 The statement made by de Gaulle came rather unexpected to the British and the
Americans and set the tone of the eventual French withdrawal from the Alliance at the
end of the 1960s.

In 1966, de Gaulle was reelected for another 7-year presidential term. The first

visit he planned to make was to the Soviet Union.75 For years now, the French President
was envisioning a pan-European détente with the Soviet Union. For his plan to
materialize, he needed to break off with NATO and appear independent of the US. To
that effect, he wrote letters to the heads of NATO members: the US, Great Britain, West

Germany, Canada, and Italy, emphasizing that "France proposes to recover the entire
exercise of her sovereignty over her territory, presently impaired by the permanent
presence of Allied military elements, or in the use which is made ofher airspace."

He

did not negotiate or discuss his decision with other NATO members. The Allies were
given one year to get out of France.
De Gaulle was convinced that the increased distance between Paris and

Washington was a precondition for the Soviet Union to get engaged with Europe. His
alternative to the American idea of the Euro-Atlantic cooperation "envisioned a core

Europe limited to Western Europe with France as its leading power (and not the growing
74 Cook, 265.
75 Ibid., 266.
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economie power Germany) and none of its members having to give up their national

identity."77 At the time, the US was getting increasingly bogged down in Vietnam. On
the other hand, the Soviet Union was undergoing its own internal shift in the beginnings
of the Brezhnev era. In 1964, Khrushchev, who introduced de-Stalinization and softer
form of communism in the Soviet Russia, ended his Communist Party career. However,

his legacy of relative non-aggressive Moscow remained, decreasing the Soviet threat in
Europe and eventually opening the door to détente.
On the European side, the beginning of détente was initiated by Willy Brandt
under the umbrella of Bonn's Ostpolitik—opening up of the German relations to the East.
On the US side, President Lyndon Johnson started talking to the Soviet about the ending
of the Vietnam War and limitations on nuclear weapons. Subsequently, the SALT started
under LBJ, but was put on the back burner with the 1968 events taking place in
Czechoslovakia, and not restarted until President Nixon came to office.
Given the lowered fear of the Soviets in Europe, NATO relaxed its cohesion as an

alliance. As far as French participation in the Alliance was considered, on February 21,
1 966, de Gaulle declared that "France intended to regain sovereignty over its national
territory and armed forces, and would therefore review its relations with the Atlantic
Alliance. Shortly thereafter, the Paris government announced that France would
withdraw from the integrated structure ofNATO with effect from 1 July 1966, and that
the Allied staffs and military institutions should be removed from the country by 1 April
1967."78

Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution, 3.
Ibid., 1-2.

In summary, there were three basic problems in the 1950s and 1960s, which the
resulted in the final French withdrawal from NATO's command structure:

1 . the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence and the unequal risk faced
by the different NATO allies;
2. the role of the United States and its Allies, particularly France and West

Germany, as leading powers of the European order, and the place of the
Atlantic Alliance in their policy; and
3. the assessment of the Soviet Union's political and military intentions

and the possibilities for East-West détente, as well as the German
question.

79

It is important to note that none of those problems listed above pertain to the
overall goals or values of the Alliance. Rather, they speak directly to the means to
accomplish those goals and divergence of opinions on effective policies.
The joint nuclear defense proved to be impossible for NATO as an alliance.
Although the security interest of the Allies remained the same, the regional political
interests and the willingness to commit, in the face ofperception of decreasing threat and
unreliability of all the Allies, combined national and personal egos, put limits on the level
to which the Allies were willing to solidify their policies. Earl Ravenal explained this
discord in the following words: "De Gaulle's withdrawal of France from NATO and his
denial of French territory and facilities to the alliance, in 1966, rendered uncertain the
terms ofparticipation of Western Europe's largest military force; it also required NATO

79 Ibid., 4.

to shift to new and vulnerable lines of communication."

However, it did not render the

Alliance ineffective, incapable, or finished.

As mentioned earlier, despite the discord among the Allies in reference to the
MLF, the collective security nature ofNATO never wavered. Harlan Cleveland, the
former US Ambassador to NATO, summarized the importance of the MLF failure and

the subsequent withdrawal of France from the Alliance in those words:

In retrospect, the significant thing about the withdrawal of France from the
NATO defense system is that it was not very significant. It did not
destroy the Alliance—if that was the idea. It did not set France up as the
Western European partner best suited to make peace with the Russians—if
that was the idea. It did not remove France from dependence on the US
nuclear umbrella—if that was the idea. It did not even keep de Gaulle in
office. The net effects were to accelerate the reduction of French

influence in Europe, in favor of the Germans, and to prod the other
Western Allies into changing their strategy and improving their cohesion.
These can hardly have been the results consciously desired by a Gaullist
France.81

In other words, the French withdrawal had no significant effect on the collective security
or defense natures ofNATO. Ultimately, it was the temporary change in the structural
conditions, not the divergence of policies, which determined and drove the alliance and
collective security narratives.

0 Ravenal, "NATO: The Tides of Discontent," 7.

1 Cook, Forging the Alliance, 267.
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COLLABORATION AFTER DISCORD

At the end, the collaboration among the NATO members resumed after the

protracted and heated period of disputes on appropriate and beneficial policies. Although
the Multilateral Force policy turned out to be a failure, the idea opened the road to the

policy of flexible response and then the subsequent Nuclear Planning Group. In 1965,
McNamara tried to initiate the discussion on nuclear planning with the Europeans

again.82 The MLF was dead but the European allies were still unsatisfied with their level
of conventional and nuclear forces relative to the Soviet capabilities; furthermore, they

wanted to have the ability to contribute to the NATO's nuclear policy decisions. To
satisfy the European allies, in June 1965, McNamara proposed the creation of a
committee composed of NATO members that would oversee consultation on nuclear

planning. From the beginning, France made it clear that Paris was out. A year later,
France announced withdrawal from NATO. Great Britain was enthusiastic, Germany
was mixed—Berlin wanted to participate but it did not want to give up on the idea of the
MLF. Other members were waiting to see how this committee would be made up.
In November 1965, the Special Committee of Defense Ministers was created,

including ministers from Belgium, Great Britain, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Italy, the

Netherlands, Turkey, West Germany, and the US.84 A year later, the Defense Planning
Committee created a two-level nuclear planning working group. One level, the Nuclear
Defense Affairs Committee, would include all the interested members of the alliance. The
second level would become the Nuclear Planning Group made of the US, West Germany,
82 Harvey Seim, "Nuclear Policy Making inNATO," NATO Review 21, no. 1 (1973): 11-13.
83 Schwartz, 182.
84 Paul Buteux, The Politics ofNuclear Consultation in NATO, 1965-1980 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983), 39.
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Great Britain, Italy, and three other members of the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee
in rotation. All members except for France, Luxembourg, and Iceland joined the
Committee. In the beginning, Portugal, Denmark, and Norway asked to be excluded
from the rotation.85
In December 1967, NATO formally accepted the flexible response policy, for
which the Nuclear Planning Group paved the path by opening the channels of
communication on nuclear strategy, and providing a sense of equality and security.
Although the members agreed on the policy and adopted the Nuclear Planning Group, the
trust among the Allies was not restored to pre-Cuban Missile Crisis Level. As far as the
Nuclear Planning Group was concerned, the US had the monopoly on planning and kept
it secret from other Allies. Only the Brits had a bit of a view into the US strategy
planning. In regards to the policy of flexible response, McNamara could not fully explain
the logic behind the new policy to the Europeans. Without the empirical evidence and
logical process of decision making visible, Europeans were skeptical ofthe flexible
response policy. Second, it again proved the unequal distribution of security among the
allies, and added to suspicion and resentment. "If the allies had no voice in determining
the strategic nuclear policy ofthe alliance, how could they be expected to have

confidence in it?"86 Especially in the view ofthe French, this was also exaggerated by
the fact that the Brits were kept as the "special friend" having some view into this,
whereas other allies did not. Furthermore, the policy of flexible response was not

consulted with other allies—it was a unipolar decision made by the Americans.
85 Ibid., 41.
86 Schwartz, 179.
87 Harlan Cleveland, NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), 5365.

CONCLUSIONS

As we see through the accounts of German accession into the Alliance and the
discussions that accompanied Multilateral Force decisions, divergence of opinions on
means to accomplish goals is not the same, nor carries the same effects, as disagreements
on goals themselves. NATO came unscathed out ofthat period of discord bother as an
alliance and as a collective security arrangement. Both narratives played an integral role
especially in the case of Germany's joining the Alliance. In the case of nuclear policy,
the account here shows that the protracted period of disagreement does not mean the end
of the collective security and defense story of NATO.

The pattern ofNATO's discords and collaboration periods is not random. Rather,
it represents the tests of confidence among the Allies, neither accidental nor superficial.
The periods of discord and collaboration derive from divergent conceptions ofmeans and
policies, security needs, and geopolitical situations. Furthermore, they stem from

problems inherent in NATO's nature as an alliance from the beginning.88 "Military
alliance is an act that cuts two ways. In the obvious sense, alliance fosters political trust
and social community. But there is a countervailing effect: the delegation of security
responsibilities by one nation to another is also likely to excite suspicions of

abandonment and betrayal."89 However, those periods of suspicion and mistrust never
resulted in the Alliance's dissolution or in abandoning the common goals of internal
commonality and cohesion of values.

Ravenal, 'TSiATO: The Tides of Discontent," 11.

NATO was created as an alliance "which derived its security almost entirely from

this one country."90 And as an alliance, separated by an Atlantic Ocean, NATO was
bound to periodically go through phases of divergent security and political interests, as
well as differences in opinions on the means to accomplish the common goals. Through
all the periods of discord, however, those common goals remained the same: security of
Western Europe and preservation of the Western civilization based on democracy and

human rights. In the case ofWest German accession into NATO, the cost-benefit
rationality made sense to the Allies on both sides of the Atlantic. The Europeans were
benefiting by increase in security with the addition of the German human and economic
capital, and the costs did not outweigh the benefits, in their perceptions. However, in the
case of the nuclear issues, the perceptions of security benefits were not higher that the
threat costs, again in the perceptions of the Europeans, so the members ran into more
disagreements and longer discussions.
In terms of alliance dynamics in both cases of disagreement, the US was still the
preponderant power with the overwhelming superiority of economics and military,

including the nuclear power. However, Great Britain also possessed the nuclear
capability, albeit much smaller, and France was on the way of obtaining it. Great Britain

acquired nuclear weapons in 1952 and France in 1960—the date of its first independent
test. However, the nuclear power of those states is negligible in the equation of power
distribution in NATO—the US remained an undisputable hegemon. Nevertheless, the
power of the American hegemon was diminished by the lack of credibility of the
'common good' that the US was supposed to provide to the Allies—the nuclear security
for Europe. And at the end, the Americans did not get what they wanted—Great Britain
90 Buchan, NATO in the 1960s: The Implications ofInterdependence, 34.

and France both went nuclear independently, rather than under the umbrella ofNATO
and the US control.

Regarding the collective security nature ofNATO, in terms of Germany, it played
a significant role. West Germany was a democratic state, falling into the category of
Western culture. Despite the events of WWII, West Germany during the Cold War was
threatened by the Soviet Union to a greater degree than other Western European states
because of it immediate proximity to the East and the understanding of both sides ofthe
conflict that Berlin represented the demarcation line. The accepted norms ofbehavior,
characteristic of collective security arrangements, here played an important role,
especially also given the sense ofthreat. It was right after the beginning of the Korean
War and NATO needed the military provided by Germany. It gave NATO more power
in numbers. Therefore, in this case, the narratives ofNATO as a collective defense and

collective security organization were in cohesion: the US was pushing for German
accession into NATO, and France and Great Britain, despite their fears and historic

experiences, went along, and the increased sense of threat pushed the decision to extend
NATO's security umbrella to Germany forwards. Furthermore, those two narratives
added leverage to each another: democratic nature of Adenauer's Germany enabled the
accession, and the economic and military numbers that Berlin was able to supply
provided the rationale for Germany's joining in terms ofthe pure cost-benefit analysis.
In the case of Multinational Force, the interactions between collective security
and collective defense narratives ofNATO were more complicated to discern. However,

here it is important to separate the concepts of goals from the concepts of means or
policies to accomplish those goals. While MLF discussions showed growing

disagreements on the means and policies, the members did not develop divergent sets of
internal and external security goals. Therefore, while the extended and oftentimes heated
debates slowed down the decision making process, they did not weaken the collective
defense and security natures ofNATO. Even the withdrawal of France from the
command structures ofNATO did not prove to cause much trouble for the Alliance in the
long term. Rather, it proved the enduring commonality of goals that overpowered the
disagreements as to the means to accomplish those common objectives, again reinforcing
the collective security nature of the Alliance.
In terms of the external environment, detrimental to the cohesion of NATO as an

alliance, the thawing of the relationship between the East and the West must be
mentioned. Following the Cuban Missile Crisis, both sides directly faced the possibility
ofnuclear exchange and potential effects such an exchange would evoke. Furthermore,
the increasing schism between China and Russia was pushing Moscow toward the West.
In addition, Willy Brandt's opening of German foreign policy to the East, the Ostpolitik,

gave the Soviets hope for increased economic trade with Western Europe, very much
needed at the time given the economic difficulties in the Soviet Union. Therefore, the
beginning of Détente in the late 1960s decreased NATO's perception ofthreat coming
from the Soviet side.

Here again, the dependence ofthe common security and defense combination on
the structural environment is noticeable. When the Allies perceived the threat of the

Soviet to be decreasing, they involved in more protracted discussions and disagreements
regarding the policies. They allowed themselves to be more relaxed in their alliance
cohesion. However, as the threat never disappeared, neither did the alliance or collective

security natures ofNATO. As the détente was winding down, NATO experiences a
fairly rapid consolidation process, yet again proving the cyclical collaboration/discord

nature ofthe organization.91

Haftendorn, 386.
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CHAPTER V

NATO IN THE 1991 TO 2001 PERIOD

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, the narratives of collective security and collective defense exit the
Cold War environment and enter the decade of uncertainty regarding the past enemies

and future allies. In this decade, the rationality and utility ofNATO's existence will be
questioned, and the Alliance emerges from this barrage with an expanded number of
members and undefined set of goals. The second part ofNATO's nature, however, the
collective security component, will become clearer and overshadow the alliance
character, redefining the organizations role in Europe. In regards to the international
environment, another set of unknowns emerges. The political fate of Central and Eastern

Europe remains to be determined; Russia will slowly embark on the path towards illiberal
democracy, and a set of intangible transnational threats will come to the forefront of
decision making regarding NATO's strategy for the future.
Again here, the structural changes are important to emphasize. The perception of
threat changes in the post-Cold War environment. Not only is the threat intangible, in
contrast to the Cold War period when the Soviet Russia was the clear and predictable
enemy, but that threat is also hard to understand and define. After 1991, the treat
acquires a hybrid nature, combining many immeasurable elements of transnational
nature. Subsequently, the scope of internal and external security goals changes as well
into the area of basic human security.
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With this changing structure, we also begin to see a different pattern ofbehavior
between the narratives of collective security and collective defense. In that sense, we see
the reinforcement of the structure of the international environment as the driver in that

relationship. In this period, collective security narrative starts to play a more integral role
over the collective alliance element. This change is a direct result of the inability to pin
down, define, and measure the new concept of threat. Rather, the threat becomes a
multifaceted set of threats which needs to be address by multifaceted capabilities and
structures.

The beginning date of this period was already clearly identified in the previous
chapter. The effective dissolution of the Soviet Union served as the demarcation line for
the end ofthe Cold War; with that, it provided a watershed in NATO's mission, as it
eliminated one of the primary reasons why the Alliance was born. For the post-Cold War
period, the same date serves as the beginning point of a new security environment, one
without the Soviet bloc, but with many other undefined threats and insecurities. The final

date for this period, on the other end, September 1 1th, 2001, does not need much of an
introduction. The terrorist attacks in the US forced not only Washington, but also the

European capitals, to redefine the threats and refocus the means to combat those threats.
In effect, the security goals ofNATO, and subsequently the means to achieve those goals,
had to be reevaluated and readjusted. This process continues today, as the questions
regarding the future role ofNATO as an alliance and as a collective security arrangement
remain unanswered. In addition, the disagreements among the Allies regarding the
necessity and the potential ofNATO's capabilities to address those intangible threats
further complicate the decisions regarding the scope and the role of the Alliance.
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Despite all the knowns and unknowns, to use the words or Robert McNamara, one
thing became clear in this first post-Cold War decade ofNATO's existence; namely, that
the role of NATO as a collective security arrangement not only overshadowed its
function as an alliance, but effectively left it in the dust. One of the major and most

detrimental developments ofNATO in that period, enlargement ofthe organization to
Central and Eastern Europe, had very little to do with its nature as an alliance and

everything to do with its character as a collective security. While the political shape and
stability of Russia remained uncertain, the push for inclusion of Central and Eastern
European region in the Alliance, a process which continues still today, had as its
fundament the spread ofnorms ofpeaceful behavior based on the principles of
democracy at its heart.

At that point, the region of CEE was geographically close to NATO's territory
and its future political shape was hanging in the air. IfNATO were to maintain its
security, it was only natural to incorporate that region, in a similar fashion as was done in
the case ofWest Germany in 1955, into its framework. This way, the newly independent
states would fall under the umbrella of collective security, where they would be

encouraged to built a security community based on a common standard of behavior—
peaceful solution of disagreements. Furthermore, as those states were coming from the
Soviet domination, and as Russia's future was still a question, the CEE and NATO
members shared a common security interest.

The early discussions among international relations scholars regarding the eastern
enlargement ofNATO were dominated by the negative voices, represented by George
Kennan and Charles Kupchan, to name just a few. The critics ofNATO's expansion
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were worried about the effective challenge to Russia, which might potentially lead to
conflict with Moscow. Furthermore, they pointed out the difficulty of managing

expanding number of members, which would effectively weaken the decision-making
process in the alliance. At this point, it is safe to say that the alliance nature ofNATO

was put on the back burner at the expense of the collective security role. In addition, the
pursuit of collective security goals weakened the alliance component ofNATO.
After Clinton administration efficiently and swiftly pushed for the expansion of
the Alliance, the scholars in the international relations field understood that the deed has
been done and addressed the facts. Given the lack of conflict with Russia and the

increasing stability of the Central and Eastern Europe, which in turn contributed to the
overall peace and security of the Transatlantic region, the discussion regarding the NATO

enlargement became positive. Enlargement was considered to be a positive development,
leading to promotion of democratic norms in a post-Soviet space. Without an obvious
collapse of the alliance component ofNATO, the relationship between collective security
and collective defense natures of the organization became mutually reinforcing. As the

process of expansion continues and the set of threats facing Europe remains uncertain, it
becomes clear that NATO's future will focus on its role as a collective security

organization, with the alliance component serving as an effective, functional structure for
the arrangement.

This chapter begins with a discussion on the components of collective security
and collective defense in the context ofNATO's enlargement. The segment evaluating

the changing nature of security environment in Europe after 1991 follows. Then, the

enlargement process is outlined, addressing the security issues and pointing to the
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collective security elements along the way. The next section deals with the transition of
NATO to an increasingly collective security dominated institution, leading to the
concluding segment which attempts to answer the questions addressing the relationship
between the collective security and collective defense narratives ofNATO in the last
decade of the twentieth century.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE IN THE CONTEXT OF
NATO ENLARGEMENT

In a nutshell, the Post-Cold War enlargement reaffirmed NATO's openness to
new members under Article X of the North Atlantic Treaty and emphasized the

continuing process of the enlargement.1 Having said that, let us look at the discussions
that took place in the early and mid 1990s between the proponents and the opponents of
the enlargement in order to understand the underlying reasons and logic for NATO's
expansion. Although the expansion of the organization was wanted and supported by the
Western Allies, it was the Clinton administration's determination that provided the
critical push.

Generally, the proponents of the expansion argued that it was a historical
opportunity to build democracy and extend the zone of stability and security to Central
and Eastern Europe. The alliance was supposed to be the means of accomplishing that—
the practical vehicle for carrying out the idea of collective security. Acceptance to
NATO would serve as an incentive and institutionalization of democracy in the CEE
1 Alfred Cahen. The Atlantic Alliancefor the 21s' Century (Brussels: PIE-Peter Lang, 2001): 5358.

2 The 1995 Study on NATO's Enlargement, NATO, 2002.
www.nato.int/docu/handbook/200 l/hb030 1 0 1 .htm.
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region.3 Others argued that it was a political, economic, and moral obligation ofNATO
and its democratic members to include CEE in its sphere of security. Zbigniew

Brzezinski and Stephen Larrabee especially were emphasizing the need to consolidate
democracy in CEE and the contribution of such a consolidation to the overall security and

stability ofthe whole European region.5 There was also the simple alliance-based cost
benefit analysis—more members from the CEE would lower the degree ofburden on the

old members, especially the US.6 Also, on the alliance side ofthe rhetoric for
enlargement, the expansion would provide more availability and coordination of forces;
the new members would not be free riders or the net consumers—but rather, the net

contributors.7

On the other hand, the opponents of the eastern enlargement ofNATO questioned
the potential of the organization as a vehicle of democracy promotion and
institutionalization in Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, they pointed to the high

likelihood for damaging the relationship with Russia.8 They argued that the driving
mechanism behind the push for expansion is the irrelevance of the alliance and

diminishing ofthe US power in Europe.9 Why, they asked, would NATO expand ifthere
3 Lawrence Korb, "The Question ofNATO Expansion," in Kenneth Thompson, ed., NATO
Expansion (Lanham: University Press of America, 1998), 49-55.
4 Ronald Asmus, "NATO's Double Enlargement: New Tasks, New Members," in Clay Clemens,
NA TO and the Questfor Post Cold War Security (New York: St. Martin' s Press, 1 997), 69-7 1 .

5 Zbigniew Brzezinski, "NATO: The Dilemmas of Expansion," National Interest 53 (Fall, 1998):
13-17.

6 Stephen Larrabee, East European Security after the Cold War (Santa Monica: RAND, 1993),
175.

7 Catherine Kelleher, "The Military Dimension," in Jeffrey Simon, NATO Enlargement: Opinions
and Options, Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1995, pp. 179-83.

8 Michael Mandelbaum, The Dawn ofPeace in Europe (New York: Twentieth Century Fund
Press, 1996), 52-61.

9 Ronald Steel, "Beyond NATO," in Ted Carpenter and Barbara Conry, NATO Enlargement:
Illusions and Reality (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1998), 243-151.
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was no external threat? They maintained that a higher number of members would
weaken the alliance because the decision-process would be more complicated.
At the Prague Summit in 2002, called by Lord Robertson the "NATO's

transformation summit,"11 the leaders of the new NATO members expressed their
appreciation for the return to the European civilization and mentality that accession to
NATO epitomized. The Prime Minister of Hungary Medgyessy emphasized the enduring

strength and relevance ofthe Alliance.12 Vaclav Havel, the Czech President saw
"enlargement as a signal to the world of a new era where countries could no longer be

forced into spheres of influence or where the strong could subjugate the weak."13 Polish
President Aleksander Kwasniewski talked about the end of Yalta and Potsdam's legacy

that divided Europe. 14
Similar rhetoric came from the Westerners' side: Chirac referred to the end of the

division ofEurope,15 while Blair talked about the opportunity to transform NATO. 16 In
other words, to the new CEE members, as well as the old NATO Allies, enlargement
meant consolidation of democracy and, with that, consolidation of Europe. With this
approach, the practical focus ofNATO shifted from alliance to collective security. This
10 Philip Zelikow, "The Masque of Institutions," in Philip Gordon, ed., NATO's Transformation
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 84-85; Michael Brown, "The Flawed Logic ofNATO
Enlargement," Survival 37, no. 1 (1995): 34-52.

11 George Robertson, "Opening Remarks," Prague Summit 2002, NATO,
www.nato.in1/docu/speech/2002/s02 1 1 20d.htm.

12 Peter Medgyessy, "Statement on NATO Enlargement," Prague Summit 2002, NATO,
www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s02 1121 i.htm.
13 Vaclav Havel, "Statement on NATO Enlargement," Prague Summit 2002, NATO,
www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s02 1121 dhtrn.
14 Aleksander Kwasniewski, "Statement on NATO Enlargement," Prague Summit 2002, NATO,
www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021121ai.htm.

15 Jacques Chirac, "Statement on NATO Enlargement," Prague Summit 2002, NATO,
www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s02 1121 k.htm.

16 Tony Blair, "Statement on NATO Enlargement," Prague Summit 2002, NATO,
www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s02 1121 g.htm.2002.
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emphasis on the collective nature of the Alliance was well summarized by Richard Lugar
when he wrote that enlargement provided an opportunity to overcome the divisions of
Europe and build consensus on security of democratic societies and the threats to them.

17

In other words, while the alliance element was by no means eliminated, because the

outside threat was not well defined but still present, the main goal ofNATO at that point
became the internal cohesion and security under the umbrella of a security community.
However, as we mentioned earlier, the enlargement was considered to be

potentially damaging to the alliance component ofNATO. Daniel Braun argued that "the
process of enlargement. . . increased number of member with divergent views. . . and
complicated the workings of the alliance and possibly inhibited or diminished its ability
to address some of the extremely difficult issues that it confronts."

18

Sean Kay

maintained that NATO "is already politically unmanageable, militarily dysfunctional and

strategically irrelevant" for the alliance component ofthe organization. 19 Most notably,
George Kennan wrote in the New York Times that NATO enlargement is "the most fateful

error ofAmerican policy in the entire post-Cold War era."20 He based his claim on the
potential of the enlargement to block the rapprochement with Russia. Charles Kupchan
believed that NATO expansion was a mistake, but once it was on the way and could not

be stopped, he advocated for Russia's membership.21 His view was shared by the
majority of scholarly community. However, it is important to point out that in this

17 Richard Lugar, "Redefining NATO's Mission: Preventing WMD Terrorism," The Washington
Quarterly 25, no. 3 (2002): 8-9.

18 Daniel Braun, NATO Enlargement and the Politics ofIdentity, Martello Papers, 2007, 30.
19 Sean Kay, "Putting NATO Back Together Again," Current History 102, no. 6 (2003): 108-1 12.
20 George Kennan, "A Fateful Error," New York Times, 5 February, 1997.
21 Charles Kupchan, "Origins and Future of NATO Enlargement," Contemporary Security Policy
28, no. 2 (2000): 127.
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discussion, NATO was treated as a pure alliance, without taking into account its
collective security component.
On the other side of this debate were voices maintaining that "enlargement is not

an end in itself; rather, it is a means to an end."22 That end is the security of Europe.
This brings us back to the concept of security communities, introduced by Karl Deutsch
and renewed more recently by Adler and Barnett. In his 2008 article, Adler used the
enlargement ofNATO as an example of expansion of security communities.

NATO is

a community of practice "like-minded groups ofpractitioners who are informally as well
as contextually bound by a shared interest in learning and applying a common practice."

He further argued that without shedding its defense alliance identity, NATO steadily
moved into cooperative security in the 1990s."
Adler was not alone in pointing out this steady trend ofNATO in the 1990s to

migrate towards the narrative of collective security at the expense of an alliance: "It is
almost as if NATO, after having defeated attempts in 1990-91 to create an all-European
collective security organization under CSCE auspices, is gradually transforming itself
into an entity comparable to such a body — a mutual supervisory agency for the Euro-

Atlantic region."26 While NATO enlarged its membership to the East for both the
alliance and collective security reasons, "every new crisis thrust its practitioners deeper
Hans Binnendik and Richard Kugler, "Open NATO's Door Carefully," The Washington
Quarterly 22, no. 2 (1999): 125.

23 Emanuel Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, SeIfRestraint, and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation," European Journal ofInternational Relations 14,
no. 2 (2008): 195.

24 William Snyder, "Communities of Practice: Combining Organizational Learning and Strategy
Insights to Create a Bridge to the 21st Century," Social Capital, Community Intelligence Lab, 1997,
http://www.co-i-l.com/coil/knowledge-garden/cop/cols.shtml.

25 Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities," 208.
26 David Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance 's New Roles in International Security
(Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1998), 161.
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into cooperative security practices, until, in 1999, partnerships became a main component
of its new Strategic Concept. From then on, NATO aligned its practices with its role as

the institutional arm of a security community."27 An apt example ofthis trend was the
Partnership for Peace initiative. The main goal of PfP was to build up the militaries of
joining states to match the NATO standards and to enhance its political stability based on
democratic values. PfP, therefore, was designed to bring together and reconcile the two
narratives ofNATO, collective security and collective defense or as Felix Ciuta called it
"different visions and practices of an alliance against enemies, and & partnershipfor
peace."

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE POST-COLD WAR EUROPE

As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the first decade after the fall of the
Soviet Union was plagued by a plethora of insecurities and unknowns in regards to
European security environment. The peaceful reunification of Germany under the
existing system of government in Bonn and the breakup ofthe Soviet Union can be
considered landmark events that served to define the new security environment in

Europe. In addition, it soon became clearer to NATO members that most of the CEE
countries would seek values compatible with NATO and its states, as they viewed
democracy synonymous with the restoration ofnational sovereignty in their countries.
In the aftermath of the 1989 revolutions, the CEE governments did not know how

to deal with the new security environment. In the beginning, NATO was not the
27 Felix Ciuta, "The End(s) of NATO: Security, Strategic Action and Narrative of
Transformation," Contemporary Security Policy 23, no. 1 (2002): 47.
28 Ibid.

29 Andrew Michta, "NATO Enlargement post-1989: Successful Adaptation or Decline?"
Contemporary European History 33, no. 4 (2009): 365.
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preferred option, especially with the unstable situation in many ofthe CEE states and
Moscow's strong opposition to NATO's expansion. At NATO's London Summit, in July
1990, NATO invited members of the Warsaw Pact, which still existed at the time, to send
ambassadors to act as liaisons with the organization, but it did not go further than that.

In February 1989, the Warsaw Pact countries met in Budapest and announced the
dissolution of the military structures of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, which
effectively ended the organization. Subsequently, the Warsaw Pact was formally
dissolved on July 1, 1991. Later that year, at the Rome Summit, NATO announced the
creation of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) to provide a framework for

dialogue with central and eastern European countries. By mid- 1992, the NACC had
expanded from six to twenty-three members.
NATO enlargement gradually came to be seen as the preferred solution to the new
security dilemma in Europe, as it offered Central and Eastern Europeans the opportunity
to overcome the problems ofboth geostrategic vulnerability and the historical

discontinuity of state institutions.30 To the US, NATO enlargement in Central Europe
was fundamentally political and reactive, while for European members ofNATO, and
especially for Germany, it was seen as adding strategic depth for NATO in the east.

Bringing Poland into NATO marked the first step towards overcoming the
regional insecurity dilemma: it reaffirmed that the stability and security of
Poland had become a vital national interest of the united Federal Republic,
while at the same time offering to Poland the transatlantic security
framework critical to any future resolution of the two countries' tortuous
historical legacies.
30 Ibid., 365-366.

31 Ibid., 366.
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Furthermore, a number of CEE governments have also pursued stronger bilateral ties
with the US, beyond the scope ofthe NATO alliance itself, as reinsurance against the
perceived progressive weakening ofNATO.

The expansion ofNATO in the 1990s, therefore, addressed the security issues
present immediately after the break down of the Soviet bloc, but it also brought about a
less homogenous group of members, creating a more complicated process for decisionmaking, effects ofwhich are still visible today. In part due to these factors, NATO has
faced greater challenges in mustering the necessary political will and resources for the
capabilities it needs for its out of area missions in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan.
In line with the evolution of the Euro-Atlantic security environment of the first

post-Cold War decade, the 1999 NATO's Strategic Concept acknowledged that the risks

to the security ofthe Alliance "are multi-directional and often difficult to predict."33
Besides nuclear proliferation and less likely large-scale conventional aggression or
nuclear attack, they include "uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic
area and [may stem from] ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or

failed efforts at reform, the abuse ofhuman rights, and the dissolution of states."34 In
order to address these sources of insecurity, the Alliance committed itself to a multi-

dimensional approach that included political, economic, social and environmental factors
in addition to the indispensable defense dimension. Hence, the fundamental security tasks
to be performed are:
32 Hillison, Joel R. New NATO Members: Security Consumers or Producers? Strategic Studies
Institute, April 2009, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil.

33 "The Alliance's Strategic Concept Approved by the Heads of State and Government
Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council," NATO Press Release NACS(99)65, 24 April
1999: paragraph 20-23, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm.
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a) security, based on the growth of democratic institutions;
b) consultation as provided by Article 4 of the Washington Treaty;
c) traditional deterrence and defense;
d) crisis management, and
If

e) partnership.
In the framework of the multifaceted, intangible threats that emerged in the 1990s,

NATO carried on three types of enlargement in order to redefine its role, goals and means
to accomplish those goals after the Cold War. The first form of enlargement was the
acceptance of the new members to the East; the second form of enlargement refers to the
new role and missions of the Alliance; and third, "NATO's influence outside its territory,

on non-members' ground, its power projection and presence on partners' territory is a
form of extension."36

ENLARGEMENT PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL

In the House Resolution 987, also called NATO Freedom Consolidation Act of

2007, the 1 10th US Congress reemphasized the importance of enlarged NATO to the
Transatlantic security:

(1) The sustained commitment ofthe North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) to mutual defense has made possible the democratic
transformation of Central and Eastern Europe. Members of the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization can and should play a critical role in
addressing the security challenges of the post-Cold War era in creating the
stable environment needed for those emerging democracies in Europe.
35 Ibid.

36 Daniela Spinant, "NATO Enlargements: Towards a Pan-European Security System?" Final
Report submitted to NATO Office of Information and Press, June, 2000, 5.
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(2) Lasting stability and security in Europe requires the military,
economic, and political integration of emerging democracies into existing
European structures.

But the expansion ofNATO was not a given from the moment when the Cold
War ended. Rather, it came about after a few years of deliberation among the members
and their careful observation of the neighbors to the east. "Given the context of the
German reunification as well as the political pressure to grant the Conference on Security

and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) a greater role in organizing the post-Cold War
European security system, NATO ruled out enlargement as a political option at the

beginning ofthe 1990s."38 Rather, the Alliance's first steps towards the CEE countries
were very cautious and consisted in extending them "the hand of friendship" by inviting
six Warsaw Pact countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and

the Soviet Union), at the 1990 London Summit, to establish regular diplomatic liaison
with the Alliance.39

A year later at the Rome Summit in November 1991, NATO adopted a new
Strategic Concept and established a more direct relationship with Central and Eastern

Europe through the newly created North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).40 The
1991 Strategic Concept specified that the "risks to Allied security are less likely to result
37 NATO Freedom Consolidation Act of2007. HR 987. 1 10th US Congress House of
Representatives, 1st Session.
38 James M. Goldgeier, Not Whether But When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 16-17.

39 "Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance Issued by the Heads of State and
Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council" ("The London Declaration"),
NATO Press Release, 6 July 1990, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b900706a.htm.

40 "The Alliance's Strategic Concept Agreed by the Heads of State and Government Participating
in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council," NATO Press Release, 7-8 November 1991,
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b91 1 108a.htm.
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from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse
consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social, and
political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by

many countries in Central and Eastern Europe."41 Consequently, while highlighting
traditional Article V tasks (defense against any territorial aggression and preservation of
the strategic balance ofpower within Europe), the Strategic Concept laid out the grounds
for introducing more consultation and conflict prevention measures as provided by
Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Therefore, NACC was actually designed to
provide exactly such a formal mechanism through which Central and Eastern European
countries were able to consult with NATO members on various political and security
issues.

In summary, NACCs core mission was to assist the partner countries to defuse
their mutual security suspicions through a set of confidence-building measures and
consultation mechanisms and by promoting a long-term understanding of national and

multilateral security concerns.42 Until its replacement in May 1997 with the EuroAtlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), NACC grew up to include 38 members from
Central and Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union, and provided a multilateral forum
for discussion, consultation and sharing of information with regard to a wide range of
topics such as: political, economic, military and security related matters.
The intervention of Anthony Lake, the national security advisor to President
Clinton, was critical to the US decision to implement the enlargement of NATO as part of

the Clinton administration's strategy of enlarging the community of democracies. In
41 Ibid.

42 Sean Kay, NATO and the Future ofEuropean Security (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield,
1998), 66.

doing so, Clinton, through his personal relationship with President Boris Yeltsin at the
time, attempted to make Russia a part ofthe process. When in January 1994 Clinton
framed the enlargement ofNATO in terms of 'when', rather than 'whether', the political
and scholarly discussions started shaping into reality very quickly.

Richard Holbrooke

points out that 1994 was the year in which "NATO decided it would eventually expand.
This decision was reached during the January NATO summit in Brussels and reaffirmed

by President Clinton during his return to Europe in June, when he stated that the question
was no longer whether NATO would expand but how and when."
Along with Clinton, the foreign ministers ofNATO states embarked on a twophase program. First, NATO would determine through an internal discussion the process
for expanding its membership. Second, the decisions made would be presented

individually to PfP members who have expressed an interest in such discussions and
potential accession into the Alliance. "This critical step will mark the first time detailed
discussions on this subject have taken place outside the alliance. Then the ministers will
meet again in Brussels in December and review the results of the discussions with the

partners before deciding how to proceed."45
NATO launched the Partnership for Peace (PfP) at the January 1994 Brussels
Summit. In strategic terms, PfP served three main goals for the Alliance: it established a

process with membership as the target for some partners; it allowed for selfdifferentiation among partner states without extending the full benefits ofNATO
membership to the partners; and it attended Alliance's mission of exporting stability as
43 James Goldgeier, "NATO Expansion: The Anatomy of a Decision," The Washington Quarterly
21, no. 1(1998): 85.

44 Holbrooke, "America, A European Power," 44.

envisioned in the 1991 Strategic Concept. At the same time, the partner countries
interested in membership were given more access to NATO's political and military
bodies and were offered a flexible and practical set of mechanisms that went far beyond
the soft dialogue and cooperation framework institutionalized by the NACC.
As for their main concern, the PfP invitation made it clear that "active

participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary

process ofthe expansion ofNATO."47 But the degree of involvement in PfP was purely
voluntary, at a pace and scope decided by each partner. Moreover, PfP enjoyed the full
support of Russia but for different reasons. Convinced that PfP would not lead to
eventual NATO expansion, President Boris Yeltsin called the Partnership idea a "stroke
of genius.

In practical terms, Partnership for Peace set out an important agenda animated by
the goal "to intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase
stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the
spirit ofpractical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin the

Alliance."49 First, it made participation to the program contingent upon adherence of the
partner countries to "the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom from
coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance ofthe principles of international law."
In addition, the partner countries were asked to commit themselves "to refrain from the
46 "Partnership for Peace: Invitation," Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO
Press Communiqué, M-l(94)2, 10-1 1 January 1994, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b9401 10a.htm.
47 Ibid.

48 Quoted by State Secretary Warren Christopher in James Goldgeier, Not Whether But When, 59.
49 "North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Partnership for Peace: Invitation," NATO,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm.

50 "Partnership for Peace: Framework Document," Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic
Council, Annex to NATO Press Communiqué, M-l(94)2, 10-1 1 January 1994.
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b940 1 10b.htm.
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threat or use offeree against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
State, to respect existing borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means [and] to fulfill
in good faith the obligations of the Charter ofthe United Nations and the principles of the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights [as well as] the Helsinki Final Act and all

subsequent CSCE documents."51 In order to reach these goals, the PfP required all
interested partners to adjust their defense and foreign policies in conformity with the
following provisions:

a) Facilitation of transparency in national defense planning and budgeting
processes;

b) Ensuring democratic control of defense forces;
c) Maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to
constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority ofthe UN and/or
the responsibility of the CSCE;

d) The development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the
purpose ofjoint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their
ability to undertake missions in the fields ofpeacekeeping, search and rescue,
humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed;
e) The development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate
with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

c'y

The Partnership for Peace, therefore, served as an important conceptual and
operational blueprint for most of the ensuing discussions concerning NATO enlargement.
Thus, NATO's 1995 Study on Enlargement reiterated the political objectives ofthe
51 Ibid.
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Alliance as stated in the PfP Framework Document and called upon prospective members

not only to "conform to basic principles embodied in the Washington Treaty: democracy,
individual liberty and the rule of law [and] accept NATO as a community of like-minded
nations joined together for collective defense and the preservation ofpeace" but also to
"be firmly committed to principles, objectives and undertakings included in the

Partnership for Peace Framework Document."53 Moreover, the study insisted that in the
process ofpreparation for membership "premature development of measures outside PfP

for possible new members should be avoided."54 Consequently, the PfP was confirmed as
the key instrument to be used by the candidate countries to streamline their political and
military preparation for NATO membership.
Given the predominant military dimension of the PfP and the determination to
keep politically connected those partner countries that were not interested in NATO
membership at the time, namely Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland, and those
interested but not yet selectable, at the Madrid Summit NATO decided to establish the

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).55 The EAPC was designed to increase the
participation of the partner countries in the decision-making and consultation process and
to expand the scope of political and security-related issues to be discussed within its
framework. One ofthe political goals has been to transform EAPC into a NATO body

53 "Study on NATO Enlargement," NATO Basic Texts, September 1995: paragraph 70.
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-950 1 .htm.

54 Ibid., paragraph 41.
55 "Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council," NATO Basic Texts, 30 May 1997.
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b970530a.htm.
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capable ofpreventing the next "out of area" regional crisis by enhancing PfP's emphasis
on crisis management, terrorism, and disaster response.

Probably the most comprehensive and important NATO document governing the
relationships with the CEE aspiring countries was the Membership Action Plan (MAP)
approved at the NATO's Washington Summit in April 1999. MAP, as NATO defines it,
is a program of "advice, assistance and practical support tailored to the individual needs
of countries wishing to join the Alliance. Participation in the MAP does not prejudge any

decision by the Alliance on future membership."57 MAP, therefore, was designed to
reinforce the Open Door policy ofthe Alliance and its firm commitment to further
enlargement by putting into place a program of activities to assist the aspiring countries

in their preparations for possible future membership.58 While stressing that the list of
issues did not constitute criteria, neither guarantee the timeframe for membership, MAP
required each aspiring country to draw up an annual national program containing specific

information and implementation measures.59
In making its selection for enlargement, NATO assesses the suitability of the
Membership Action Plan countries regarding their potential to contribute to the Alliance,
specifically, and the stability and security of Europe, generally. In his exhaustive

56 Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, "NATO's Identity at a Crossroads: Institutional Challenges Posed by
NATO's Enlargement and Partnership for Peace Programs," Paper prepared for presentation at the 40th
annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Columbia International Affairs Online, Columbia
University Press, February 1999.

57 "North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Membership Action Plan." NATO.
http://www.nato.int/issues/map/index.html.

58 "Membership Action Plan Approved by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council," NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)66, 24 April 1999.
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-066e.
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analysis on NATO enlargement, Thomas Szayna of RAND identifies seven areas for
assessment:

1. GDP growth;
2. Per capita GDP;
3. Attainment of market economy;
4. Defense expenditure;
5. Defense expenditures per troop;
6. Attainment of democratic political institutions; and,

7. Strategic Rationale—strategic position and the armed forces.60
The MAP assists candidates in the quest for membership. The organization
makes it clear that no uniform roadmap to NATO membership exists, and that attaining

all the prerequisites is not a guarantee of membership. For NATO to even consider a
country for accession, specific political and military prerequisites must be fulfilled:
1. Peaceful resolution of ethnic, external territorial, internal jurisdictional, and
international disputes. Refrain from using threats offeree in international
relations that are inconsistent with the purposes of the U.N.
2. Institution of democratic and civilian control of the armed forces.

3. Commitment to the PfP Framework Document and active participation in PfP.
4. Establishment of free market economies and democratic political systems
based on the rule of law.

6 Raymond Milien, Pax NATO: The Opportunities ofEnlargement, Strategic Studies Institute,
August, 2002, www.carlisle.army.mil.
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5. Initiation of steps that allow the armed forces to operate seamlessly within the
integrated military structure with the emphasis on collective defense and

interoperability.6'
From the requirements and expectations outlined in both the PfP as well as MAP
documents, it is clear that the goal of the expansion was targeting both external and
internal NATO security. Externally, as mentioned earlier, the threats were not quite

defined yet; however, the future shape and international position of Russia was not clear.
Internally, the expansion aimed at creating an extensive collective security umbrella,
based on commonality of democratic values, peaceful and stable security environment,

and protection from external threats. In this sense, NATO was taking on a more extended
role as a security community. And with a larger number of members, its functioning as an
alliance was increasingly undermined.
NATO's relationship with the Central and Eastern European region and the

strength of the emerging combined security community was first put to test during the
1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo. Although preceded by a few low-scale NATO
interventions in Bosnia in 1995, the Kosovo crisis caught both NATO and its CEE

partners relatively unprepared for dealing with this sort of situations. Having been
primarily engaged in peace-keeping and peace-building training and exercises within the
PfP framework and driven by various political interests, the CEE countries and to a
certain extent NATO itself signaled moderate willingness to engage themselves into
peace enforcement missions. The Kosovo crisis represented a defining moment for

evaluating the strength ofthe institutional and normative building stones shaping the
triangle relationship between Romania, Hungary and NATO. To be sure, the military
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contribution ofboth countries during the Kosovo operation was very limited, but the key
input was political.

NORMATIVE EFFECTS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

There is not much argument or debate today that the enlargement ofNATO to the
Central and Eastern Europe contributed to the political and economic stability of the
region, especially combined with the simultaneous expansion ofthe European Union in
the eastern direction. Zoltan Barany even makes a case that NATO may have been more
influential than the EU in the democratization of Eastern Europe because it provided

security critical to successful democratization and induced positive changes in some

policy areas. 63 The CEE took on a democratic shape, albeit to various degrees of
success. In the aspect of creating a democratic, peaceful norm of behavior, NATO had
succeeded as a collective security organization tasked at providing and extending the
accepted norms of security. But again, this success came at a price of expanding the
alliance component ofNATO. And increasing number of players generally has a
tendency to complicate the rules of the game and making the decision process difficult to
complete.

Earlier, the arguments for and against the expansion ofNATO were addressed. In
the same way as was the case with the alliance component, the normative success of
NATO's enlargement to the East, regarding the promotion of democracy and enhancing
European security, was not impervious to the political and scholarly debates. Jeane
Kirkpatrick, the former US Ambassador to the UN during the Reagan presidency,
62 Spinant, 52.
63 Zoltan Barany, "NATO's Peaceful Advance," Journal ofDemocracy 15, no. 1 (2004): 75.
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maintained that the membership in NATO for CEE countries would help to achieve the

goals of promoting democracy in the region, stabilizing the region and deterring any

future Russian aggression, while at the same time strengthening the NATO alliance.64 As
Rachel Epstein stated:

NATO has in fact contributed to democratization as well as to other

positive trends among its member states. NATO has significantly
denationalized defense strategies and thereby stabilized relations among

states. Although NATO by no means triumphs in all its endeavors to
shape the policies of aspiring and member states, it does exercises
considerable influence if it so chooses where certain domestic conditions

prevail. Exploiting the political fluidity inherent in post-cold war
transitions, for example, NATO cultivated transnational coalitions that

supported the alliance's democratizing, denationalizing agenda.65
NATO's organizational structures, the process of normative socialization, and the
prospect ofNATO membership played a key role in CEE in promoting norms of civilmilitary relations, civilian control of the military and military transparency.
For example, in the case of the Polish military, the officers initially resisted

changes in order to retain the autonomy ofthe armed forces. However, NATO demanded
that this rhetoric be removed from the public and private military discourses if Poland

plans on becoming the Alliance's member. In addition, "NATO played a significant role
in helping to subordinate the military to civilian control, reinforcing the Polish politicians

Dan Reiter, "Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy," International Security
25, no. 4 (2001): 41-67.

65 Rachel Epstein, "NATO Enlargement and the Spread of Democracy: Evidence and
Expectations," Security Studies 14, no. 1 (2005): 63-64.

175

domestically and by spreading and reinforcing these norms through interaction with and
education of Polish military officers.
It is clear that socialization in the context of collective security institutions plays a

very important role; however, this role has been hardly addressed in cases of security and
defense in the theoretical literature. According to Alexandra Gheciu NATO has
conducted a socialization process in liberal-democratic norms of security behavior on
Central and Eastern European states.

NATO was especially heavily involved in the eastern projection of liberaldemocratic norms in the field of security. These include accountability

and transparency in the formulation of defense policies and budgets, the
division of powers within the state in the area of security, government
oversight of the military through civilian defense ministries, and
accountability for the armed forces. In addition, NATO has sought to
project into Central and East European countries Western-defined liberal
norms and rules of international behavior, in particular involving peaceful

settlement of disputes, multilateralism, and democracy and human rights
promotion in the international arena."

The prospect ofNATO membership has created generally positive incentives for
democratization in the CEE region. For example, a key attraction to Slovak voters ofthe
coalition that unseated Meciar in the 1998 elections was its commitment to Euro-Atlantic

integration. Prior to the 2002 elections, President Rudolf Schuster remarked, "everybody
realizes that if we want to get into NATO and the EU, this must be granted by certain

66 Ibid.

67 Alexandra Gheciu, "Security Institutions are Agents of Socialization? NATO and the 'New
Europe'," International Organization 59 (Fall 2005): 974.

personalities."

In other words, people such as Meciar, the obstacle to Slovakia's

integration into Europe, would have to be voted out of power. Another example is the
signing ofbasic treaties between Central and East European governments aspiring to
NATO membership and their neighbors. The main reason why the aspiring countries
concluded these pacts with traditional adversaries (such as Slovakia with Hungary in
1995, Romania with Hungary in 1996, and Romania with Ukraine in 1997) was the
signatories' realization that it would substantially improve their chances ofbeing
admitted to the Alliance.69
The Alliance, in its first round of expansion in the post-Cold War environment,

has promoted democratization in a number of specific policy areas, oftentimes
overlapping and reinforcing those areas with the efforts of the EU. However, NATO
largely focused on military effectiveness, civil-military relations, defense expenditures,
and a host of other issues that the EU has not taken into account. "Foremost among these

[was] civilian control over the armed forces. Such control is essential to the success of a
democratic polity, and in this regard, it is beyond question that the demands ofNATO
membership have had a strongly pro-democratic effect in Eastern Europe."
Transparency and other confidence-building and security-building measures
within NATO provided assurance to the future member states and allowed them to focus
on their domestic and economic issues, rather than feeling the need to focus as much on

basic security. Transparency played an important role in maintaining and building

confidence among allies after the candidates' accession as well.71 As Milien states:
68 Barany, "NATO's Peaceful Advance," 74-75.
69IbId.
70 Ibid.

71 Milien, 10.

"Enlargement contributed to security and stability in two ways. First, potential
candidates seek membership in order to enjoy the assured security of collective defense.
Second, the allure ofNATO and EU membership is so great, candidates have taken steps
to reform their economies, governments, and armed forces. No other initiative has
enhanced stability as quickly and assuredly as NATO enlargement."
On the other hand of the discussion on normative effectiveness of NATO in the

post-Soviet European space, Dan Reiter argues that

NATO membership has not and will not advance democratization in
Europe. The empirical record during the Cold War is clear: Inclusion in
NATO did not promote democracy among its members. Further,
enlargement did not contribute much to democratization in the three East

European states admitted in 1999, and the promise ofNATO membership
is unlikely to speed democracy within any of the nine countries awaiting a
decision on their request for membership. The weakness of the
democratization argument, coupled with the costs and risks of further
enlargement, caution against pursuit of this policy in the near or medium
term. Instead the West should rely on the European Union (EU) to spread
democracy, an approach that is more likely to foster democratization yet

less likely to alienate Russia.73

Reiter' s arguments find support from other scholars as well. Andrew Michta maintained
that while "NATO enlargement after the Cold War contributed to the democratic
transformation of post-communist states, it failed. . . to generate a larger consensus on the

shared mission and to provide the requisite military capabilities."74 In other words, while
the democratization of the CEE did happen, the cohesion of the alliance and the
Ibid., 5.
Reiter, 45.
Michta, 376.

collective security values were weakened. In addition, Michta says, "the more NATO
has expanded to foster the military-political security of the new democratic states of
eastern and south-eastern Europe, the less it seems capable of dealing with real security
threats such as Afghanistan. Facing the possible strategic failure of its ISAF mission,

NATO needs to re-evaluate the policy track chosen post-1989."75 The ability ofthe
security alliance that is NATO, therefore, to meet the main goals of protection against
potential tangible and intangible threats, is challenged.

While scholars and analysts continue to debate the actual scope and phases
ofthe process, few seem to question its overall political utility,
emphasizing the norm-setting aspect of the two cycles ofNATO
enlargement and their contribution to the democratic transformation of the
post-communist space. However, while the institutional and normative
aspects ofwhat has transpired since 1989 may give some profound
satisfaction, today, with NATO polarized by debates on current and future
missions, the geopolitical dimension ofNATO enlargement into postcommunist Europe requires careful reassessment as a backdrop to the
Eurasian security environment.

Andrew Michta's comments bring to light another issue associated with the

strengthening ofthe collective security in Europe and effectiveness ofNATO as an
alliance, namely the issue ofpost-Soviet Russia. James Baker, a former White House
Chief of Staff and Secretary of State under President George H. W. Bush, said in 2002

that NATO made a mistake in the 1990s in not considering Russia for membership.77
While NATO and Russia came to a tentative agreement on the first wave of enlargement,

IUlU.

Ibid., 365.

James Baker, "Russia in NATO?" The Washington Quarterly 25, no. 1 (2002): 95-103.

the following expansion steps of the Alliance heavily threatened Russia and undermined
Moscow's security. "According to Russia's expectations from the first half of the 1990s,

NATO should disintegrate in the same way the Warsaw Pact did."78 However, that did
not happen.

The other acceptable scenario from the Russian perspective is the
transformation ofNATO from an exclusive, and mainly military,

organization to a Europe-wide, open political structure. As long as the
political transformation ofNATO would end in its subordination to the
. . .OSCE, Russia could even accept the accession of the central European

countries, except for the Baltic republics.79
However, NATO's expansion has not stopped there, either. The bottom line in terms of
security here is this: the more Russia feels threatened by its closest neighbors to the
West, their growing unity and combined power, the more threat it presents to NATO.
Here, the basic security dilemma is at play.
Michael Williams and Iver Neumann also bring up the idea of democratic peace

theory in respect to NATO and Russia. They argue that

the claim that enlargement represents a consensual extension of the
democratic peace runs into an even more intractable problem: the fact that
the most democratic circles in Russia have opposed NATO enlargement

exactly on the grounds that it threatens the development of democracy in
Russia. Indeed, the Russian consensus against NATO enlargement is

overwhelming.80
78 Alexander Duleba, "Russia and NATO Enlargement" in Janusz Bugajski, ed., Toward an

Understanding ofRussia: New European Perspectives (Washington DC: Council on Foreign Relations,
2002), 153.
79 Ibid.

80 Williams and Neumann, 359.
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To give only a few examples: in February 1996, Russian Deputy Defense
Minister Audrey Kokoshin attended an annual conference on security sponsored by the
German Ministry of Defense where he argued that "we have pulled back to the East,
Ol

while NATO is turning in this direction and is pushing us further and further eastward."
Similarly, in their first meeting, Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov reportedly told
Polish Foreign Minister Geremek that "you have to understand we are not glad about the
enlargement ofNATO. But we know it will happen. Just don't ask us to be happy about

it."82 At an Economic Forum in Davos, in February 1997, Anatoly Chubays declared that
when it came to the question ofNATO enlargement "for the first time in the last five
years, I personally am adopting the same position as Messrs. Zhirinovsky and

Zyuganov."83 As Williams and Neumann aptly point out:
Such statements hardly seem to vindicate a view of the enlargement

process as the consensual extension of a democratic security community.
And in light of such views, it seems unlikely that one can explain the
enlargement process as a straightforward evolution of the consensual and
progressive security community embodied by NATO. Nor can such a
position explain adequately why despite this considerable opposition and
continuing misgivings, Russia in the end largely acquiesced to NATO's

enlargement.84

Charles Kupchan, who in the early 1990s criticized the expansion ofNATO to the East
along George Kennan, ten years later argued that the United States should guide the
81 Quoted in Allen Lynch, "Russia and NATO: Expansion and Coexistence?" The International
Spectator 32, no. 1 (1997): 82.

82 See Jane Perlez, "Warsaw Journal: Trying to Make the Twain of East and West Meet," New
York Times, 17 April 1998, A4.

83 Quoted in Przemyslaw Grudzinski and Peter van Ham, Integrating Russia in Europe: Mission
Impossible? Working Papers on European Integration and Regime Formation, no. 14 (Estbjerg: South
Jutland University Press, 1997), 27.

84 Williams and Neumann, 360.
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enlargement ofNATO and make sure that Russia's inclusion in the alliance is a top
priority. The US and its NATO allies must seize historic opportunity to bring Russia into
the Atlantic community, as only in this way the goal of collective security for Europe
could be accomplished.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE: CONTRADICTION OR
REINFORCEMENT?

The post-Cold War enlargement ofNATO was the biggest and the most important
geopolitical change in Europe, after the transitions of 1989 to 1991. The 1990s
expansion of the Alliance, which started a process of subsequent enlargements, carried
into the future significant implications for the Alliance. Enlargement was and still is a
part ofNATO's transformation in the Post-Cold War era in which NATO has evolved
from a traditional form of military-political alliance into a combination of an alliance and
security community, with the component of a security community gaining an increasing
dominance over the alliances characteristic.

The originator ofthat change was the shift in the international environment, with
the fall of the Soviet Union, end ofbipolarity and clear definition of threat, and expanded
group of similar-minded states in Europe. Subsequently, this change led to the change in
the relationship between collective security and collective defense in the framework of
NATO. Whereas in the two previous periods discussed, the international environment
stayed unchanging, and with that so did the relationship between the two narratives, in
the 1990s, with the changing international environment, the dependency of this
85 Charles Kupchan, "The origins and nature ofNATO enlargement" Contemporary Security
Policy 21, no. 2(2000): 147.
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relationship on the international structure became evident. While before those two
narratives reinforced each other to such an extent that at times one could not exist without

the other, as was the case with the creation ofNATO, here the collective security
narrative took precedence over the alliance narrative. With the absence of clearly defined
external threat, NATO focused on creating an expanded community of members whose

goal is internal and external security, very much resembling what Deutsch defined a
security community. However, this extension of collective security arrangement also
meant that the functioning ofNATO as an alliance, with more members, would be
somewhat hampered.

While the new members generally have done a good job at fulfilling and

increasing their NATO commitments since joining,86 the enlarged number ofAllies
within NATO slowed down the decision-making process within the Alliance and diffused

greatly the agreement on the means and goals ofNATO's mission. Daalder and
Goldgeier write:

Besides raising questions of efficacy, changes in NATO's composition
and scope will also raise questions about the alliance's core purpose. As
was true when NATO expanded eastward, in the 1990s, the most
controversial aspect of any effort to enlarge the alliance's membership will
be how such enlargement might affect the security guarantee in Article V

ofthe North Atlantic Treaty.87
However, on the other side of this discussion, no NATO member currently faces a
military threat from another country, much less the type of threat that led to NATO's
86 Hillison, New NATO Members: Security Consumers or Producers?
87 Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, "Global NATO," Foreign Affairs 85 (September/October
2006): 105.
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establishment in 1949. "In the unlikely event that such a threat did materialize, nothing
about NATO's enhanced reach would in any way weaken its collective defense

commitments."88 But the current situation does not guarantee the similar future
environment. "The core question remains whether the new NATO will endure long
enough to sustain the structure of the Euro-Atlantic security, as the alliance transforms
itself into a collective security organization with marginal military capabilities. "

RQ

In

other words, will NATO be able to sustain the alliance element, while it manages its
collective security arrangement? Is it possible that the alliance element will become an
imbedded part of collective security?
The fundamental contradiction ofNATO in the 1990s and today is that while

enlargement was critical to the security ofpost-communist states, the process of setting
the security norms and systematic transformation has become the primary focus of the

Alliance.90 The irony of the post-1989 transformation ofNATO, therefore, lies in the
very success of the enlargement process. Alliances are first and foremost against
something, and only peripherally serve to support and promote shared values. The post1991 NATO chose to redefine itself through norm-setting, arguably at the expense of the
alliance component. "On the balance, NATO has become hollowed out, raising the
question of its long-term ability to provide security to those post-communist states that
originally joined the alliance to ensure their newly regained independence."

Stuart

Croft, however, argues that the problem of enlargement is not in the jeopardized
effectiveness of the alliance, but lack of strategy for the expansion itself.
88 Ibid., 106.
89 Michta, 375.
90 Ibid.

91 Ibid., 376.
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A different perspective holds that the flaw lies not with an ongoing
process of enlargement, but rather in the lack of strategy surrounding the
management of the issue [of enlargement]. NATO will be enlarged. ...
But it should do so with an eye to three sets ofprocesses; the enlargement
of the European Union; the development ofNATO-EU interaction on
security matters; and, of course, the development of a structured interface
between Russia and both NATO and the EU. In an already overcrowded

diplomatic agenda, this is a tall order.

But is it possible that the enlargement was a part of the process of searching for new
purpose ofNATO, which was transforming itself from a military-political alliance whose
primary purpose is territorial defense of its members to a security community that would
act on the stabilization of the area through new missions?

At the intersection of the collective security and collective defense elements of
NATO are the emergence of divergent interests among the enlarged group of members
that is not entirely homogenous any more and the increasing difficulty of reaching
consensus within an Alliance with close to 30 members. Within the pre-1991 Alliance,

different perceptions on policies generated already an identifiable cleavage. There was a
disagreement on means between France and the United States, present within NATO ever
since the creation of the Alliance in 1949. However, this divergence did not impact the

goals and caused no harm to the collective security and defense character ofNATO.
There is a second cleavage that became clear after the end of the Cold War,
namely the different perception of most immediate threats between the members to the

92 Stuart Croft, "Guaranteeing Europe's Security? Enlarging NATO again," International Affairs
78, no. 1(2002): 113.

93 Petar Kurecic, 'TSIATO Enlargement: A Geopolitical Victory of the United States in the PostCold War Era?" Results and Perspectives. Hrvatski Geografski Glasnik 70, no. 1 (2008): 32.
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West and the East.94 In other words, NATO enlargement is a challenge for the consensus
rule and tradition inside the Atlantic Alliance. The more members' negotiations within

the alliance increase the likelihood of collision among members' interests. Potential
tensions inside the alliance in time of crisis may undermine the decision-making
capability ofNATO, its political credibility and, consequently, the effectiveness of its

military action.95 Furthermore, they can potentially imbalance both of the narratives of
NATO.

Despite the initial criticisms and current arguments that the alliance is weakened
and ineffective, that it lacks defined purpose and the agreement among the members on
the means is non-existent, the fact is that "the first post-Cold War round of NATO

enlargement can be proclaimed a success. None of the fears and worst-case predictions
that opponents of enlargement circulated in the pre-accession debates have

materialized."96 The enlargement did not cause a serious problem for the relationship
between Moscow and the West, and there was no widespread nationalist or anti-Western

backlash; the political cohesiveness, decision-making ability, and military effectiveness
were not seriously harmed; the costs of the expansion were manageable for both NATO
and the new members; the membership has not led to a greater aggressiveness on the part
of the new members; and the new borders of NATO have not proved to be divisive and

the new structures established helped to ensure that excluded applicants were not left out

94 Spinant, 7.
95 Ibid., 8.
96 Jiri Sedivy, "The puzzle of NATO Enlargement," Contemporary Security Policy 22, no. 1
(2001): 1.
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in the cold. In addition, NATO has played a key role in the transformation and

stabilization ofthe post-communist area ofthe Central and Eastern Europe.97
Perhaps Williams and Neumann sum up NATO's post-Cold War development
and effectiveness best, when they write:

The evolution of NATO constitutes one of the most important
developments in post-Cold War international security. Despite predictions
of fragmentation from within or supercession from above, the Alliance has
emerged as a—perhaps the—dominant institution in contemporary
security relations. While debates in the late 1980s often revolved around
whether NATO would, could, or should survive, they now centre around
the implications of its centrality, and its current and (possible) future

enlargement.98

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and of its CEE communist satellites,
NATO defied all realist assumptions about alliances dissolving in absence of a threat and
made instead a series of steps that allowed it to move again, within just a decade, to the
core of the European security system. In 2000, Kenneth Waltz wrote that NATO, as with
all other international institutions, is dependent on the national interests of the states
involved. The US and other NATO states see the organization as a useful tool in
promoting their interests. This does not mean that the organization is unimportant or not
useful, but simply that its existence and utility is up to the powerful states involved.

NATO expansion is part ofthe expansion of American influence.99

97 Ibid., 20.

98 Williams and Neumann, 357.
99 Kenneth Waltz, "NATO Expansion: A Realist's View," Contemporary Security Policy 21, no. 2
(2000): 23.
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In addition, "one of the most dominant fears associated with enlargement of the
Atlantic Alliance to new members was the dilution of NATO and its defacto

transformation into a talk shop."100 Instead, NATO has moved closer to becoming a
security community that Karl Deutsch envisioned in the 1950 or a community ofpractice
which Adler and Barnett brought back in the 1990s. Enlargement to the Central and
Eastern Europe provided NATO with the opportunity and means to become a leading

institutional agent ofthe cooperative security community ofpractice. 101 European states
want to be member ofNATO and other regions look at it as a blueprint to emulate.
In 2008, Emanuel Adler applied the concept of community ofpractice to NATO,
in lieu ofprevious idea of security communities. Community of practice, Alder wrote,
"can incorporate so many concepts because it encompasses not only the conscious and
discursive dimensions and the actual doing of social change, but also the social space
where structure and agency overlap and where knowledge, power, and community

intersect."102 He essentially combined the structural component of an alliance with the
idea-based normative factor of collective security. "Communities of practice are

intersubjective social structures that constitute the normative and epistemic ground for
action, but they also are agents, made up ofreal people, who—working via network
channels, across national or organizational lines, and in the halls of government—affect
I G?'?

political, economic, and social events."
NATO in the 1990s, and subsequently now, clearly displays the characteristics
outlined by Adler. The North Atlantic Alliance as the community of practice is a
100 Charles Kupchan, "Expand NATO and split Europe," New York Times, 27 November 1994.
101 Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities," 214.
102 Ibid., 199.
103 Ibid., 200.
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"security community spread via the diffusion not only of democratic values but also of
self-restraint subjectivities. Liberal democracy and self-restraint norms and practices are
intimately related, and in some instances it might not be prudent to treat them as separate
normative categories. Self-restraint norms might be necessary (but not sufficient) for
liberal democracy, and liberal democratic norms are not necessary for self-restraint (as

evidenced by non-liberal security communities)."104 NATO has encouraged
democratization in the post-communist CEE countries for three reasons: "First, securing

national sovereignty and security establishes the fundamental basis that makes it possible
for democratic transition and consolidation to proceed. East Europeans found themselves

in a highly uncertain security environment following the end of their countries' state-

socialist regimes. They had no security alternative to the Alliance."105
The difference between NATO and all other security organizations is that

NATO's integrated command arrangements, its common procedures and doctrine, and
the trust and bonds developed over decades of cooperation are an irreplaceable force.

During the Cold War, the collective defense guarantee was the rationale ofthe Alliance,
but in the post-Cold War era, greater security flexibility became apparent. Although the
Alliance remains committed to the fundamental tasks of security, consultation, deterrence
and defense, it has added partnership, conflict prevention, and crisis management as part

of its responsibilities.106

Ibid., 198.
Milien, Pea NATO: The Opportunities ofEnlargement.

189

CONCLUSIONS

The end of the Cold War and bipolarity makes it possible for European security to
encompass a continental vision of security. Security is no longer exclusively a military
challenge, but it is economic, political, social, and environmental as well. NATO must
adapt to be able to simultaneously carry out three complementary enlargements: new
members, new missions, and power-projection extension. These three enlargements and
the effects that they collectively generate, form a spine for a pan-European security

arrangement.107 In these combined issues and tasks, NATO's structure as an alliance and
its mission as a collective security arrangement complement each other, reinforce each
other, and it is safe to say, could not function without each other.
Enlargement process is a continuation of the security community of the
democratic states. Thomas Risse-Kappen maintains that NATO "extends that community
of values, it extends that community into Eastern Europe and, potentially, into even the
successor states of the Soviet Union, creating a 'pacific federation' from Vladivostok to

Berlin, San Francisco, and Tokyo."108 However, there are, however, two major
difficulties with viewing enlargement as a straightforward extension of the Western
democratic security community. "First, it ignores the fact that while official policy may
appear to mirror a consensus, enlargement has been subject to severe and continuing
criticism from within countries traditionally forming the Alliance. The policy of
enlargement often met strong resistance within the policy-making community, and it

continues to be subject to strong criticism."109
107 Spinant.
108 Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Identity in a Democratic Security Community" in Peter Katzenstein,
ed. The Culture ofNational Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 396.

109 Williams and Neumann, 359.
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Michael Mandelbaum, for example, considers it a sure means of losing the

peace.110 John Lewis Gaddis has observed that among historians there is a near universal
consensus that NATO enlargement is a mistake. ! ? ? Obviously, for the present moment,
NATO has been able to not only stay afloat as a security institution, but also extend its
territorial membership and operations. However, that does not guarantee its effectiveness
and persistence in the future. One thing remains clear, however: NATO would not and
will not survive as a collective defense organization alone; rather, it needs to hone its
operability as an alliance and focus on its mission as a collective security organization in
the future.

110 Michael Mandlebaum, "Preserving the New Peace: The Case Against NATO Expansion,"
Foreign Affairs 74, no. 3 (1995): 9.

1 ' ' John Lewis Gaddis, "History, Grand Strategy and NATO Enlargement," Survival 40, no. 1

(1998): 145.

CHAPTER VI

NATO IN THE POST-2001 PERIOD

INTRODUCTION

The final empirical section looks at NATO in the post-2001 environment. As
discussed earlier, the international environment in this most recent decade is
characterized by more intangible, transnational threats and issues, quite different than the

nature ofthreats during the Cold War and the immediate post-Cold War decade. In that
respect, NATO must readjust its scope, goals and means to meet those new threats. The
year 2001, marked by the 9/11 attacks on the United States, serves as the watershed
moment. For the first time in the history ofNATO, the Article V was evoked in defense
of the United States.

Given the trends of the collective security and collective defense narratives
prevalent in the 1990s, the natural assumption would have been that NATO continues to
absorb more and more collective security characteristics at the expense of the alliance
narrative. While that is the case in reference to the Alliance's engagement in

Afghanistan, the out-of-area NATO operation under the auspices ofthe UN, the Allies
themselves have an increasingly difficult time agreeing on the Alliance's goals and
means in Afghanistan. Furthermore, there is an increasing discord regarding the role of
NATO in European and international security. Therefore, while the members seem to
appreciate the idea ofNATO as a collective security organization, spreading its collective
security principles outside of Europe, they are not willing to provide practical
commitment to realize that noble idea.

In this chapter, NATO's involvement in Afghanistan serves as the framework for
analysis of its dual nature as an alliance and a collective security organization. Going
back to the elements used in the previous chapters, we need to look at the international

environment, internally and externally first. Internally, the expansion ofNATO in
Europe in continuing, encompassing more and more democratic states who see NATO as
an effective vehicle for security. Externally, however, the international system is still
operating in the structure ofunipolarity, with the US at the helm, albeit the power of the
US is slowly declining. Furthermore, the external threats in this environment remain
intangible and hard to define, and encompass both state as well as transnational threats.
In this environment, what is happening with the narratives of collective security
and collective defense in the framework ofNATO? The pattern of development from the
last decade of the twentieth century, discussed in the previous chapter, continues.
NATO's role as a collective security arrangement, or more as a security community for

Europe, grows, whereas its role as an alliance remains in decline. NATO members have
an increasingly difficult time agreeing on what constitutes an external threat, how to deal
with that threat, and who is going to pay for the capabilities to deal with it.
The involvement of the organization in Afghanistan shows a few possible
directions for the Alliance in the future: Afghanistan's issues with political instability,
terrorism, and opium trade present threats to Europe and, as such, belong in the realm of
NATO's responsibilities, despite the fact that Afghanistan is outside of the European
area. If that is the case, then it is clear that the nature and scope of threats are changing

and NATO is responding to that change. The second direction is that ofNATO as a
collective security organization—in this case, NATO is broadening its scope and area of
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operations to Afghanistan. In this scenario, Afghanistan poses a threat to the broader
international community and needs to be addressed as a practical and moral obligation.
As a prolonged effort which is in its seventh year now, Afghanistan serves as a test case
for NATO members' ability to come to agreements on policies and carry those policies
effectively. The jury is still out on the success ofNATO's mission in Afghanistan, and in
a similar fashion, on the role of NATO in European and international security.

Having said that, the fact that in the post-2001 environment "NATO's members
and partners continued to recognize it as a key Euro-Atlantic security institution—as the
main transatlantic forum, in spite of all its problems, for articulating and implementing

security policies in the Western security community"1 shows that the utility ofNATO has
not diminished. Rather, it has enabled NATO to "identify common allied priorities,

identify problems, define solutions to those problems, and help implements those
solutions, including in the areas ofpreventing and combating terrorism." However, the
picture is not quite that rosy. On the other hand, NATO has sustained a

certain loss of moral authority in the eyes of allied publics as well as in
partner states, in part because of the alliance's (perceived) willingness to
tolerate or actively support significant exceptions to liberal norms. ...
Should this situation persist in the future, it could easily lead to deeper
questions and challenges to the moral authority of the alliance. . ..That, in
turn, could significantly undermine the ability of the alliance to act as a
key player in the contemporary field of security.

1 Alexandra Gheciu, Securing Civilization? The EU, NATO, and the OSCE in the Post-9/11 World
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 114.

2Ibid., 115.
3Ibid., 114.
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All allies seemed to agree that the future of the alliance rested, in large part, on the
success of the mission in Afghanistan. Committing NATO to out-of-area operations at
meetings in Reykjavik and Prague in 2002, supporters ofNATO saw the mission in
Afghanistan to be a bridge linking the NATO of the Cold War with a new, post-Cold War
NATO that would be involved in the war on terror. According to Amin Tarzi, reporting
on Afghanistan for the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty:

It was Afghanistan, the last battlefield ofthe Cold War, that led to the
tragic events of 1 1 September 2001 . NATO's first challenge in the war on
terrorism began in Afghanistan as well ... As such, NATO's shift of
attention from the threat posed by the former Soviet Union to terrorism
seems a natural and logical progression. A major question that remains
unanswered, however, is whether or not NATO is facing the challenge

with solid unity ofpurpose and action."

This section will first outline the origins ofNATO's involvement in Afghanistan
and the actual situation on the ground in the country. Next, the scope and nature of
disagreements among the Allies regarding NATO's involvement in Afghanistan will be
addressed, concluding with the discussion on the relationship between collective security
and collective defense narratives in respect to the post-2001 period in NATO's most
current history.

NATO'S ROAD TO AFGHANISTAN

The Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty was invoked for the first time in the

history of the Alliance after 9/11: the "U.S. leaders welcomed the European pledges of
4 Rupp, NATO after 9/11, 154.

support, and the U. S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan soon had a key NATO

component."5 On October 7th, 2001, the United States, in the aftermath ofthe attacks of
September 1 1th, launched the Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The OEFAfghanistan later became one of five components ofthe OEF as the US effort in the War
on Terrorism. The other subordinate components of the Operation Enduring Freedom

have taken place in Kyrgyzstan (finished in 2004), the Philippines, in the Horn of Africa,
and in Trans-Sahara region. In Afghanistan, the Operation Enduring Freedom ran by the
US, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), executed by NATO,

operated parallel with each other, with a high degree ofjoint efforts, until they merged
together in 2009. The goal of the OEF-Afghanistan, as stated by President Bush in 2001,
shortly after 9/11, was to eliminate terrorist training camps in Afghanistan, damage the
infrastructure in the country, capture the AI-Qaeda leaders, remove the Taliban from
power, and dismantle terrorist groups operating out of Afghanistan.
In December 2001, the United Nations Security Council sanctioned the creation
of the International Security Assistance Force tasked with providing security in

Afghanistan in the wake of the US invasion in an effort to re-establish a legitimate
Afghan government. "NATO member countries have responded to the call of the U.N.
Security Council to assist the Afghan government in restoring security in Kabul and its
surroundings. Their forces constitute the backbone ofthe International Security

Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan."7 This decision was based on an earlier Bonn
Agreement regarding Afghanistan.
5 Ted Carpenter, "NATO at 60: A Hollow Alliance," Policy Analysis 635 (March, 2009): 1.
6 "Bush Announces Start of War on Terror," Global Security, 20 September 2001.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2001/09/mil-010920-usia01.htm.

7 Rupp, NATO after 9/11, 157.

196

Officially called the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan
Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Governing Institutions, the Bonn
Agreement, as its name shows, was designed to aid Afghans in building of their state and

government after years of Soviet and later Taliban domination. The NATO-led ISAF was
to be responsible for providing security in the period of transition from conflict and

instability to legitimate and capable governance in Afghanistan.8 Despite this ambiguous
statement by NATO regarding Afghanistan, pressure continued to mount throughout
2003 on the Alliance to commit to ISAF formally, and also to the nation-building mission
in Afghanistan. This was in part due to the fact that most ofthe states contributing to
ISAF were already NATO members or partner states. With the general mandate from the
Prague Summit to support out-of-area operations, it only seemed natural that NATO
would directly oversee the ISAF. In February 2003, with NATO under stress as a result
of Iraq differences, Secretary General Robertson proposed a formal NATO mission in
Afghanistan in part to counter the perception ofthe Alliance in trouble as a result of the

deadlock on the issue of Iraq.9 In August 2003, NATO commenced the control of
security and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.
Since NATO took command of ISAF in 2003, the Alliance has gradually

expanded the reach of its mission, originally limited to Kabul, to cover Afghanistan's
whole territory and, in a similar fashion, has broadened the issue scope of its operations.

8 Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001), United Nations. 20 December, 2001.
http://www.undemocracy.com/S-RES-1386(2001).pdf. See also: North Atlantic Treaty Organization:
International Security Assistance Force. NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm.
9 Rupp, NATO after 9/11, 157.

The number of ISAF troops has grown accordingly from the initial 5,000
to around 50,000 troops coming from 42 countries, including all 28 NATO
members. In accordance with all the relevant Security Council
Resolutions, ISAF' s main role is to assist the Afghan government in the
establishment of a secure and stable environment. To this end, ISAF

forces are conducting security and stability operations throughout the
country together with the Afghan National Security Forces and are directly
involved in the development of the Afghan National Army through
mentoring, training and equipping. Through its Provincial Reconstruction
Teams (PRTs), ISAF is supporting reconstruction and development
(R&D) in Afghanistan, securing areas in which reconstruction work is
conducted by other national and international actors. Where appropriate. . .
ISAF is also providing practical support for R&D efforts, as well as
support for humanitarian assistance efforts conducted by Afghan
government organizations, international organizations, and NGOs.

Upon NATO's arrival in Afghanistan, the political stability of the Afghan government
was practically non-existent. Not only was there a possibility that the transitional
government in Kabul could be easily destabilized and toppled, but also the legitimacy of
President Hamid Karzai was heavily questioned.

On the ground, Karzai was variously portrayed as a pawn of the United
States or in the pocket of southern anti-Taliban fighters of Pashtun
ethnicity, or implicitly controlled by the Northern Alliance. The Northern
Alliance exerted explicit control over Kabul and the associated political
processes by dint of its 27,000-man military contingent based in the city
and its environs.11

10Ibid.

11 Sean Maloney, "Afghanistan Four Years On: An Assessment," Parameters 35 (Autumn 2005):
21.
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Furthermore, the central government in Kabul held very little power; rather, the
control came from the local leaders, anti-Taliban chieftains which the media pejoratively
labeled "warlords." In addition, "remnants of the Taliban, supported by the remnants of al
Qaeda' s military forces were in the process of transitioning from a conventional guerilla
war to a low-level terrorist campaign, and the possibility of a return to the destructive

post-Soviet era infighting between the chieftains existed in numerous locations, including

Kabul."12 Given the past 30 years ofthe Afghan history, the population outside of the
Pashtun areas was not openly hostile toward the international forces, but it generally was
not overtly supportive either.
In 2003, international forces in Afghanistan included 18,000 members of the

Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan and 4,500 military provided by the states
participating in International Security Assistance Force. "The OEF at the time was
evolving into a mature counterinsurgency force, operating mostly in the southeast and
eastern parts ofAfghanistan, while ISAF was confined to Kabul. ISAF had a muddled
mandate and, without the resources to carry it out, functioned as a nearly symbolic
European presence in Kabul, a green-uniformed island in a tan-uniformed sea." On the

Afghan side, the Afghan National Army was weak and untrained. In addition, the
"infrastructure damage after 25 years ofwar was another impediment to extending

federal government control over the provinces."1
Overall, the Afghan transitional government had questionable legitimacy among
the people, it was subject to coercion and pressure by the warlords and Taliban groups,
and it was dependent on international forces in every way. "Without security, there can
12 Ibid., 22
13 Ibid., 30.

14 Ibid., 24.
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be no reconstruction, and with no reconstruction there would be no nation-building, thus
leaving Afghanistan susceptible to continued instability and penetration by international
terrorism. On the plus side, the insurgency was forced by OEF operations to alter its
methodology, which in turn made insurgent operations less effective." There were clear
indicators that the Afghan population did not and would not support the continuation of
Taliban and Al-Qaeda influence in the country.

The acceptance by NATO of the ISAF command changed the perception of the
Afghan transition government. Under the Canadian leadership, ISAF extended its
support, and with that legitimacy, to the interim government in Kabul, and provided the
most essential element for a government and society to function—security.

ISAF's area of operations was expanded to encompass the entire province of
Kabul, not just the city, and coordination between ISAF and OEF was improved,
particularly in the special operations realm. ISAF was able to keep an eye on
potential problem factions. . . and facilitate a wide variety of local projects which1 7
synergistically assisted the security efforts by building trust with the population.

Furthermore, ISAF, in conjunction with OEF-Afghanistan, the Afghan Ministry
of Defense and the National Directorate of Security embarked on the process of
institution-building, through enhancing the leadership of military, police and government
and providing training. However, the difficulty came in the reality that "all of this had to
be done without generating the perception that the result was being imposed from the
outside by foreign entities. OEF [took] on the organized insurgents, while ISAF [assisted]
15 Ibid.

16 Ibid., 25.
17 Ibid.
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with security of the capital. PRT expansion [provided] bases for the extension of central

government power into the outlying areas."18 This mission was further emphasized by
former Secretary General ofNATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. In 2004, he outlined his four
priorities for the future of the Alliance: Afghanistan, Iraq, military transformation, and
cooperative relations among member states. The mission in Afghanistan was his top

priority, however.19
Early on during the initial phases of the ISAF mission, getting most NATO states,
other than the US, Canada and Germany, to deploy more than a few troops was

difficult.20 That lack of commitment became a persistent problem based on perception of
NATO's members' support of the US efforts in Afghanistan despite systematic pledges
of troop increases. At the Istanbul Summit, in June 2004, NATO pledged to increase its
troop presence form 6500 to 10,000 troops in the lead-up to the October 2004 election
(however 1000 of these would be held in reserve in Europe). The US publicly welcomed
this but was privately disappointed by the modest increases in troop levels. The US
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld proposed deploying the newly established NATO
Response Force to Afghanistan, but several NATO members, led by France, successfully

opposed this.21
In the fall of 2004, the US pressed its NATO allies to consider merging the US
combat mission in Afghanistan with the ISAF force. This was publicly rejected by
France and Germany, partly because ofthe reluctance by Germany and others to engage
their troops in combat in Afghanistan. Initially, NATO only operated around Kabul and

19 Rupp, NATO after 9/11, 153.
20 Ibid., 163.
21 Ibid., 165-166.
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in the northern provinces. In 2005 meeting ofNATO defense ministers, the alliance
eventually agreed to expand the mission to the western provinces, adding several hundred
troops, and then eventually expanding the ISAF mission to the entire country.
Throughout 2005, the US and its NATO allies became better at coordinating the two

missions, the OEF and the ISAF, eventually leading to the merger ofthe two.22
At the NATO summit in April 2008, NATO countries pledged to continue to
work to remove the other so-called "national caveats" on their troops' operations that

U.S. commanders say limit operational flexibility."23 Subsequently, the NATO members
improved in the coordination of their troops and adopted the flexible rules of engagement
that allowed for more adequate response to problems in Afghanistan. All have also
agreed that their forces would come to each others' defense in times of emergency
anywhere in Afghanistan. However, as of the end of 2008, some NATO members still did
not relax their caveats. "Some nations refuse to conduct night-time combat. Others do

not fight after snowfall. These caveats were troubling to those NATO countries with
forces in heavy combat zones, such as Canada, which feel they are bearing the brunt of

the fighting."24
In 2007, the problems plaguing the situation in Afghanistan increased in size and
scope. "The drivers of instability include insurgency, chronic weakness ofthe Afghan
government and state institutions, exploding drug production, and a weak economy.
Uncoordinated military operations by international forces and shifting political dynamics

22 Ibid., 167-168.

23 Kenneth Katzman, "Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy," CRS
Report for Congress, 2008, 34.

24 Ibid., 35.
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in the region are additional contributing factors."" The stabilization efforts and statebuilding endeavors became increasing complicated. Furthermore, the problems with the
troop's contributions and the commitment ofNATO members aggravated the situation:

with the partial exception of British, Canadian, and Dutch units, most of
the NATO troop contributions amount to little more than military
symbolism. The NATO governments can argue that they are contributing
to the U.S. led mission, but in reality most of the deployments are

militarily irrelevant. That is true even as overall alliance troop levels in
Afghanistan have gradually climbed. Most NATO members have placed a
variety of caveats on the use of their military personnel. Some forbid them
from engaging in night operations (which are inherently more dangerous).
Others prohibit their forces from being deployed in certain areas of the
country—specifically, those areas where significant combat is taking place
and where additional troops might actually prove useful.

The national caveats, overtime, became the problem most difficult to manage for
the ISAF command. "In most instances national caveats actually reduced the number of

troops. The problem became particularly acute with the Stage III enlargement into
southern Afghanistan, where the Taliban posed a serious security threat. ISAF needed to
implement a firm approach in order to counter the threat, but the approach is in danger of
being undermined by [the caveats]."
In defense of NATO members, one can list many reasons why the restrictions

have been imposed on the use of troops in Afghanistan: lack of equipment and training;
domestic political reasons, namely the lack of belief that the troops are sufficient to create
25 Ali Jalali, "Afghanistan: Regaining Momentum," Parameters 37 (Winter 2007/8): 5.
26 Carpenter, "NATO at 60: A Hollow Alliance," 6.
27 Peter Thruelsen, 'TSiATO in Afghanistan—What Lessons Are We Learning, And Are We
Willing to Adjust?" Danish Institute for International Studies Report 14 (2007).

stability in Afghanistan; lack of flexibility of troop in countering the new arising threats
and their complexity.

The response has been decidedly underwhelming. Although the French
parliament voted in September 2008 to keep the country's 3,500 troops in
Afghanistan, Paris has no current plans to increase that contingent. French
Defense Minister Hervé Morin stated bluntly in February 2009 that France

has "already made a considerable effort" toward stabilizing Afghanistan
and that "there's no question for the moment of sending additional
troops." The Netherlands, which despite its size has been one of the more
substantial contributors, not only refuses to increase its military
commitment, it has also announced that it will begin drawing down its

1,770 troops in 2010. Germany argues that its military is simply too
stretched to commit more troops beyond the 4,500 already in the country.

Typically, Berlin insists that a larger deployment of combat troops would
be superfluous, since the
primary
focus of the Afghan mission should be
¦
29
on civilian reconstruction.

In February 2009, the ISAF increased its troops from approximately 43,000 in 2008 to
56,000. This meant more troops in more areas that previously had little or no regular
security presence. The consequence was actually more fighting as militants were pushed
away from some of the more densely populated areas.

Craig Whitlock, "Afghanistan Appeal May Temper European Allies' Ardor for Obama,"
Washington Post, 7 February, 2009; and David Rising and George John, "NATO Chief: More European
Troops in Afghanistan," Associated Press, 7 February, 2009.

30 "Afghanistan Report," NATO, 2009. As of July, 2009, ISAF has approximately 64,500 troops.
ISAF consists of 42 countries. The contributions are as follows: US: 29950; UK: 9000; Germany: 4050;

France: 3160; Canada: 2800; Italy: 2795; Poland: 2000; Netherlands: 1770; Australia: 1090; Romania:
1025; Spain: 780; Turkey: 730; Denmark: 700; Belgium: 510; Norway: 485; Bulgaria: 470; Sweden: 430;
Czech Republic: 340; Hungary: 310; Croatia: 295; Slovakia: 230; Lithuania: 200; Latvia: 165; Macedonia:
165; New Zealand: 160; Estonia: 150; Greece: 145; Albania: 140; Finland: 1 10; Azerbaijan: 90; Portugal:
90; Slovenia: 80; United Arab Emirates: 25; Ukraine: 25; Luxemburg: 9; Iceland: 8; Singapore: 8; Ireland:

7; Jordan: 7; Austria: 3; Bosnia and Herzegovina: 2; Georgia: 1. Source: "ISAF Placemat" as of 23 July
2009. Available at: http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf.
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EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN DISAGREEMENTS: ALLIANCE IN JEOPARDY?

The discussions, agreements, and disagreements among NATO members touch on
two main areas: does NATO's engagement in Afghanistan compromise NATO's role in

security of Europe?; what are the goals ofNATO in Afghanistan and what are the
appropriate means to achieve those goals? It is important to note here, that the members
are having issues with agreement on more specific goals, whereas before the discussions
centered on the means. However, it is not the general goals of overall European internal
and external security that are in question; rather the more specific objectives ofthat
security. This question goes back to the concept of how the comprehensive security
should be defined in the first place.

Specifically, the ISAF mission is seen as especially crucial for two reasons.
Failure could potentially hurt the alliance and US commitment to it, which some

countries, particularly the Baltic states, see as critical. However, an increase in out-ofarea operations is not seen as preferable, as these countries would prefer to see NATO's
focus more within the European region.
In Estonia, for example, within the government and among the general public,

NATO is seen as Tallinn's principle security guarantee and as absolutely a critical
alliance. There is a fear that the US commitment to NATO may be diminishing. Tallinn
wants to make sure that the alliance stays central to European security and is not

marginalized by the development of an EU defense policy. Lithuania and Latvia are both
very similar among political elites and citizens. They see NATO as a guarantor of
security, a check against Russian imperialist ambitions, and as offering potential to aid in
31 Bugajski, Janusz and Ilona Teleki. Atlantic Bridges: America's New European Allies (New
York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Ine, 2007).
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democratization for countries farther east in ways that other organizations cannot provide.
In this framework, the Article V guarantee, with the US strongly involved in NATO, is
highly important to all three Baltic republics.
Disagreements related to the goals and the methods to accomplish them regarding

Afghanistan started arising between the US and the European members in the early stages
of the engagement in Afghanistan. "Should Afghanistan be rebuilt as a model democracy
once the war against the Taliban had been won, as the Americans argued? The
Europeans doubted whether a working democracy could be established in a tribal
country, and advocated as much regional governance as possible under the rule of law
whether this was Western or Shia." On the other hand, the training and creation of

functional and capable Afghan police that could provide the security for state- and

nation-building were questioned.32 The Washington's position regarding those issues
was clearly stated by the former Secretary of State under President George W. Bush,
Condoleezza Rice:

This is a defining moment for Afghanistan, for NATO, and for our wider
democratic community. Our nations and organizations have achieved our
greatest success when we have married power and principle to achieve
great purposes—not when we have dealt with the world as it is, but when
we have sought to change the world for the better. This same spirit must
guide our efforts today. We are transforming NATO into an alliance that
its founders might not have recognized but would certainly have
celebrated: an alliance of free nations, joined in common effort with other
great democracies from across the globe, to support the growth ofpeace
and freedom throughout the world. Now we must fulfill our commitment
to success in Afghanistan—for in so doing, we will help a new democracy
32 Helga Haftendorn, "EU-US Cooperation on Non-European Issues" in Geir Lundestad, ed., Just
Another Major Crisis: The United States and Europe since 2000 (New York: Oxford University Press,
2008), 146.

take root in the heart of a troubled region, and we will make a lasting
contribution to the security of the world.

The problems historically typical to the NATO alliance are some ofthe same ones that
can be seen in the case of ISAF. These include troop levels, troop transport, and the

problems of defense spending. In addition, the problems of national caveats have caused

at times great difficulty in mission operation.34
Aside from those practicalities, the two major challenges for NATO in

Afghanistan include: 1) The reluctance of some allies to commit troops to
counterinsurgency tasks. This includes national caveats on troop area of deployment,
decision-making, use of troops for certain tasks, etc. Even though countries that are

taking disproportionate casualties have been placated through various adjustments, this
has been done very much on an ad hoc basic; 2) Defining realistically the goals of the

military mission in Afghanistan and how these goals will be accomplished.35
In the testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, NATO's lack of
commitment and cohesive strategy in Afghanistan was compared to the Alliance

problems during the Cold War again. "At present NATO is manning the Afghan frontier,
but doing nothing to address the threat emerging from its other side. This is akin to
NATO's guarding the Fulda Gap throughout the Cold War, but having no agreed policies

Condoleezza Rice, "Fulfilling the Commitment to Success in Afghanistan." Prepared Remarks
at the NATO Afghanistan Contributing Nations Meeting; Brussels, Belgium, January 26, 2007.

34 Helle Dale, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test Case for Future Missions" Backgrounder 1985.
Heritage Foundation, December, 2006.

35 Lukasz Kulesa, "ISAF Operation in Afghanistan and the Future ofNATO—Time for Change,"
Panstwowy Instytut Studiow Miedzynarodowych (Polish National Institute for International Studies),
Strategic Files, Issue #2, March 2008, 1.

for dealing with the Soviet Union."

Richard Cordesman supports this view and argues

that overall "NATO lacks a 'long war' strategy, and economic levels to match its military

efforts."37 The NATO military forces are inadequate, the efforts in training the Afghan
National Police are largely insufficient and ineffective, and the drug eradication and
counter-narcotics endeavors are unrealistic and are not bringing desired results.

According to ISAF, its mission in Afghanistan represents universal values, which
would seem that there was no legitimate opposition to the mission. The Alliance very
much frames it in terms of norms and a universal struggle for civilization itself.

Such

framing ofthe situation as a confrontation between good and evil has made NATO less
likely to pay enough attention to how its own actions are perceived by people within

Afghanistan, especially in the use of force and causing collateral damage, including
deaths of civilians, in its military operations. This has led some to be sympathetic to or
ally themselves with those opposed to the ISAF presence in the country and the Afghan
government that it supports. It has also led some more moderate factions within the
Taliban to forge links with Al Qaeda. Also, the lines between the ISAF mission and the
US-led counterterrorism operations have become blurred at times.
NATO's mission in ISAF in Afghanistan is structured by the idea that only a
mission that effectively combines both military and non-military dimensions in a
comprehensive manner can effectively promote stability and prevent Afghanistan from
36 James Dobbins, "Ending Afghanistan's Civil War." Testimony presented before the House
Armed Services Committee on January 30, 2007, 10.

37 Richard Cordesman, "Winning in Afghanistan: How to Face the Rising Threat," the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 2006.
38 Ibid.

39 Alexandra Gheciu, Securing Civilization? The EU, NATO , and the OSCE in the Post-9/11
World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 109.
40Ibid., 110.
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re-emerging as a safe haven for terrorism.41 However, state building is always a difficult
exercise, but it is especially so in the case of Afghanistan. It has a long and devastating
recent history ofwarfare, its national political institutions have been destroyed, has an

ongoing and well-organized insurgency, weak rule of law, very low levels of
development in pretty much every sense, opium as its primary export commodity, and
high levels of corruption, to name just a few issues that NATO is dealing with in

Afghanistan.42
The new government in Afghanistan, backed by large numbers of coalition troops
and high amounts of outside financial assistance has begun to bring some degree of
democracy to Afghanistan, as well as new infrastructure and increased educational

opportunity for the Afghan people. However, rule of law is still rather weak in much of
the country. Although the country is still quite poor, it has shown real signs of economic

growth, even if it is largely dependent on the flow of foreign aid. Corruption is a major
threat to the legitimacy and moral authority of the Karzai government. In addition,
Afghanistan has become less safe on a day-to-day basis for civilians. Security for

Afghan civilians to work, travel, and sleep free of fear is essential to the construction of a
viable state and success of the mission in Afghanistan.

The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, made up of small
contingents of military and civilian personnel, are front and center in NATO's ISAF
mission in Afghanistan. These PRTs both help the government forces to fight Taliban
and other armed groups. However, they also assist in various nation-building tasks, such
41 Ibid., 107.

42 Robert Rotberg, "Renewing the Afghan State" in Robert Rotberg, Building a New Afghanistan
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press and World Peace Foundation, 2007).

as constructing water wells, building hospitals and schools. They are a key component in
the three-part strategy for ISAF in Afghanistan, including elements of security,
governance, and development.
The ultimate aim ofNATO in Afghanistan, as mentioned earlier, is to spread
stability throughout the country in the framework of those three dimensions. In addition
to the PRTs, NATO is working in Afghanistan to train the Afghan National Army and
provide advice and assistance in the areas of defense and institution-building. In the
process, the Alliance seeks to promote the democratic norms of transparency and
democratic accountability. "The Kantian idea has found expression in the contemporary
NATO discourse, which insists that in the fight against international terrorism, it has
become particularly important to differentiate between responsible actors and dangerous,

illiberal individuals and groups."44 In other words, NATO seeks to create conditions
where Afghans can enjoy security, representative government, and self-sustaining
peace.

45

However, although NATO's goals in Afghanistan sound rational and organized,
the members do not seem to be able to find a coherent and agreed upon strategy how to
accomplish them.

The coalition does not have a coherent strategy for Afghanistan and some

member states are not prepared to sustain a counter-insurgency operation.
In the Taliban, NATO faces an opponent that aims to create disagreement
within the Alliance and wants to influence national domestic publics. The
consensus-based nature of NATO's decision-making mechanisms

provides insurgents with an obvious opportunity to influence NATO's
strategy-making process. In particular, they can selectively target
Gheciu, Securing Civilization? 87.
Ibid., 108.

individual member states in their attacks in order to affect public opinion
and make it more risk-averse. Thus, the Afghanistan operation clearly
demonstrates the limitations of NATO's consensus -based decision-making

process. It places clear limits on NATO's ability to successfully develop

and implement a coherent strategy.46

Furthermore, NATO lacks the adequate material capabilities to accomplish the

goals outlined earlier. "The evolution of the Afghan operation shows that NATO is ill
prepared to conduct a large-scale and complex stability and reconstruction operation that
requires its forces to be capable of sustaining counter-insurgency campaigns. These
difficulties are multiplied by the coalition's inability to agree on a joint perception of the
conflict in Afghanistan, whether regarding adequate responses or in terms of operational

objectives."47 Overall, the multi-faceted nature ofthe issues in Afghanistan and the
appropriate measure to address those problems makes it difficult for the Alliance to
generate the necessary political will to raise the essential resources to progress towards
agreed operational objectives. Given this lack ofpolitical will, combined with
disagreements on the definitions of security, the alliance component ofNATO is going
through a period of weakening, despite and, in part, because of the increased role of
NATO as a collective security arrangement within the geographical boundaries of
Europe.

46 Timo Noetzel and Sibylle Scheipers. "Coalition Warfare in Afghanistan: Burden-sharing or
Disunity?" Chatham House Briefing Paper. Asia and International Security Programmes, ASP/ISP BP
07/01, 2007, 8.

47 Ibid., 8.
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CONCLUSIONS: AFGHANISTAN AS A TEST CASE FOR NATO?

The September 1 1th attacks "marked the beginning of a new era"48 for NATO.
From small amounts of special operation troops, NATO mission in Afghanistan gradually
grew in both troop levels and in the scope of the mission. Over time, the mission shifted
from defeating al-Qaeda in Afghanistan to creating a free, democratic and stable
government in a war-torn country. While all NATO members agree on this general goal,
the commitments and will ofvarious NATO states vary widely, and over time have been
increasingly harder to maintain.
This chapter used the case ofNATO's engagement in Afghanistan to show the
interaction of collective security and alliance narratives in the post-2001 period. It is
clear to see that in the case ofAfghanistan, the elements of collective security are hard at
play; however, the alliance functionality and decision-are not supportive, and rather
hindering, of the collective security values. While NATO is clear in setting its goals for
the mission in Afghanistan around democratic values ofpeace and stability, the
agreement on means to accomplish that, emphasized in the alliance characteristics of
NATO in terms ofrationality of members' behavior relating to troops commitment, and
other political and economic assurances, is missing. As Alexandra Gheciu writes:

From its creation in 1949, NATO defined itself as the security arm of a

community of liberal-democratic norms and values, regarded as the core
values of the Western world. Thus, in the eyes of its members, what made

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization different from pervious military
alliances was its explicit expression of, and support for, a security
48 Will Chalmers, "Testing the Alliance: NATO in Afghanistan and the Global War on Terror,"
Canadian Army Journal 11, no. 2 (2008): 131.
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community of liberal-democratic values-democracy, individual liberty,
and the rule of law.50

The NATO mission in Afghanistan is seen as testing the alliance's political will
and military capabilities. "Since the Washington Summit in 1999, the allies have sought
to create a "new" NATO, capable of operating beyond the European theater to combat
emerging threats, such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction."51 In Afghanistan, NATO found a way to show that its relevance in the postCoId War environment and its ability to counter the new set ofthreats. However, while
the values are emphasized in the rhetoric coming out of the Alliance, that language is not
supported by the physical and material commitment ofthe member states.

For the first forty years ofNATO's existence, its political dimension, built
around Article 2, was often subordinated to—though never completely

subsumed by—the military dimension. The end of the Cold War,
however, led the allies to focus on Article 2 to an unprecedented degree, in
a situation in which NATO embarked on a process of adaptation to the

new environment. To a large degree, NATO's efforts at reinventing itself
involved a strengthening of its political dimension, as the allies insisted
that their security organization had never beenjust a military alliance

against the Soviet Union.52
Many argue that Afghanistan will determine the future role ofNATO, if not its existence.
"The Alliance attempted in Afghanistan, as in Kosovo, to serve as a risk manager, but as
50 Gheciu, Securing Civilization?, 80.
51 Vincent Morelli and Belkin, Paul, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic
Alliance," CRS Report for Congress, April 17, 2009,

http://66.102. 1.104/scholar?q=cache:6cuLaPmv8noJ:scholar.google.com/+NATO+Afghanistan&hl=en.
52 Gheciu, Securing Civilization?, 80.
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"success" in Afghanistan becomes doubtful, the future of the Alliance has been called

further into question."53 If the situation in Afghanistan remains unchanged, then it could
potentially result in a withdrawal of combat forces by some key alliance countries. While
this would not kill the ISAF mission, it would hurt its credibility and, consequently, that

ofNATO.54 One important overriding question for NATO engagement in Afghanistan
involves "NATO's ability to honor its commitment to adapt to the new security
environment while remaining true to the liberal-democratic norms around which it

defines its identity."55
As the initial post-Cold War debates about the relevance of NATO were
subsiding, the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent US -led war on terror forced the Alliance to

attempt to redefine its role once more. This presented the Transatlantic Allies with the
challenge ofnot only proving that they were not facing an existential crisis again, but also
they were challenged to adapt their institutions to a new environment where they faced
numerous, often ill-defined tasks. Broadly speaking, the Alliance found it necessary to

aggressively and consciously pursue both collective security and collective defense goals.
The collective security role included a renewed effort at promoting liberal-democratic
norms that were shared among the members. The collective defense role included

measures aimed at identifying and defeating if necessary, the state and transnational
actors who were identified as the new existential threats to the security community of

NATO, its member states and their partners.56

Michael Williams, NATO, Security and Risk Management: From Kosovo to Kandahar (New
York: Routledge, 2009), 89.

54 Kulesa, 2.
55Gheciu, Securing Civilization?, 115.
56 Ibid., 79.
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However, while the original reaction to the attack on the United States was
unified in values and goals, from the beginning the NATO members were not acting in
cohesion characteristic to an alliance. At the Prague Summit in November 2002, several
NATO states expressed hope that the Alliance would more formally engage in the UN

supported nation-building efforts in Afghanistan. A number ofNATO members,
however, voiced reservations. By this point, the US and the European members were at
odds over the prosecution of the war on terror and the pending conflict with Iraq.
Worried that NATO was becoming a mere tool of U.S. foreign policy, some
members expressed concern that ifNATO entered the Afghan conflict, the Alliance
would inevitably be drawn into Washington's search for Osama bin Laden and the
Bush's administration larger campaign against Islamic extremists. A senior foreign
policy specialist with US Senate Foreign Relations Committee observed that NATO's

willingness to enter Afghanistan was "directly linked to the organization's determination
to 'steer clear' of Iraq."57
With the focus in Prague on the Alliance's new members, the establishment of the
NATO Response Force, and avoidance of a major public split over Iraq, Afghanistan
received modest attention by NATO's heads of state and government. According to Lord
Robertson, NATO must "maintain the will and the capabilities. . . to root out and defeat
[criminal terrorists and criminal states] .... NATO played the key role in defeating the
threats and the instability that followed it. We must now transform our Alliance so it can

play an equally pivotal part in the war against terrorism and the dangers of weapons of
mass destruction."58
Rupp, NATO after 9/11, 158.
Gheciu, Securing Civilization?, 96.
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The US decision to not accept the assistance of its NATO allies proved to be
damaging in the long-run, because ousting the Taliban was simply the first battle in the
much larger war on terror context in which it was set by the US and others. Afghanistan
fell victim to a similar problem that had plagued previous Western interventions in the
country—namely, that the military campaign far outpaced the political strategy. In other
words, after the toppling of the Taliban, the US was left with the far more difficult task of
managing the situation of a failed state and attempting to rebuild the country, both

politically and otherwise.59 There was lingering resentment among some allies within
NATO that Washington had not included its allies in the planning or conduct of
Operation Enduring Freedom, which had been successful in toppling the Taliban in
cooperation with the Northern Alliance forces. Had the NATO allies been involved at
this point, it is possible that some of them would have been involved in the peacekeeping
and reconstruction mission much earlier.

In other words, had NATO been officially involved in the OEF-Afghanistan, this
could have provided the bridge between the invocation of the Article V on September

12th, 2001 and the peacekeeping and nation-building mission in Afghanistan. It would
have given much greater political power to the mission and made the requisition oftroops
and supplies from member states potentially easier. Furthermore, it would have provided
a mutually reinforced cooperation between the collective security nature ofNATO with
the functionality of an alliance to uphold and spread out the values of democratic peace
and stability.

Michael Williams, NATO, Security and Risk Management, 87.
Rupp, NA TO after 9/11,1 62.
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Instead, there is great strain and argument among NATO partners regarding the
ISAF effort in Afghanistan. The British, Canadians, and Dutch have particularly
complained about the amount of the fighting that their troops are required to do in the
southern parts of Afghanistan, where the Taliban is much stronger. Canadian officials
pointed out, for example, that Canadian casualty rates were higher than those ofthe
United States. In January, 2009, the US announced that it would send an additional 3200

marines to the south to help in the fighting. This was important not only for the
bolstering of the combat efforts tactically, but also politically to emphasize to the British,
the Canadian and the Dutch allies in particular that the US was doing its part in the most

dangerous parts ofthe country. The US has shifted away from publicly criticizing its
NATO allies with regard to their contributions in Afghanistan, in part because of the

realization of difficulty of maintaining such deployments for Canada, Germany and
others in terms of their domestic audiences, but also because of understanding that

sending more troops itself can help as a show of leadership or perhaps even shaming

other countries into sending more troops.61
The Taliban's resurgence and the accompanying increase in violence further

exposed the gaps in the resolve and goals of various NATO members with regard to the
mission. Most NATO troops, except for British, Dutch, Canadian and US, were kept in
areas that were considered to be relatively secure. Many also placed very restrictive
conditions on the use of their forces in Afghanistan. In addition, the lack of agreement at

times among national commands added to the difficulty ofthe mission.62 The decision to
Karen DeYoung, "Allies Feel Strain of Afghan War: Troop Levels Among Issues Dividing U. S,
NATO Countries," Washington Post, 15 January, 2008.

62 Chalmers, 132.

hand over control of southern provinces to NATO has caused great concern among
Afghan leaders regarding the US long-term commitment and NATO's ability to fight.
However, the differences on the role ofNATO as a collective security and
collective defense organization in relations to the case of Afghanistan remain. France,
for example, argues that NATO should concentrate on collective defense, rather than
dealing with development and democracy projects, which it feels are better left to the EU,

the UN, the World Bank, or other civilian institutions, rather than NATO.64 The French
government may have decided to support NATO command ofthe ISAF mission in
Afghanistan, despite its bitter quarrel with the US regarding Iraq at the time, "out of a

desire to avoid doing too much long-term damage to NATO."65 As Noetzel and
Scheipers explain:

ISAF's geographical expansion also led to increasingly visible cracks
within the coalition, especially when the Taliban launched an insurgency
campaign in southern Afghanistan in 2006. The large operational
spectrum ISAF finds itself confronted with today leads to increasingly
divergent perceptions of operational objectives among coalition members.
Most participation states define coalition operations in Afghanistan as
being specifically about counter-insurgency and counterterrorism or about
stabilization and reconstruction. The situation on the ground is that

coalition forces are deployed to conduct operations across the whole
operational spectrum, increasingly under both ISAF and OEF mandates.

63 Seth Jones, "Averting Failure in Afghanistan," Survival 48, no. 1 (2006): 112.
64 Morelli and Belkin.

65 John Schmidt, "Last Alliance Standing? NATO after 9/11," The Washington Quarterly 30, no.
1 (2006-2007): 98.

66 Noetzel and Scheipers, 6.
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In the first decade of the 21st century, under the Bush Administration, NATO as
an alliance exhibited two trends which have long characterized its development: periodic
exposure to crisis and division, and subordination to American leadership. Views of
NATO in the last ten years were shaped by Afghanistan giving rise to a return to the
alliance on America's part, as opposed to the focus on the European expansion that
dominated the 1990s. Today, NATO remains important to President Obama, but he
returned to a more equal distribution ofvoices between the American and European
members. "The safest assumption. . . is that Obama will continue to favor the trend
towards a global NATO. . . . However, retreat (or defeat) in Afghanistan could hasten a
contrary trend towards a consolidation NATO with a renewed concentration on the wider

Europe."67
The current strategy of the United States and NATO in Afghanistan is based on
the idea of establishing security, while maintaining a light footprint that would lead to
providing adequate prerequisites for eventual self-sufficient political and economic
stability in Afghanistan. The worsening security environment, however, has
demonstrated that this strategy has not been successful.

Establishing security during stability operations is largely a function of
several factors that foreign powers can influence: the number and
performance oftroops and police, amount of money, establishment of a
peace treaty, and duration ofthe operation. The United States and NATO
have failed to meet most of these benchmarks. In particular, the amount

of troops, police and financial assistance has been among the lowest of
any stability operation since the end of the Second World War, and there

has been no peace settlement.68
67 Mark Webber, "NATO: The United States, Transformation and the War in Afghanistan," British
Journal ofPolitics and International Relations 11 (2009): 46.

68 Jones, "Averting Failure in Afghanistan," 111.

Therefore, with its engagement in Afghanistan, "NATO has placed its reputation

and arguably its future on the line in Central Asia. Failure in Afghanistan would be

devastating for NATO."69 NATO has moved slowly to deal with the problems in
Afghanistan, contrary to its public statements on the importance of the mission in
Afghanistan. Furthermore, rather than emphasize the connective nature of collective
security and alliance, which would be beneficial to both NATO and Afghanistan, NATO
members continue to disagree on the means and goals of the organization, to the
detriment of both, the Alliance's relevance and purpose, as well as its effectiveness.

Rupp, NATO after 9/11, 155.
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CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS: NATO'S YELLOW BRICK ROAD?

The new Strategic Concept must... serve as an invocation ofpolitical will
or—to put it another way—a renewal of vows, on the part of each
member. Threats to the interests ofthe Alliance comefrom the outside, but
the organisation's vigour could as easily be sapped from within. The
increasing complexity ofthe global political environment has the potential
to gnaw away at Alliance cohesion; economic headaches can distract
attention from security needs; old rivalries could resurface; and the
possibility is real of a damaging imbalance between the military
contributions of some members and that of others. NATO states cannot
allow twenty-first century dangers to do what past perils could not: divide
their leaders and weaken their collective resolve. Thus, the new Strategic

Concept must clarify both what NATO should be doing for each Ally and
what each Ally should be doingfor NATO.

Report of the Group of Experts on NATO's Strategic Concept, 2010

INTRODUCTION

The goal of this project was to utilize the analysis of collective security and
collective defense throughout NATO's existence in an effort to make informed
assumptions about the future route the Alliance should take if it wants to maintain and
reinforce its relevance and effectiveness. This concluding chapter first provides the
summary of the main points made in this paper. The second section embarks on a
journey of speculation regarding NATO's strategic concept and its transformation and
1 NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement. Analysis and Recommendations ofthe
Group ofExperts on a New Strategic Conceptfor NATO. The Group of Experts: Madeleine K. Albright,
Jeroen van der Veer, Giancarlo Aragona, Marie Gervais-Vidicaire, Geoff Hoon, Umit Pamir, Fernando

Perpina-Robert Peyra, Hans-Friedrich von Ploetz, Bruno Racine, Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Aivis Ronis,

Yannis-Alexis Zepos. May 17th, 2010. http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/expertsreport.pdf.
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assesses how symptomatic these most current developments are of the expected path
NATO might take in regards to its role as a collective security and collective defense
organization.

The following passage provides a very accurate review of the relevance of this
project:

Creating a global NATO is not about saving the alliance from
obsolescence. The issue is not whether NATO goes out of area or out of

business. The issue is how the world's premier international military
organization should adapt to the demands of the times in a way that
advances the interests not just of the Atlantic community but of a global
community of democracies dependent on global stability. Global threats
cannot be tackled by a regional organization. NATO has worked well in
the past because its founding treaty demands that members be committed
both to the political and economic principles underpinning democracy and
to the common security challenges faced by the alliance. It would be
foolish not to welcome into the alliance other countries that can make the

same commitments and help confront new global challenges.

NATO traditionally and historically has been described as and considered to be an
alliance. However, as discussed in this paper, the story ofNATO is that of two
narratives: of collective security and collective defense. While conceptually separate, in
the case of the North Atlantic Alliance those two narratives are linked together. Through

most ofthe NATO's history, those two narratives reinforced each other to such an extent
that neither would have been possible or durable without the other. Furthermore, the
combination of the collective security and defense has been heavily dependent on the
structure of the international environment.

2 Daalder and Goldgeier, 105.
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Given the change in the current international environment after the fall of the
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the interaction of these two narratives has also

changed. In the past twenty years, NATO's role as a collective security arrangement has
been taking precedence over its character as a collective defense institution. However, as
shown through its history, NATO has never, nor can it now, function as a pure alliance or
solely as a collective security arrangement. Ultimately, the future ofNATO is based on
both features, intertwined: collective security and an alliance.

As shown in the conceptual theory chapter, the history ofNATO, with its dual
narrative of collective security and collective defense, also serves as a bridge between the
neorealist, neoliberal, and post-positivist traditions. As Michael Williams and Iver
Neumann write:

While prominent neorealists have claimed that international institutions
hold out only a 'false promise' as a foundation for new security structures,
social constructivists have argued that the 'persistence' of NATO
demonstrates the need for a fuller understanding of institutions, and that

such an understanding provides a basis for concluding that international
'security communities' possess considerably more promise as a means of
structuring security relations than neorealism has traditionally allowed.
From a social constructivist perspective, NATO did not fragment as
neorealists had predicted because the shared democratic norms and
identities of the members meant that they did not perceive each other as
threats with the end of the Cold War. From this viewpoint, NATO's

continuation is seen as demonstrating the Alliance's enduring and
institutionalised patterns of co-operation, the existence of common
'regulative' and 'constitutive' norms and values within the organisation,
and the continuing impact of the shared democratic identities upon which
the Alliance is based.

3 Williams and Neumann, "From Alliance to Security Community," 358.
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This connection, then, leads us to the summary of main arguments made in the theoretical
and empirical chapters.

SUMMARY OF MAIN POINTS

Let us review briefly the main points made in the theoretical section and the
subsequent empirical chapters.

Chapter two explored and utilized the theoretical framework combining the
elements of alliances and collective security arrangements to provide the basis for

understanding NATO's transition from an alliance to collective security mentality in the
theoretical scope. In that context, the discussion returned to Karl Deutsch and the
concept of security communities, again, to provide the basis for the current position of
NATO as a merger between an alliance and a collective security institution. Also, this
section served as a segway to the projections ofthe relationship between alliance
characteristics and the nature of collective security in the future, in the case of NATO. In

Thomas Risse-Kappen's words, "the Western Alliance represents an institutionalization
of the transatlantic security community based on common values and a collective identity

of liberal democracies."4 NATO is not just an alliance; rather it is a security community
set to spread its democratic values and collective security.
Despite the fact that the general literature in the field has shown collective
security and collective defense as two separate concepts, ifNATO were to be considered
only as an alliance, it would give a rather unique example of an alliance. The same can
be said if NATO were to be framed only as a collective security arrangement. Therefore,

this exceptional and distinctive dual nature of the North Atlantic Alliance provides a
4 Risse-Kappen, "Identity in a Democratic Security Community," 395.
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fertile ground for joined application of traditionally divergent approaches. More
specifically, in the case ofNATO, there is an interaction of realist understanding of threat
(alliance) combined with neoliberal institutionalist and constructivist understanding of
internal security (collective security).
What is the pattern of the interaction between the two narratives of collective
security and defense? What are the drivers that dictate the behavior of those narratives?
To answer these questions, this project looked at four different time periods in the history
ofNATO. In each ofthose time periods, the development of each of the two narratives
was analyzed.

The alliance narrative is closely linked with the perception of threat. As the
perception of threat rises, NATO behaves as an alliance designed to prepare and counter
that threat. In the same time, with the high degree of commonality of values among the
member states, NATO acts as a collective security arrangement. Starting with the origins
ofNATO through most of its history, the two narratives of the Transatlantic Alliance
have been reinforcing each other. This pattern ofbehavior is shown in the discussions
surrounding NATO's birth and structure (Chapter III) and in the decision to allow
Germany's membership in 1955 (Chapter IV). Furthermore, the failure of Multilateral
Force serves as an example showing that despite disagreements on policies and means to
accomplish the goals of security, the narratives of collective defense and collective
security remained intact (Chapter V).
However, the story of those two narratives and their mutual reinforcement
changes with the end of the Cold War and the shifts in the structure ofthe international
environment. In the post-Cold War environment, the narrative of collective security

begins to take precedence over the narrative of collective defense. Because those two
concepts are subject to the international structure, with the changes in the nature and
tangibility of threat that NATO has been facing since 1991, the interaction ofthose
narratives has also transformed. In the past two decades, NATO has been increasingly

struggling with finding and defining its role as an alliance, but the collective security
component has been expanding in terms of geographical scope, cohesiveness, and
policies. This internal battle of the Alliance is examined through the lens ofNATO's
expansion to the East in the 1990s (Chapter V) and its engagement in Afghanistan in the
first decade of the third millennium (Chapter VI).
In the last and the most current case discussed here, NATO's engagement in

Afghanistan, while there has been the potential for the collective security and alliance
narrative to work together to the benefit of the Alliance and Afghanistan, the members so
far have not able to effectively set a path for the organization that utilizes those two
natures ofNATO. The case ofAfghanistan, itself, is originally based on the clear
assumptions ofNATO's role and responsibility as a collective security organization.
However, the disagreements on the alliance character ofNATO and on its collective
security role have dominated the discourse, and unfortunately, seem to have failed to set
the path for the future of the Alliance.
Two factors must be present for a security organization to establish itself,
effectively act, and maintain itself over time as a collective security and collective
defense institution. In other words, there are two necessary elements: a high degree of

commonality ofpolitical, cultural, economic, and historical characteristics found in
regional integrated institutions. Second, there has to be an agreed upon external threat or
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perception of threat, tangible or intangible. The first element serves as the basis for
creation of the integrated collective body, whether regional or more expansive, with the
main focus on providing internal collective security. The second element, the common

perception of threat, provides the collective defense component against the environment
external to the collective group. Chapter two provided a detailed discussion on the
concepts of collective security, collective defense, and security communities.
Chapters three through six supplied empirical evidence to the theoretical

arguments discussed in the second section. They traced the development of the two
NATO narratives from the organization's creation in 1949 to its most recent engagement

in Afghanistan. Edward Mortimer's words very well summarize NATO's persistent role
in the Transatlantic area: "Two basic assumptions, almost truisms, shape the basis of the
security system, which is emerging in Europe. First of all, security is indivisible. The new
security architecture must include all European states, if it is to ensure stability on a
continent that was the scene for two devastating world wars."

In discussion of the collective security and collective defense roles ofNATO
throughout its history, especially the perception and understanding of threat should be
reemphasized, as it is the most defining variable that impacted the relationship of the two
narratives, and with that the role and behavior of the Alliance. NATO was created to
counteract the tangible threat coming from the East, namely the Soviet Union.

Throughout the Cold War, the perception of increased threat from the Soviets reinforced
the cohesion of the alliance nature of NATO, whereas the sense of declining danger from

Moscow loosened the unity of the members, creating the cycles of discord and
5 Edward Mortimer, "European Security after the Cold War," Adelphi Paper 271 (Summer, 1992)
International Institute for Security Studies, London, 1992.
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collaboration among NATO allies. However, during the Cold War, there was never any

disagreement among the members on the general internal and external security goals.
Despite a period of discord, both of the narrative remained strong and intact.

The story of threat and security in reference to NATO had to be vastly revised in
the post-Cold War environment, characterized by the disappearance of the tangible threat
in the form of the Soviet Union and the emergence of intangible, transatlantic security
issues. Daniela Spinant writes:

The changing nature of international relations as a consequence of the
globalization process and the diffuse character of threats ask for a
continental vision of security in Europe. No state can separate its security
from that of its neighbors, nor can it deal, on its own, with cross-border
threats. On the other hand, security cannot be achieved only by military
means, as it has economic, political, social, environmental and human
rights aspects. A logic consequence is that conflict prevention,
peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building can no longer be
considered as separate activities.

In other words, NATO does not have a choice between choosing its role for the future
between collective security and collective defense; rather, NATO must assume both of
those responsibilities if it intends to remain relevant to and effective in providing external
and internal security to the Transatlantic area.
This period of questioning NATO's validity and effectiveness as a security
organization is not the first and probably not the last. NATO has faced imminent

collapse so often that it is difficult to take seriously the latest judgment that its days are
numbered. As James Sperling and Mark Webber aptly point out:
6 Spinant.
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NATO seems to possess an inexhaustible capacity for recovery, a
characteristic NATO pessimists largely ignore. Of course, mere survival
is not enough; what matters equally is how far and how ell survival
reflects a more thoroughgoing adaptation to new circumstances. NATO's
efforts to do just that, however imperfect or ill-judged, is the real story of
the last two decades. ... From 1989 to 2009 the alliance has engaged in a

ceaseless process of transformation—of structure and organization, of
operations, partnerships and membership.

It is enough to look at both the vertical and horizontal transformation ofNATO to
see that the organization is indeed attempting to adjust to the challenges of the new
international environment and the appropriate role in such environment. First of all,
however, the transformation ofNATO was a necessity after the end of the Cold War, for
both NATO and Europe.

During the Cold War the alliance had come to function as more than
simply a collective defence organization but the disappearance ofthe
Warsaw Pact along with the Soviet Union undoubtedly robbed it of its
major rationale. An alliance bound to traditional defense tasks, it was
claimed, faced real 'danger of dissolution' if it could not reorient itself to
the emerging and fluid circumstances of the post-Cold War world.

And that is exactly what NATO did—it embarked on a road ofreorientation of its
geographical and issue-related scope. Furthermore, on the side of Europe, there was no
other security organization as effective and reliable as NATO, while the problems were
mounting in the 1990s. "As the high hopes of 1989 have way by the early 1990s to the

7 James Sperling and Mark Webber, "NATO: from Kosovo to Kabul," International Affairs 83,
no. 3 (2009): 491-492.

8 Ibid., 492.
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problems of disintegrating communist federations, Balkan instability and uncertainties in
Mitteleuropa, NATO came to occupy centre stage in the so-called 'architectural' debate
on European security institutions."

Throughout the scope of this project, the instances of horizontal (geographical)
and vertical (issues) transformation ofNATO have been addressed through the discussion
on the Alliance's enlargement in the 1990s in relation to the horizontal transformation
and through the debate on NATO's role in Afghanistan, the organization's first out-ofarea operation, in reference to the vertical transformation. "As NATO's geographic

range has expanded, so has the scope of its operations; the alliance now takes on jobs that
are no longer strictly related to territorial integrity and security but pertain to international

stability more broadly."10 However, every change brings positive and negative results, as
well as creating a whole new set of problems. The transformation ofNATO is not
impervious to this dynamic, either.

Besides raising questions of efficacy, changes in NATO's composition
and scope will also raise questions about the alliance's core purpose. As
was true when NATO expanded eastward, in the 1990s, the most
controversial aspect of any effort to enlarge the alliance's membership will
be how such enlargement might affect the security guarantee in Article 5
of the North Atlantic Treaty. Some current NATO members, particularly
some of the newer ones, might worry that geographic enlargement will
weaken the existing collective defense commitments of the alliance.
However, no NATO member currently faces a military threat from another
country, much less the type of threat that led to NATO's establishment in
1949. In the unlikely event that such a threat did materialize, nothing
about NATO's enhanced reach would in any way weaken its collective
defense commitments.
9 Ibid.

10 Daalder and Goldgeier, 105.
11 Ibid., 106.
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The question that still remains to be answered is the relationship between NATO
and Russia, in which case, both the horizontal and vertical transformations of the

Alliance play a role. In 2009 and 2010, NATO increasingly engaged Russia in a dialogue
regarding both the European and international security, the role ofboth actors in the
security environment, and the potential for cooperation. This was a vastly changed
attitude from the one of the past decade, which culminated in a suspension of any
dialogue between NATO and the EU on one side, and Russia on the other, in August
2008, in the aftermath of the conflict in Georgia.
And the last development that should be addressed in the context of the

conclusions to this project is NATO's new strategic concept. It has been now ten years
since the Alliance released its last strategic concept in 1999. Given the changes in the
international environment and the transformation of the Alliance itself, the new strategic
concept was well overdue.

In the 1999 Strategic Concept, NATO addressed the changing, multifaceted and
transnational nature ofthe international security environment. Given this framework, the
Alliance defined its role in meeting the challenges of this new setting. At the Washington
Summit that year, it was decided that NATO

must safeguard common security interests in an environment of further,
often unpredictable change. It must maintain collective defence and
reinforce the transatlantic link and ensure a balance that allows the

European Allies to assume greater responsibility. It must deepen its
relations with its partners and prepare for the accession of new members.
It must, above all, maintain the political will and the military means
19
required by the entire range of its missions.
12 The Alliance Strategic Concept. Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating
in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999.
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At the 1999 Washington Summit, the members were talking about the dual role of
NATO as a collective security and collective defense organization—although not in that
elaborate of terms. They referred to both basic security and to the values of democracy
and human rights, among other things.

NATO's essential and enduring purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty,
is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and
military means. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and
the rule of law, the Alliance has striven since its inception to secure a just

and lasting peaceful order in Europe. It will continue to do so. The
achievement of this aim can be put at risk by crisis and conflict affecting

the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance therefore not only
ensures the defence of its members but contributes to peace and stability in

this region.13
However, that was the posture of the Alliance in 1999, two and a half years before the

attacks of September 1 1th, before the fundamental recognition of changed nature of
threat, before the first in history invocation of Article V, before the engagement ofNATO
in the first out-of-area operation in Afghanistan. The new Secretary General ofNATO,
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, appointed in April 2009, has been tasked with providing a
proposal for the new NATO strategic concept by the end of 2010. The designated group
of experts published the recommendations for the new strategic concept for NATO in

May, 2010.14
13 Ibid.

14 NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement. Analysis and Recommendations ofthe
Group ofExperts on a New Strategic Conceptfor NATO. The Group of Experts: Madeleine K. Albright,
Jeroen van der Veer, Giancarlo Aragona, Marie Gervais-Vidicaire, Geoff Hoon, Umit Pamir, Fernando
Perpina-Robert Peyra, Hans-Friedrich von Ploetz, Bruno Racine, Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Aivis Ronis,

Yannis-Alexis Zepos. May 17th, 2010. http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/expertsreport.pdf.

The recommendations for the new strategic concept incorporate the elements of
internal and external security of the NATO members. Furthermore, it is safe to say that
the new strategic concept will emphasize the changing nature of international
environment, and with that, the transforming political and military issues.

Having said

that, given the current level of disagreement among the members, best exemplified by the
lack of coherent strategy in Afghanistan, there is a clear danger of the members' not

being able to cohesively frame the mission and strategy ofNATO in the future. While
some members, as mentioned earlier, strongly support the global collective security

responsibility of the Alliance, others prefer NATO to limit itself to security in Europe.
However, one of the main points made in the recommendations is the need for NATO's
increased cooperation with other international organizations in and outside of Europe.
Furthermore, the Allies will have to agree on the internal form ofNATO to

address its projected mission and the adequate means to accomplish that mission. Jens
Ringsmose and Sten Rynning argue that "in the short run, the current disagreements
about the Alliance's key tasks and the primary threats to allied security are too profound
to allow for a Strategic Concept that differs distinctly from the existing document. The

default position will be the 1999 Strategic Concept. In the long run, however, we expect

NATO to keep to the trajectory of globalization."17

15 Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning, Come Home, NATO! The Atlantic Alliance 's New Strategic
Concept, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2009.
16 NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement. Analysis and Recommendations ofthe
Group ofExperts on a New Strategic Conceptfor NATO.
17 Ibid.
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Karl-Heinz Kamp argues the opposite. He poses that the new strategic concept

will differ significantly from the one adopted in 1999.18 The author acknowledges that
the consensus among the Allies regarding the role ofNATO and its form is still an open

question; however, the need for redefinition will force the new form of the strategic
concept. Along with this project, as well as many other authors, Kamp agrees that the
Allies will struggle with reaching a workable concurrence in reference to wide scope of
topics: balancing between European and global security, to maintenance ofNATO's

credibility and relevance, scope of global and European security issues, the application of
Article V, the role of Russia, and the utility and control ofnuclear weapons, just to name
a few of the issues.

In summary, NATO from its birth has displayed characteristics of and acted as an
alliance and collective security institutions, with variant degrees of both at various times.
In the international environment where the nature and perception of threat are changing
and where the concept of sovereignty and power are being challenged, a combination of
collective security and collective defense in one organization provides an optimal

security arrangement and NATO has all the tools at its disposal to become that optimal
security organization in the future. The alliance nature, with its traditional focus on
external threat, provides the means and material power, whereas the collective security

part addresses the internal stability and supplies the legitimacy to the organization and the
accepted norms of behavior. Therefore, the two security concepts are complementary
and mutually reinforcing. The question that remains to be answered, however, is whether

the political leadership ofNATO, as well as the internal leadership of the member states,
18 Karl-Heinz Kamp, "The Way to NATO's New Strategic Concept," Research Paper, NATO
Defense College 46, 2009.

is ready and willing to make and carry out decisions combining those two elements of
NATO in the future.

NOW WHAT: NATO AS A 'COLLECTIVE SECURITY ALLIANCE'?

Before we delve into the discussion on the results of the research undergone and

presented in this project, and the speculation on the success of the Alliance in
Afghanistan and the subsequent validation of the future ofNATO as a collective security
and collective defense organization, let us remind ourselves why this discussion is
necessary.

In September 2009, Zbigniew Brzezinski published an article focusing
specifically on the future ofNATO. In this article, he referred to NATO as the
"collective security alliance," a term very fitting for the purpose of this project, as it
precisely incorporates the two narratives discussed here: collective security and
collective defense. Brzezinski writes: "NATO's potential is not primarily military.
Although NATO is a collective-security alliance, its actual military power comes
predominantly from the United States, and that reality is not likely to change anytime

soon."19 The author then goes on to combine those two natures ofthe Alliance in more
tangible terms. "NATO's real power derives from the fact that it combines the United
States' military capabilities and economic power with Europe's collective political and
economic weight.... Together, that combination makes NATO globally significant."
Brzezinski' s article on the future ofNATO provides yet another proof of the

importance of the discussion on the current and future shape and role ofNATO—and,
19 Zbigniew Brzezinski, "An Agenda for NATO," Foreign Affairs 88, no. 5 (September/October
2009).

therefore, confirms the saliency of this project. Parallel to some of the arguments made
here, Brzezinski outlines four main issues that NATO will have to face in its new
strategic concept:

First, how to attain a politically acceptable outcome for NATO's
deepening engagement in the overlapping Afghan and Pakistani conflicts;
second, how to update the meaning and obligations of "collective
security" as embodied in Article 5 of the alliance's treaty; third, how to
engage Russia in a binding and mutually beneficial relationship with
Europe and the wider North Atlantic community; and fourth, how to
respond to novel global security dilemmas.
¦? 1

The issues outlined by Brzezinski refer to many of the challenges mentioned in
this project: NATO's relevance and credibility, the Alliance's mission in the European
and global security, and the dual character ofNATO as a collective security and
collective defense. And here too, Brzezinski brings up the argument relating to the

changing nature ofthreat confronting NATO and other players in the global security
environment. "The basic challenge that NATO now confronts is that there are

historically unprecedented risks to global security. Today's world is threatened neither by
the militant fanaticism of a territorially rapacious nationalist state nor by the coercive
aspiration of a globally pretentious ideology embraced by an expansive imperial

power."22 He goes on to position those global threats in the context of increasingly
globalization and interconnectedness of international actors and issues. "The paradox of
our time is that the world, increasingly connected and economically interdependent for

21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
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the first time in its entire history, is experiencing intensifying popular unrest made all the
more menacing by the growing accessibility ofweapons of mass destruction—not just to
states but also, potentially, to extremist religious and political movements."
While Brzezinski aptly points to the current major internal and external dilemmas
ofNATO, the reality ofthe Alliance's functioning especially in 2009 and 2010 time
frame in Afghanistan, however, contradicts his speculations to some extent. Although it
is true that NATO draws on the US military power and the European collective character,
those two features of the Alliance are at odds. The case of Afghanistan, in this respect,

shows the inability of the Allies to come to a consensus regarding not only the means, but
also the definition of effectiveness of collective actions. While the Americans and

Europeans still maintain the need for cooperation in the name of defense and security for
both sides of the Atlantic, the basic understanding of what that defense and security

constitute seems to be challenged. Furthermore, the Europeans are increasingly
dissatisfied with the American leadership and irritated with the distribution of power
within the Alliance.

Especially in the case ofAfghanistan, and more recently Pakistan, this question as
to the definition of security goals is clearly visible. While Washington continuously
perceives the stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan as absolutely necessary to American
and European security, at quite a large cost, Europeans are not on the same page with
Americans. When the US, despite decreasing popular approval, increased the number of
troops in Afghanistan, the European capitals announced upcoming withdrawals, precisely
spurred by the loud public opposition to the war in Afghanistan.

23 Ibid.

To satisfy the need expressed by the generals on the ground in Afghanistan and
the growing public disapproval of the US engagement there, "on December 1, 2009,
President Obama announced a new strategy for Afghanistan including the decision to
commit an additional 30,000 U.S. military forces to address the conflict. The plan also
considers the idea of reducing the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan beginning in

201 1 if conditions on the ground warrant."24 In the words ofthe Administration and the
Congress in the US, "NATO's mission in Afghanistan. . . is seen as a test of the allies'
military capabilities and their political will to undertake a complex mission in a distant

land and to sustain that commitment."25 Therefore, while the need to increase the troops
is seen as necessary, the Administration also provided for the projected end state allowing
for withdrawal of troops to appease the public opinion.
The US is not alone in this assumption. Supreme Allied Commander in Europe

James Stavridis in January 2010 was estimating that the European Allies will contribute

about 10,000 more troops, in addition to the 30,000 increase from the US.26 "Several
key NATO members. . . view the Afghanistan mission as a test case for the allies' ability
to generate the political will to counter significant threats to their security. These
countries believe Afghanistan provides a test of will against the concrete danger of

Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic
Alliance," Congressional Research Service, Federation of American Scientists, 2009, ii,
http://ftp.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf. See also Kenneth Katzman, "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban
Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy," Congressional Research Service Report RL30588, 2009; Steve
Bowman and Catherine Dale, "War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for
Congress," Congressional Research Service Report R40156, 2009. "Obama to Increase Troops in
Afghanistan by 30,000," Foreign Policy Bulletin 20, no. 1 (2010): 3-9.
25 Morelli and Belkin, 1.

26 Viola Gienger and Tony Capaccio, "NATO Commander Predicts More Alliance Troops for
Afghanistan," Bloomberg Businessweek, 14 January, 2010.
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international terrorism."27 However, as mentioned earlier, in the same time as the
statements about the commitment to collective security are made, "there appears to be

growing opposition to the war among the public throughout Europe who question the
threat to Europe from Afghanistan, and many experts suggest that significant progress in
stabilizing Afghanistan must be made in 2010 or allied solidarity in support of the ISAF
mission, including within the United States, could begin to unravel."
While the forces from the US, Great Britain, Canada, and the Netherlands have

been carrying the brunt of fighting, the lack ofpolitical will and increasing opposition
have pushed the governments of Great Britain and the Netherlands to announce
withdrawals. The British and Dutch decisions are symptomatic of a greater feeling
sweeping through the European capitals. Since February 2010, NATO has been

increasingly squabbling over the troop contributions, given the declining political will in
member states and increasing financial problems in the EU. Subsequently, the war in

Afghanistan has decreased in popularity in every country in Europe. In February,
Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that "public and political opposition to the military

had grown so great in Europe that it was directly affecting operations in Afghanistan and
impeding the alliance's broader security goals. ... Right now, the alliance faces very

serious, long-term, systemic problems."29 As of2009, only 5 out of28 NATO members
have met the target budget commitment of 2% of GDP spent on defense, while the US
spends over 4% of its GDP on defense. Even though the European contributions made up
40% of the troops in Afghanistan in 2009, the growing economic crisis in Europe and
27 Ibid., 2.
28 Ibid.

29 Brian Knowlton, "Gates Calls European Mood a Danger to Peace," New York Times, 23
February, 2010.
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lack ofpublic support are pushing the increase in discrepancy between the Europeans and
the Americans.

In a sense, NATO and the US are caught in a catch 22 in Afghanistan. The policy
decision makers, the military leaders active in the theater, and academics equally are
emphasizing the fact that Afghanistan is a test case for NATO's role and effectiveness in
the future security environment and the need for cohesive cooperation between the
American and European Allies. In the same time, neither the Europeans nor the
Americans have sufficient resources or the political will to provide the resources

necessary for success in Afghanistan. To demonstrate this shortage, in January 2010,
NATO's Secretary General Rasmussen asked Russia for help in supplying military
helicopters to Afghanistan, because the European Allies did not have enough equipment

or money to buy the necessary gear.31 In March, Rasmussen and then later Supreme
Allied Commander Europe Admiral James Stavridis met with political leaders ofNATO
states (PM Jan Fischer, Defense Minister Martin Bartak, and Chief of StaffVlastimil
Picek) and emphasized the need for more troops and trainers in Afghanistan. Their
requests were denied.

The refusal to support NATO's efforts in Afghanistan comes in the wake of April
2008 Bucharest Summit where Bush Administration pushed for the strategic vision

outlining the rationale for ISAF mission in Afghanistan. "The paper made four principal
points: the allies promised a "long-term commitment" to Afghanistan; expressed support
to improve the country's governance; pledged a "comprehensive approach" to bring civil
30 "NATO Chief Defends European Role in Afghan War," Associated Press, 25 February, 2010.
31 Ibid.

32 Tom Clifford, "NATO Commander Makes Afghanistan Troop Plea," The Prague Post, 31
March, 2010.
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and military efforts to affect stabilization; and promised increased engagement with

Afghanistan's neighbors, especially Pakistan."33 At that point, while the Allies agreed
that the "military commitment remained paramount,"34 they did not pledge more troops.
Rather, they "believed that the United States, as a global power, needed to provide the
leadership and resources to counter the destabilizing influences upon Afghanistan of the
two neighboring states [Iran and Pakistan]."
In other words, the Allies expect NATO under the US leadership to be successful
in Afghanistan and come up with tangible results in the near future, while in the same
time not having enough resources or will to provide the necessary number of troops,
trainers, and equipment. As NATO is less and less capable of accomplishing the end
goals, the political will and support in Europe and the US are declining. So, the public on
both sides of the Atlantic want to have it both ways: security and stability in Afghanistan
without the cost of achieving those goals.

Ironically, the Europeans are increasingly dissatisfied with the distribution of
power and control in the Alliance, again nothing new or unusual for NATO. However,
this frustration with the US leadership follows the 2008 Bucharest Summit, mentioned
earlier, where the European Allies expressed their expectations ofthe US leadership in
terms of troop's contributions and strategy. Therefore, the problems lie not only in the
European lack ofpolitical will and economic means, but also in questioning the
American leadership. In September 2008, "a highly respected opinion poll published by
the German Marshall Fund found a sharp decline had developed in European public
opinion towards U.S. leadership since 2002. In key European countries, the desirability of
33 "ISAF's Strategic Vision," NATO Summit, Bucharest, April 3, 2008, 1.
34 Morelli and Belkin, 4

35 Ibid., 5.
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U.S. leadership in the world,... fell from 64% in 2002 to 36% in June 2008."36 Part of
this decline in support and want of the US leadership comes from the public's confusion

of war in Afghanistan with the war in Iraq. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates expressed
his concern with this particular political confusion in February 2008: "I worry that for

many Europeans the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan are confused.... Many of them ...
have a problem with our involvement in Iraq and project that to Afghanistan."
The Obama Administration attempted to address this growing European
dissatisfaction. In the process of complete review of the US and NATO strategy in

Afghanistan, the President solicited the Allies' input. "This outreach was evident in an
early March 2009 meeting of the NATO Foreign Ministers by Secretary of State Clinton
and a meeting a week later with the North Atlantic Council by Vice President Biden. In
both cases, Europe's ideas for new strategies to deal with Afghanistan were solicited."
Given this dual set ofproblems with NATO's actions in Afghanistan, namely the

lack ofpolitical will and economic resources to continue the war and the increasing
dissatisfaction with the US leadership, NATO is struggling to find a workable bargain
between collective security and collective defense. And again, as in the past, those two
narratives are susceptible to the changes in the structure of the international environment.

The symptom of this inability of the Allies to adapt to the international environment can
be found in the disagreements on what constitutes threat and security. While Washington
perceives the lack of security and stability in Afghanistan as a vital threat to European
and American security, the European capitals do not see the same danger in Kabul,
36 "Transatlantic Trends," The German Marshall Fund, September 2008.

37 "Gates Asks Europeans to Face Afghan Threat," International Herald Tribune, 9 October, 2008,
3.

38 Morelli and Belkin, 5.

spreading to Pakistan and Iran. Furthermore, the Allies disagree on what it means for the
Alliance to be effective in handling those threats.

The distribution of power in the Alliance—the domination of the US in terms of
military power and decision-making, has not changed. The US, in concert with its past
history, is the hegemon who structurally wants to maintain its dominant power and is
fearful of the competition. However, what has changed is the willingness of the
Europeans to be satisfied with the role of a consultant, rather than an equal partner in the
decision making, especially when the definition of threat remains so nebulous.
Does this mean that NATO has run out of the yellow brick road ofthe dual
narrative of collective security and collective defense? Not necessarily. The failure of
NATO's cohesion in terms ofpolicy, and military and economic commitments, in
Afghanistan does not carry a clean dichotomous effect: 1. ifNATO fails in Afghanistan,
it fails as a valid and effective Alliance in the future, or 2. ifNATO wins in Afghanistan,

its validity and effectiveness as an Alliance are confirmed.
In the past, NATO went through series ofperiods of discord, for example
regarding the nuclear policy or conventional capabilities. IfNATO does not accomplish
all its goals in Afghanistan or the Allies are unable to generate cohesive policies
39 In 1988, Charles Kupchan proposed four hypotheses for inrra-alliance behavior in regards to
NATO's engagement in the Persian Gulf. First, the External Threat hypothesis suggests that alliance
cohesion rises and falls with external threats to collective security. This holds today: with the lack of

tangible and defined threat, the Alliance's cohesion is declining. Second, the Alliance Security Dilemma
hypothesis proposes that cohesion is a function of the coercive potential of the alliance leader and its ability
to exact cooperative behavior from its weaker partners. This hypothesis holds true today again. While the
US is still dominant, its power relative to the European members is declining, and with that the US ability

to dictate policy for the Alliance as whole weakens. Third, the Collective Action hypothesis suggests that

alliance behavior is fundamentally a public goods problem. Today, this is very evident in the fact that both
sides of the Atlantic want to accomplish goals without paying the costs. Fourth, the Domestic Politics

hypothesis asserts that alliance behavior is determined primarily by political and economic factors at the
domestic level. This is reflected in the fact that the decrease in the popular support for the war in

Afghanistan is reflected in the inability to make commitments by the North Atlantic Council, regarding
means and goals of the Alliance. See: Charles Kupchan, "NATO and the Persian Gulf: Examining IntraAlliance Behavior," International Organization 42, no. 2 (1988): 317-346.
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regarding Afghanistan, this might force the Alliance to define more clearly the future role

and scope ofNATO.40 The Alliance might possibly limit its area of operations to Europe
only, while continuing its comprehensive approach strategy in cooperation with other
international organizations. This comprehensive approach was first used in Afghanistan
out of necessity, but has recently been emphasized by the Group of Experts that proposed
the recommendations for the new strategic concept for the Alliance, along with
underscoring the need for partnership with intergovernmental and non-governmental
organizations, as well as engaging Russia.
While the Atlantic is getting wider, not narrower, with the disagreements and
unwillingness to carry the burden of unclear security growing, neither side can afford to
dismantle the Alliance. The Transatlantic community is still a community of shared

political and cultural values; it is still a community that faces a plethora of similar
problems and challenges; it is a community that remains stronger together than separate.
The Europeans still need the US military and economic power, while the US still needs
the European political support in the international environment. The question, then, is:
how much further is NATO able and willing to extend its collective security and
collective defense, both politically and geographically? That question will be answered
not only by the success ofNATO in Afghanistan, but also by the economic wellbeing of
both Europe and the US in the near future.

40 See: Mark Webber, "NATO: The United States, Transformation and the War in Afghanistan,"
British Journal ofPolitics andInternational Relations 11, no. 1 (2009): 46-63.

41 NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement. Analysis and Recommendations ofthe

Group ofExperts on a New Strategic Conceptfor NATO.
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